https://github.com/coreos/etcd
Tip revision: d57e8b8d97adfc4a6c224fe116714bf1a1f3beb9 authored by Gyuho Lee on 07 February 2019, 18:41:58 UTC
version: 3.3.12
version: 3.3.12
Tip revision: d57e8b8
store.go
// Copyright 2016 The etcd Authors
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
package auth
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"sort"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"github.com/coreos/etcd/auth/authpb"
pb "github.com/coreos/etcd/etcdserver/etcdserverpb"
"github.com/coreos/etcd/mvcc/backend"
"github.com/coreos/pkg/capnslog"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
)
var (
enableFlagKey = []byte("authEnabled")
authEnabled = []byte{1}
authDisabled = []byte{0}
revisionKey = []byte("authRevision")
authBucketName = []byte("auth")
authUsersBucketName = []byte("authUsers")
authRolesBucketName = []byte("authRoles")
plog = capnslog.NewPackageLogger("github.com/coreos/etcd", "auth")
ErrRootUserNotExist = errors.New("auth: root user does not exist")
ErrRootRoleNotExist = errors.New("auth: root user does not have root role")
ErrUserAlreadyExist = errors.New("auth: user already exists")
ErrUserEmpty = errors.New("auth: user name is empty")
ErrUserNotFound = errors.New("auth: user not found")
ErrRoleAlreadyExist = errors.New("auth: role already exists")
ErrRoleNotFound = errors.New("auth: role not found")
ErrAuthFailed = errors.New("auth: authentication failed, invalid user ID or password")
ErrPermissionDenied = errors.New("auth: permission denied")
ErrRoleNotGranted = errors.New("auth: role is not granted to the user")
ErrPermissionNotGranted = errors.New("auth: permission is not granted to the role")
ErrAuthNotEnabled = errors.New("auth: authentication is not enabled")
ErrAuthOldRevision = errors.New("auth: revision in header is old")
ErrInvalidAuthToken = errors.New("auth: invalid auth token")
ErrInvalidAuthOpts = errors.New("auth: invalid auth options")
ErrInvalidAuthMgmt = errors.New("auth: invalid auth management")
// BcryptCost is the algorithm cost / strength for hashing auth passwords
BcryptCost = bcrypt.DefaultCost
)
const (
rootUser = "root"
rootRole = "root"
tokenTypeSimple = "simple"
tokenTypeJWT = "jwt"
revBytesLen = 8
)
type AuthInfo struct {
Username string
Revision uint64
}
// AuthenticateParamIndex is used for a key of context in the parameters of Authenticate()
type AuthenticateParamIndex struct{}
// AuthenticateParamSimpleTokenPrefix is used for a key of context in the parameters of Authenticate()
type AuthenticateParamSimpleTokenPrefix struct{}
type AuthStore interface {
// AuthEnable turns on the authentication feature
AuthEnable() error
// AuthDisable turns off the authentication feature
AuthDisable()
// Authenticate does authentication based on given user name and password
Authenticate(ctx context.Context, username, password string) (*pb.AuthenticateResponse, error)
// Recover recovers the state of auth store from the given backend
Recover(b backend.Backend)
// UserAdd adds a new user
UserAdd(r *pb.AuthUserAddRequest) (*pb.AuthUserAddResponse, error)
// UserDelete deletes a user
UserDelete(r *pb.AuthUserDeleteRequest) (*pb.AuthUserDeleteResponse, error)
// UserChangePassword changes a password of a user
UserChangePassword(r *pb.AuthUserChangePasswordRequest) (*pb.AuthUserChangePasswordResponse, error)
// UserGrantRole grants a role to the user
UserGrantRole(r *pb.AuthUserGrantRoleRequest) (*pb.AuthUserGrantRoleResponse, error)
// UserGet gets the detailed information of a users
UserGet(r *pb.AuthUserGetRequest) (*pb.AuthUserGetResponse, error)
// UserRevokeRole revokes a role of a user
UserRevokeRole(r *pb.AuthUserRevokeRoleRequest) (*pb.AuthUserRevokeRoleResponse, error)
// RoleAdd adds a new role
RoleAdd(r *pb.AuthRoleAddRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleAddResponse, error)
// RoleGrantPermission grants a permission to a role
RoleGrantPermission(r *pb.AuthRoleGrantPermissionRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleGrantPermissionResponse, error)
// RoleGet gets the detailed information of a role
RoleGet(r *pb.AuthRoleGetRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleGetResponse, error)
