https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts
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draft-ietf-quic-tls.md
---
title: Using TLS to Secure QUIC
docname: draft-ietf-quic-tls-latest
date: {DATE}
category: std
ipr: trust200902
area: Transport
workgroup: QUIC
stand_alone: yes
pi: [toc, sortrefs, symrefs, docmapping]
author:
-
ins: M. Thomson
name: Martin Thomson
org: Mozilla
email: mt@lowentropy.net
role: editor
-
ins: S. Turner
name: Sean Turner
org: sn3rd
email: sean@sn3rd.com
role: editor
normative:
QUIC-TRANSPORT:
title: "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport"
date: {DATE}
seriesinfo:
Internet-Draft: draft-ietf-quic-transport-latest
author:
-
ins: J. Iyengar
name: Jana Iyengar
org: Fastly
role: editor
-
ins: M. Thomson
name: Martin Thomson
org: Mozilla
role: editor
QUIC-RECOVERY:
title: "QUIC Loss Detection and Congestion Control"
date: {DATE}
seriesinfo:
Internet-Draft: draft-ietf-quic-recovery-latest
author:
-
ins: J. Iyengar
name: Jana Iyengar
org: Fastly
role: editor
-
ins: I. Swett
name: Ian Swett
org: Google
role: editor
informative:
AEBounds:
title: "Limits on Authenticated Encryption Use in TLS"
author:
- ins: A. Luykx
- ins: K. Paterson
date: 2016-03-08
target: "http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/TLS-AEbounds.pdf"
IMC:
title: "Introduction to Modern Cryptography, Second Edition"
author:
- ins: J. Katz
- ins: Y. Lindell
date: 2014-11-06
seriesinfo:
ISBN: 978-1466570269
QUIC-HTTP:
title: "Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 3 (HTTP/3)"
date: {DATE}
seriesinfo:
Internet-Draft: draft-ietf-quic-http-latest
author:
-
ins: M. Bishop
name: Mike Bishop
org: Akamai Technologies
role: editor
ROBUST:
title: "Robust Channels: Handling Unreliable Networks in the Record Layers of QUIC and DTLS 1.3"
author:
- ins: M. Fischlin
- ins: F. Günther
- ins: C. Janson
date: 2020-05-16
target: "https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/718"
--- abstract
This document describes how Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used to secure
QUIC.
--- note_Note_to_Readers
Discussion of this draft takes place on the QUIC working group mailing list
(quic@ietf.org), which is archived at
[](https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=quic).
Working Group information can be found at [](https://github.com/quicwg); source
code and issues list for this draft can be found at
[](https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/labels/-tls).
--- middle
# Introduction
This document describes how QUIC {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}} is secured using TLS
{{!TLS13=RFC8446}}.
TLS 1.3 provides critical latency improvements for connection establishment over
previous versions. Absent packet loss, most new connections can be established
and secured within a single round trip; on subsequent connections between the
same client and server, the client can often send application data immediately,
that is, using a zero round trip setup.
This document describes how TLS acts as a security component of QUIC.
# Notational Conventions
{::boilerplate bcp14}
This document uses the terminology established in {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}.
For brevity, the acronym TLS is used to refer to TLS 1.3, though a newer version
could be used; see {{tls-version}}.
## TLS Overview
TLS provides two endpoints with a way to establish a means of communication over
an untrusted medium (that is, the Internet) that ensures that messages they
exchange cannot be observed, modified, or forged.
Internally, TLS is a layered protocol, with the structure shown in
{{tls-layers}}.
~~~~
+-------------+------------+--------------+---------+
Handshake | | | Application | |
Layer | Handshake | Alerts | Data | ... |
| | | | |
+-------------+------------+--------------+---------+
Record | |
Layer | Records |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------+
~~~~
{: #tls-layers title="TLS Layers"}
Each Handshake layer message (e.g., Handshake, Alerts, and Application Data) is
carried as a series of typed TLS records by the Record layer. Records are
individually cryptographically protected and then transmitted over a reliable
transport (typically TCP), which provides sequencing and guaranteed delivery.
The TLS authenticated key exchange occurs between two endpoints: client and
server. The client initiates the exchange and the server responds. If the key
exchange completes successfully, both client and server will agree on a secret.
TLS supports both pre-shared key (PSK) and Diffie-Hellman over either finite
fields or elliptic curves ((EC)DHE) key exchanges. PSK is the basis for Early
Data (0-RTT); the latter provides perfect forward secrecy (PFS) when the (EC)DHE
keys are destroyed.
After completing the TLS handshake, the client will have learned and
authenticated an identity for the server and the server is optionally able to
learn and authenticate an identity for the client. TLS supports X.509
{{?RFC5280}} certificate-based authentication for both server and client.
The TLS key exchange is resistant to tampering by attackers and it produces
shared secrets that cannot be controlled by either participating peer.
TLS provides two basic handshake modes of interest to QUIC:
* A full 1-RTT handshake, in which the client is able to send Application Data
after one round trip and the server immediately responds after receiving the
first handshake message from the client.
* A 0-RTT handshake, in which the client uses information it has previously
learned about the server to send Application Data immediately. This
Application Data can be replayed by an attacker so it MUST NOT carry a
self-contained trigger for any non-idempotent action.
A simplified TLS handshake with 0-RTT application data is shown in {{tls-full}}.
~~~
Client Server
ClientHello
(0-RTT Application Data) -------->
ServerHello
{EncryptedExtensions}
{Finished}
<-------- [Application Data]
{Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
() Indicates messages protected by Early Data (0-RTT) Keys
{} Indicates messages protected using Handshake Keys
[] Indicates messages protected using Application Data
(1-RTT) Keys
~~~
{: #tls-full title="TLS Handshake with 0-RTT"}
{{tls-full}} omits the EndOfEarlyData message, which is not used in QUIC; see
{{remove-eoed}}. Likewise, neither ChangeCipherSpec nor KeyUpdate messages are
used by QUIC. ChangeCipherSpec is redundant in TLS 1.3; see {{compat-mode}}.
QUIC has its own key update mechanism; see {{key-update}}.
Data is protected using a number of encryption levels:
- Initial Keys
- Early Data (0-RTT) Keys
- Handshake Keys
- Application Data (1-RTT) Keys
Application Data may appear only in the Early Data and Application Data
levels. Handshake and Alert messages may appear in any level.
The 0-RTT handshake is only possible if the client and server have previously
communicated. In the 1-RTT handshake, the client is unable to send protected
Application Data until it has received all of the Handshake messages sent by the
server.
# Protocol Overview
QUIC {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}} assumes responsibility for the confidentiality and
integrity protection of packets. For this it uses keys derived from a TLS
handshake {{!TLS13}}, but instead of carrying TLS records over QUIC (as with
TCP), TLS Handshake and Alert messages are carried directly over the QUIC
transport, which takes over the responsibilities of the TLS record layer, as
shown in {{quic-layers}}.
~~~~
+--------------+--------------+ +-------------+
| TLS | TLS | | QUIC |
| Handshake | Alerts | | Applications|
| | | | (h3, etc.) |
+--------------+--------------+-+-------------+
| |
| QUIC Transport |
| (streams, reliability, congestion, etc.) |
| |
+---------------------------------------------+
| |
| QUIC Packet Protection |
| |
+---------------------------------------------+
~~~~
{: #quic-layers title="QUIC Layers"}
QUIC also relies on TLS for authentication and negotiation of parameters that
are critical to security and performance.
Rather than a strict layering, these two protocols cooperate: QUIC uses the TLS
handshake; TLS uses the reliability, ordered delivery, and record layer provided
by QUIC.
At a high level, there are two main interactions between the TLS and QUIC
components:
* The TLS component sends and receives messages via the QUIC component, with
QUIC providing a reliable stream abstraction to TLS.
* The TLS component provides a series of updates to the QUIC component,
including (a) new packet protection keys to install (b) state changes such as
handshake completion, the server certificate, etc.
{{schematic}} shows these interactions in more detail, with the QUIC packet
protection being called out specially.
~~~
+------------+ +------------+
| |<---- Handshake Messages ----->| |
| |<- Validate 0-RTT parameters ->| |
| |<--------- 0-RTT Keys ---------| |
| QUIC |<------- Handshake Keys -------| TLS |
| |<--------- 1-RTT Keys ---------| |
| |<------- Handshake Done -------| |
+------------+ +------------+
| ^
| Protect | Protected
v | Packet
+------------+
| QUIC |
| Packet |
| Protection |
+------------+
~~~
{: #schematic title="QUIC and TLS Interactions"}
Unlike TLS over TCP, QUIC applications that want to send data do not send it
through TLS "application_data" records. Rather, they send it as QUIC STREAM
frames or other frame types, which are then carried in QUIC packets.