// RoleRevokePermission gets the detailed information of a role
RoleRevokePermission(r *pb.AuthRoleRevokePermissionRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleRevokePermissionResponse, error)
// RoleDelete gets the detailed information of a role
RoleDelete(r *pb.AuthRoleDeleteRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleDeleteResponse, error)
// UserList gets a list of all users
UserList(r *pb.AuthUserListRequest) (*pb.AuthUserListResponse, error)
// RoleList gets a list of all roles
RoleList(r *pb.AuthRoleListRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleListResponse, error)
// IsPutPermitted checks put permission of the user
IsPutPermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo, key []byte) error
// IsRangePermitted checks range permission of the user
IsRangePermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo, key, rangeEnd []byte) error
// IsDeleteRangePermitted checks delete-range permission of the user
IsDeleteRangePermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo, key, rangeEnd []byte) error
// IsAdminPermitted checks admin permission of the user
IsAdminPermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo) error
// GenTokenPrefix produces a random string in a case of simple token
// in a case of JWT, it produces an empty string
GenTokenPrefix() (string, error)
// Revision gets current revision of authStore
Revision() uint64
// CheckPassword checks a given pair of username and password is correct
CheckPassword(username, password string) (uint64, error)
// Close does cleanup of AuthStore
Close() error
// AuthInfoFromCtx gets AuthInfo from gRPC's context
AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx context.Context) (*AuthInfo, error)
// AuthInfoFromTLS gets AuthInfo from TLS info of gRPC's context
AuthInfoFromTLS(ctx context.Context) *AuthInfo
// WithRoot generates and installs a token that can be used as a root credential
WithRoot(ctx context.Context) context.Context
// HasRole checks that user has role
HasRole(user, role string) bool
}
type TokenProvider interface {
info(ctx context.Context, token string, revision uint64) (*AuthInfo, bool)
assign(ctx context.Context, username string, revision uint64) (string, error)
enable()
disable()
invalidateUser(string)
genTokenPrefix() (string, error)
}
type authStore struct {
// atomic operations; need 64-bit align, or 32-bit tests will crash
revision uint64
be backend.Backend
enabled bool
enabledMu sync.RWMutex
rangePermCache map[string]*unifiedRangePermissions // username -> unifiedRangePermissions
tokenProvider TokenProvider
}
func (as *authStore) AuthEnable() error {
as.enabledMu.Lock()
defer as.enabledMu.Unlock()
if as.enabled {
plog.Noticef("Authentication already enabled")
return nil
}
b := as.be
tx := b.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
defer func() {
tx.Unlock()
b.ForceCommit()
}()
u := getUser(tx, rootUser)
if u == nil {
return ErrRootUserNotExist
}
if !hasRootRole(u) {
return ErrRootRoleNotExist
}
tx.UnsafePut(authBucketName, enableFlagKey, authEnabled)
as.enabled = true
as.tokenProvider.enable()
as.rangePermCache = make(map[string]*unifiedRangePermissions)
as.setRevision(getRevision(tx))
plog.Noticef("Authentication enabled")
return nil
}
func (as *authStore) AuthDisable() {
as.enabledMu.Lock()
defer as.enabledMu.Unlock()
if !as.enabled {
return
}
b := as.be
tx := b.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
tx.UnsafePut(authBucketName, enableFlagKey, authDisabled)
as.commitRevision(tx)
tx.Unlock()
b.ForceCommit()
as.enabled = false
as.tokenProvider.disable()
plog.Noticef("Authentication disabled")
}
func (as *authStore) Close() error {
as.enabledMu.Lock()
defer as.enabledMu.Unlock()
if !as.enabled {
return nil
}
as.tokenProvider.disable()
return nil
}
func (as *authStore) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, username, password string) (*pb.AuthenticateResponse, error) {
if !as.isAuthEnabled() {
return nil, ErrAuthNotEnabled
}
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
defer tx.Unlock()
user := getUser(tx, username)
if user == nil {
return nil, ErrAuthFailed
}
// Password checking is already performed in the API layer, so we don't need to check for now.
// Staleness of password can be detected with OCC in the API layer, too.
token, err := as.tokenProvider.assign(ctx, username, as.Revision())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
plog.Debugf("authorized %s, token is %s", username, token)
return &pb.AuthenticateResponse{Token: token}, nil
}
func (as *authStore) CheckPassword(username, password string) (uint64, error) {
if !as.isAuthEnabled() {
return 0, ErrAuthNotEnabled
}
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
defer tx.Unlock()
user := getUser(tx, username)
if user == nil {
return 0, ErrAuthFailed
}
if bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword(user.Password, []byte(password)) != nil {
plog.Noticef("authentication failed, invalid password for user %s", username)
return 0, ErrAuthFailed
}
return getRevision(tx), nil
}
func (as *authStore) Recover(be backend.Backend) {
enabled := false
as.be = be
tx := be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
_, vs := tx.UnsafeRange(authBucketName, enableFlagKey, nil, 0)
if len(vs) == 1 {
if bytes.Equal(vs[0], authEnabled) {
enabled = true
}
}
as.setRevision(getRevision(tx))
tx.Unlock()
as.enabledMu.Lock()
as.enabled = enabled
as.enabledMu.Unlock()
}
func (as *authStore) UserAdd(r *pb.AuthUserAddRequest) (*pb.AuthUserAddResponse, error) {
if len(r.Name) == 0 {
return nil, ErrUserEmpty
}
hashed, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(r.Password), BcryptCost)
if err != nil {
plog.Errorf("failed to hash password: %s", err)
return nil, err
}
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
defer tx.Unlock()
user := getUser(tx, r.Name)
if user != nil {
return nil, ErrUserAlreadyExist
}
newUser := &authpb.User{
Name: []byte(r.Name),
Password: hashed,
}
putUser(tx, newUser)
as.commitRevision(tx)
plog.Noticef("added a new user: %s", r.Name)
return &pb.AuthUserAddResponse{}, nil
}
func (as *authStore) UserDelete(r *pb.AuthUserDeleteRequest) (*pb.AuthUserDeleteResponse, error) {
if as.enabled && strings.Compare(r.Name, rootUser) == 0 {
plog.Errorf("the user root must not be deleted")
return nil, ErrInvalidAuthMgmt
}
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
defer tx.Unlock()
user := getUser(tx, r.Name)
if user == nil {
return nil, ErrUserNotFound
}
delUser(tx, r.Name)
as.commitRevision(tx)
as.invalidateCachedPerm(r.Name)
as.tokenProvider.invalidateUser(r.Name)
plog.Noticef("deleted a user: %s", r.Name)
return &pb.AuthUserDeleteResponse{}, nil
}
func (as *authStore) UserChangePassword(r *pb.AuthUserChangePasswordRequest) (*pb.AuthUserChangePasswordResponse, error) {
// TODO(mitake): measure the cost of bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword()
// If the cost is too high, we should move the encryption to outside of the raft
hashed, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(r.Password), BcryptCost)
if err != nil {
plog.Errorf("failed to hash password: %s", err)
return nil, err
}
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
defer tx.Unlock()
user := getUser(tx, r.Name)
if user == nil {
return nil, ErrUserNotFound
}
updatedUser := &authpb.User{
Name: []byte(r.Name),
Roles: user.Roles,
Password: hashed,
}
putUser(tx, updatedUser)
as.commitRevision(tx)
as.invalidateCachedPerm(r.Name)
as.tokenProvider.invalidateUser(r.Name)
plog.Noticef("changed a password of a user: %s", r.Name)
return &pb.AuthUserChangePasswordResponse{}, nil
}
func (as *authStore) UserGrantRole(r *pb.AuthUserGrantRoleRequest) (*pb.AuthUserGrantRoleResponse, error) {
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
defer tx.Unlock()
user := getUser(tx, r.User)
if user == nil {
return nil, ErrUserNotFound
}
if r.Role != rootRole {
role := getRole(tx, r.Role)
if role == nil {
return nil, ErrRoleNotFound
}
}
idx := sort.SearchStrings(user.Roles, r.Role)
if idx < len(user.Roles) && strings.Compare(user.Roles[idx], r.Role) == 0 {
plog.Warningf("user %s is already granted role %s", r.User, r.Role)
return &pb.AuthUserGrantRoleResponse{}, nil
}
user.Roles = append(user.Roles, r.Role)
sort.Strings(user.Roles)
putUser(tx, user)
as.invalidateCachedPerm(r.User)
as.commitRevision(tx)
plog.Noticef("granted role %s to user %s", r.Role, r.User)
return &pb.AuthUserGrantRoleResponse{}, nil
}
func (as *authStore) UserGet(r *pb.AuthUserGetRequest) (*pb.AuthUserGetResponse, error) {
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
user := getUser(tx, r.Name)
tx.Unlock()
if user == nil {
return nil, ErrUserNotFound
}
var resp pb.AuthUserGetResponse
resp.Roles = append(resp.Roles, user.Roles...)
return &resp, nil
}
func (as *authStore) UserList(r *pb.AuthUserListRequest) (*pb.AuthUserListResponse, error) {
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
users := getAllUsers(tx)
tx.Unlock()
resp := &pb.AuthUserListResponse{Users: make([]string, len(users))}
for i := range users {
resp.Users[i] = string(users[i].Name)
}
return resp, nil
}
func (as *authStore) UserRevokeRole(r *pb.AuthUserRevokeRoleRequest) (*pb.AuthUserRevokeRoleResponse, error) {
if as.enabled && strings.Compare(r.Name, rootUser) == 0 && strings.Compare(r.Role, rootRole) == 0 {
plog.Errorf("the role root must not be revoked from the user root")
return nil, ErrInvalidAuthMgmt
}
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
defer tx.Unlock()
user := getUser(tx, r.Name)
if user == nil {
return nil, ErrUserNotFound
}
updatedUser := &authpb.User{
Name: user.Name,
Password: user.Password,
}
for _, role := range user.Roles {
if strings.Compare(role, r.Role) != 0 {
updatedUser.Roles = append(updatedUser.Roles, role)
}
}
if len(updatedUser.Roles) == len(user.Roles) {
return nil, ErrRoleNotGranted
}
putUser(tx, updatedUser)
as.invalidateCachedPerm(r.Name)
as.commitRevision(tx)
plog.Noticef("revoked role %s from user %s", r.Role, r.Name)
return &pb.AuthUserRevokeRoleResponse{}, nil
}
func (as *authStore) RoleGet(r *pb.AuthRoleGetRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleGetResponse, error) {
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
defer tx.Unlock()
var resp pb.AuthRoleGetResponse
role := getRole(tx, r.Role)
if role == nil {
return nil, ErrRoleNotFound
}
resp.Perm = append(resp.Perm, role.KeyPermission...)
return &resp, nil
}
func (as *authStore) RoleList(r *pb.AuthRoleListRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleListResponse, error) {
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
roles := getAllRoles(tx)
tx.Unlock()
resp := &pb.AuthRoleListResponse{Roles: make([]string, len(roles))}
for i := range roles {
resp.Roles[i] = string(roles[i].Name)
}
return resp, nil
}
func (as *authStore) RoleRevokePermission(r *pb.AuthRoleRevokePermissionRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleRevokePermissionResponse, error) {
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
defer tx.Unlock()
role := getRole(tx, r.Role)
if role == nil {
return nil, ErrRoleNotFound
}
updatedRole := &authpb.Role{
Name: role.Name,
}
for _, perm := range role.KeyPermission {
if !bytes.Equal(perm.Key, []byte(r.Key)) || !bytes.Equal(perm.RangeEnd, []byte(r.RangeEnd)) {
updatedRole.KeyPermission = append(updatedRole.KeyPermission, perm)
}
}
if len(role.KeyPermission) == len(updatedRole.KeyPermission) {
return nil, ErrPermissionNotGranted
}
putRole(tx, updatedRole)
// TODO(mitake): currently single role update invalidates every cache
// It should be optimized.
as.clearCachedPerm()
as.commitRevision(tx)
plog.Noticef("revoked key %s from role %s", r.Key, r.Role)
return &pb.AuthRoleRevokePermissionResponse{}, nil
}
func (as *authStore) RoleDelete(r *pb.AuthRoleDeleteRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleDeleteResponse, error) {
if as.enabled && strings.Compare(r.Role, rootRole) == 0 {
plog.Errorf("the role root must not be deleted")
return nil, ErrInvalidAuthMgmt
}
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
defer tx.Unlock()
role := getRole(tx, r.Role)
if role == nil {
return nil, ErrRoleNotFound
}
delRole(tx, r.Role)
users := getAllUsers(tx)
for _, user := range users {
updatedUser := &authpb.User{
Name: user.Name,
Password: user.Password,
}
for _, role := range user.Roles {
if strings.Compare(role, r.Role) != 0 {
updatedUser.Roles = append(updatedUser.Roles, role)
}
}
if len(updatedUser.Roles) == len(user.Roles) {
continue
}
putUser(tx, updatedUser)
as.invalidateCachedPerm(string(user.Name))
}
as.commitRevision(tx)
plog.Noticef("deleted role %s", r.Role)
return &pb.AuthRoleDeleteResponse{}, nil
}
func (as *authStore) RoleAdd(r *pb.AuthRoleAddRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleAddResponse, error) {
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
defer tx.Unlock()
role := getRole(tx, r.Name)
if role != nil {
return nil, ErrRoleAlreadyExist
}
newRole := &authpb.Role{
Name: []byte(r.Name),
}
putRole(tx, newRole)
as.commitRevision(tx)
plog.Noticef("Role %s is created", r.Name)
return &pb.AuthRoleAddResponse{}, nil
}
func (as *authStore) authInfoFromToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*AuthInfo, bool) {
return as.tokenProvider.info(ctx, token, as.Revision())
}
type permSlice []*authpb.Permission
func (perms permSlice) Len() int {
return len(perms)
}
func (perms permSlice) Less(i, j int) bool {
return bytes.Compare(perms[i].Key, perms[j].Key) < 0
}
func (perms permSlice) Swap(i, j int) {
perms[i], perms[j] = perms[j], perms[i]
}
func (as *authStore) RoleGrantPermission(r *pb.AuthRoleGrantPermissionRequest) (*pb.AuthRoleGrantPermissionResponse, error) {
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
defer tx.Unlock()
role := getRole(tx, r.Name)
if role == nil {
return nil, ErrRoleNotFound
}
idx := sort.Search(len(role.KeyPermission), func(i int) bool {
return bytes.Compare(role.KeyPermission[i].Key, []byte(r.Perm.Key)) >= 0
})
if idx < len(role.KeyPermission) && bytes.Equal(role.KeyPermission[idx].Key, r.Perm.Key) && bytes.Equal(role.KeyPermission[idx].RangeEnd, r.Perm.RangeEnd) {
// update existing permission
role.KeyPermission[idx].PermType = r.Perm.PermType
} else {
// append new permission to the role
newPerm := &authpb.Permission{
Key: []byte(r.Perm.Key),
RangeEnd: []byte(r.Perm.RangeEnd),
PermType: r.Perm.PermType,
}
role.KeyPermission = append(role.KeyPermission, newPerm)
sort.Sort(permSlice(role.KeyPermission))
}
putRole(tx, role)
// TODO(mitake): currently single role update invalidates every cache
// It should be optimized.
as.clearCachedPerm()
as.commitRevision(tx)
plog.Noticef("role %s's permission of key %s is updated as %s", r.Name, r.Perm.Key, authpb.Permission_Type_name[int32(r.Perm.PermType)])
return &pb.AuthRoleGrantPermissionResponse{}, nil
}
func (as *authStore) isOpPermitted(userName string, revision uint64, key, rangeEnd []byte, permTyp authpb.Permission_Type) error {
// TODO(mitake): this function would be costly so we need a caching mechanism
if !as.isAuthEnabled() {
return nil
}
// only gets rev == 0 when passed AuthInfo{}; no user given
if revision == 0 {
return ErrUserEmpty
}
if revision < as.Revision() {
return ErrAuthOldRevision
}
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
defer tx.Unlock()
user := getUser(tx, userName)
if user == nil {
plog.Errorf("invalid user name %s for permission checking", userName)
return ErrPermissionDenied
}
// root role should have permission on all ranges
if hasRootRole(user) {
return nil
}
if as.isRangeOpPermitted(tx, userName, key, rangeEnd, permTyp) {
return nil
}
return ErrPermissionDenied
}
func (as *authStore) IsPutPermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo, key []byte) error {
return as.isOpPermitted(authInfo.Username, authInfo.Revision, key, nil, authpb.WRITE)
}
func (as *authStore) IsRangePermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo, key, rangeEnd []byte) error {
return as.isOpPermitted(authInfo.Username, authInfo.Revision, key, rangeEnd, authpb.READ)
}
func (as *authStore) IsDeleteRangePermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo, key, rangeEnd []byte) error {
return as.isOpPermitted(authInfo.Username, authInfo.Revision, key, rangeEnd, authpb.WRITE)
}
func (as *authStore) IsAdminPermitted(authInfo *AuthInfo) error {
if !as.isAuthEnabled() {
return nil
}
if authInfo == nil {
return ErrUserEmpty
}
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
u := getUser(tx, authInfo.Username)
tx.Unlock()
if u == nil {
return ErrUserNotFound
}
if !hasRootRole(u) {
return ErrPermissionDenied
}
return nil
}
func getUser(tx backend.BatchTx, username string) *authpb.User {
_, vs := tx.UnsafeRange(authUsersBucketName, []byte(username), nil, 0)
if len(vs) == 0 {
return nil
}
user := &authpb.User{}
err := user.Unmarshal(vs[0])
if err != nil {
plog.Panicf("failed to unmarshal user struct (name: %s): %s", username, err)
}
return user
}
func getAllUsers(tx backend.BatchTx) []*authpb.User {
_, vs := tx.UnsafeRange(authUsersBucketName, []byte{0}, []byte{0xff}, -1)
if len(vs) == 0 {
return nil
}
users := make([]*authpb.User, len(vs))
for i := range vs {
user := &authpb.User{}
err := user.Unmarshal(vs[i])
if err != nil {
plog.Panicf("failed to unmarshal user struct: %s", err)
}
users[i] = user
}
return users
}
func putUser(tx backend.BatchTx, user *authpb.User) {
b, err := user.Marshal()
if err != nil {
plog.Panicf("failed to marshal user struct (name: %s): %s", user.Name, err)
}
tx.UnsafePut(authUsersBucketName, user.Name, b)
}
func delUser(tx backend.BatchTx, username string) {
tx.UnsafeDelete(authUsersBucketName, []byte(username))
}
func getRole(tx backend.BatchTx, rolename string) *authpb.Role {
_, vs := tx.UnsafeRange(authRolesBucketName, []byte(rolename), nil, 0)
if len(vs) == 0 {
return nil
}
role := &authpb.Role{}
err := role.Unmarshal(vs[0])
if err != nil {
plog.Panicf("failed to unmarshal role struct (name: %s): %s", rolename, err)
}
return role
}
func getAllRoles(tx backend.BatchTx) []*authpb.Role {
_, vs := tx.UnsafeRange(authRolesBucketName, []byte{0}, []byte{0xff}, -1)
if len(vs) == 0 {
return nil
}
roles := make([]*authpb.Role, len(vs))
for i := range vs {
role := &authpb.Role{}
err := role.Unmarshal(vs[i])
if err != nil {
plog.Panicf("failed to unmarshal role struct: %s", err)
}
roles[i] = role
}
return roles
}
func putRole(tx backend.BatchTx, role *authpb.Role) {
b, err := role.Marshal()
if err != nil {
plog.Panicf("failed to marshal role struct (name: %s): %s", role.Name, err)
}
tx.UnsafePut(authRolesBucketName, []byte(role.Name), b)
}
func delRole(tx backend.BatchTx, rolename string) {
tx.UnsafeDelete(authRolesBucketName, []byte(rolename))
}
func (as *authStore) isAuthEnabled() bool {
as.enabledMu.RLock()
defer as.enabledMu.RUnlock()
return as.enabled
}
func NewAuthStore(be backend.Backend, tp TokenProvider) *authStore {
tx := be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
tx.UnsafeCreateBucket(authBucketName)
tx.UnsafeCreateBucket(authUsersBucketName)
tx.UnsafeCreateBucket(authRolesBucketName)
enabled := false
_, vs := tx.UnsafeRange(authBucketName, enableFlagKey, nil, 0)
if len(vs) == 1 {
if bytes.Equal(vs[0], authEnabled) {
enabled = true
}
}
as := &authStore{
be: be,
revision: getRevision(tx),
enabled: enabled,
rangePermCache: make(map[string]*unifiedRangePermissions),
tokenProvider: tp,
}
if enabled {
as.tokenProvider.enable()
}
if as.Revision() == 0 {
as.commitRevision(tx)
}
tx.Unlock()
be.ForceCommit()
return as
}
func hasRootRole(u *authpb.User) bool {
// u.Roles is sorted in UserGrantRole(), so we can use binary search.
idx := sort.SearchStrings(u.Roles, rootRole)
return idx != len(u.Roles) && u.Roles[idx] == rootRole
}
func (as *authStore) commitRevision(tx backend.BatchTx) {
atomic.AddUint64(&as.revision, 1)
revBytes := make([]byte, revBytesLen)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(revBytes, as.Revision())
tx.UnsafePut(authBucketName, revisionKey, revBytes)
}
func getRevision(tx backend.BatchTx) uint64 {
_, vs := tx.UnsafeRange(authBucketName, []byte(revisionKey), nil, 0)
if len(vs) != 1 {
// this can happen in the initialization phase
return 0
}
return binary.BigEndian.Uint64(vs[0])
}
func (as *authStore) setRevision(rev uint64) {
atomic.StoreUint64(&as.revision, rev)
}
func (as *authStore) Revision() uint64 {
return atomic.LoadUint64(&as.revision)
}
func (as *authStore) AuthInfoFromTLS(ctx context.Context) *AuthInfo {
peer, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok || peer == nil || peer.AuthInfo == nil {
return nil
}
tlsInfo := peer.AuthInfo.(credentials.TLSInfo)
for _, chains := range tlsInfo.State.VerifiedChains {
for _, chain := range chains {
cn := chain.Subject.CommonName
plog.Debugf("found common name %s", cn)
ai := &AuthInfo{
Username: cn,
Revision: as.Revision(),
}
md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return nil
}
// gRPC-gateway proxy request to etcd server includes Grpcgateway-Accept
// header. The proxy uses etcd client server certificate. If the certificate
// has a CommonName we should never use this for authentication.
if gw := md["grpcgateway-accept"]; len(gw) > 0 {
plog.Warningf("ignoring common name in gRPC-gateway proxy request %s", ai.Username)
return nil
}
return ai
}
}
return nil
}
func (as *authStore) AuthInfoFromCtx(ctx context.Context) (*AuthInfo, error) {
md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return nil, nil
}
//TODO(mitake|hexfusion) review unifying key names
ts, ok := md["token"]
if !ok {
ts, ok = md["authorization"]
}
if !ok {
return nil, nil
}
token := ts[0]
authInfo, uok := as.authInfoFromToken(ctx, token)
if !uok {
plog.Warningf("invalid auth token: %s", token)
return nil, ErrInvalidAuthToken
}
return authInfo, nil
}
func (as *authStore) GenTokenPrefix() (string, error) {
return as.tokenProvider.genTokenPrefix()
}
func decomposeOpts(optstr string) (string, map[string]string, error) {
opts := strings.Split(optstr, ",")
tokenType := opts[0]
typeSpecificOpts := make(map[string]string)
for i := 1; i < len(opts); i++ {
pair := strings.Split(opts[i], "=")
if len(pair) != 2 {
plog.Errorf("invalid token specific option: %s", optstr)
return "", nil, ErrInvalidAuthOpts
}
if _, ok := typeSpecificOpts[pair[0]]; ok {
plog.Errorf("invalid token specific option, duplicated parameters (%s): %s", pair[0], optstr)
return "", nil, ErrInvalidAuthOpts
}
typeSpecificOpts[pair[0]] = pair[1]
}
return tokenType, typeSpecificOpts, nil
}
func NewTokenProvider(tokenOpts string, indexWaiter func(uint64) <-chan struct{}) (TokenProvider, error) {
tokenType, typeSpecificOpts, err := decomposeOpts(tokenOpts)
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrInvalidAuthOpts
}
switch tokenType {
case tokenTypeSimple:
plog.Warningf("simple token is not cryptographically signed")
return newTokenProviderSimple(indexWaiter), nil
case tokenTypeJWT:
return newTokenProviderJWT(typeSpecificOpts)
case "":
return newTokenProviderNop()
default:
plog.Errorf("unknown token type: %s", tokenType)
return nil, ErrInvalidAuthOpts
}
}
func (as *authStore) WithRoot(ctx context.Context) context.Context {
if !as.isAuthEnabled() {
return ctx
}
var ctxForAssign context.Context
if ts, ok := as.tokenProvider.(*tokenSimple); ok && ts != nil {
ctx1 := context.WithValue(ctx, AuthenticateParamIndex{}, uint64(0))
prefix, err := ts.genTokenPrefix()
if err != nil {
plog.Errorf("failed to generate prefix of internally used token")
return ctx
}
ctxForAssign = context.WithValue(ctx1, AuthenticateParamSimpleTokenPrefix{}, prefix)
} else {
ctxForAssign = ctx
}
token, err := as.tokenProvider.assign(ctxForAssign, "root", as.Revision())
if err != nil {
// this must not happen
plog.Errorf("failed to assign token for lease revoking: %s", err)
return ctx
}
mdMap := map[string]string{
"token": token,
}
tokenMD := metadata.New(mdMap)
// use "mdIncomingKey{}" since it's called from local etcdserver
return metadata.NewIncomingContext(ctx, tokenMD)
}
func (as *authStore) HasRole(user, role string) bool {
tx := as.be.BatchTx()
tx.Lock()
u := getUser(tx, user)
tx.Unlock()
if u == nil {
plog.Warningf("tried to check user %s has role %s, but user %s doesn't exist", user, role, user)
return false
}
for _, r := range u.Roles {
if role == r {
return true
}
}
return false
}