# Carrying TLS Messages {#carrying-tls}
QUIC carries TLS handshake data in CRYPTO frames, each of which consists of a
contiguous block of handshake data identified by an offset and length. Those
frames are packaged into QUIC packets and encrypted under the current TLS
encryption level. As with TLS over TCP, once TLS handshake data has been
delivered to QUIC, it is QUIC's responsibility to deliver it reliably. Each
chunk of data that is produced by TLS is associated with the set of keys that
TLS is currently using. If QUIC needs to retransmit that data, it MUST use the
same keys even if TLS has already updated to newer keys.
One important difference between TLS records (used with TCP) and QUIC CRYPTO
frames is that in QUIC multiple frames may appear in the same QUIC packet as
long as they are associated with the same packet number space. For instance,
an endpoint can bundle a Handshake message and an ACK for some Handshake data
into the same packet. Some frames are prohibited in different packet number
spaces; see Section 12.5 of {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}.
Because packets could be reordered on the wire, QUIC uses the packet type to
indicate which keys were used to protect a given packet, as shown in
{{packet-types-keys}}. When packets of different types need to be sent,
endpoints SHOULD use coalesced packets to send them in the same UDP datagram.
| Packet Type | Encryption Keys | PN Space |
|:--------------------|:----------------|:-----------------|
| Initial | Initial secrets | Initial |
| 0-RTT Protected | 0-RTT | Application data |
| Handshake | Handshake | Handshake |
| Retry | Retry | N/A |
| Version Negotiation | N/A | N/A |
| Short Header | 1-RTT | Application data |
{: #packet-types-keys title="Encryption Keys by Packet Type"}
Section 17 of {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}} shows how packets at the various encryption
levels fit into the handshake process.
## Interface to TLS
As shown in {{schematic}}, the interface from QUIC to TLS consists of four
primary functions:
- Sending and receiving handshake messages
- Processing stored transport and application state from a resumed session
and determining if it is valid to accept early data
- Rekeying (both transmit and receive)
- Handshake state updates
Additional functions might be needed to configure TLS.
### Handshake Complete {#handshake-complete}
In this document, the TLS handshake is considered complete when the TLS stack
has reported that the handshake is complete. This happens when the TLS stack
has both sent a Finished message and verified the peer's Finished message.
Verifying the peer's Finished provides the endpoints with an assurance that
previous handshake messages have not been modified. Note that the handshake
does not complete at both endpoints simultaneously. Consequently, any
requirement that is based on the completion of the handshake depends on the
perspective of the endpoint in question.
### Handshake Confirmed {#handshake-confirmed}
In this document, the TLS handshake is considered confirmed at the server when
the handshake completes. At the client, the handshake is considered confirmed
when a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame is received.
A client MAY consider the handshake to be confirmed when it receives an
acknowledgement for a 1-RTT packet. This can be implemented by recording the
lowest packet number sent with 1-RTT keys, and comparing it to the Largest
Acknowledged field in any received 1-RTT ACK frame: once the latter is greater
than or equal to the former, the handshake is confirmed.
### Sending and Receiving Handshake Messages
In order to drive the handshake, TLS depends on being able to send and receive
handshake messages. There are two basic functions on this interface: one where
QUIC requests handshake messages and one where QUIC provides bytes that comprise
handshake messages.
Before starting the handshake QUIC provides TLS with the transport parameters
(see {{quic_parameters}}) that it wishes to carry.
A QUIC client starts TLS by requesting TLS handshake bytes from TLS. The client
acquires handshake bytes before sending its first packet. A QUIC server starts
the process by providing TLS with the client's handshake bytes.
At any time, the TLS stack at an endpoint will have a current sending
encryption level and receiving encryption level. Encryption levels determine
the packet type and keys that are used for protecting data.
Each encryption level is associated with a different sequence of bytes, which is
reliably transmitted to the peer in CRYPTO frames. When TLS provides handshake
bytes to be sent, they are appended to the handshake bytes for the current
encryption level. The encryption level then determines the type of packet that
the resulting CRYPTO frame is carried in; see {{packet-types-keys}}.
Four encryption levels are used, producing keys for Initial, 0-RTT, Handshake,
and 1-RTT packets. CRYPTO frames are carried in just three of these levels,
omitting the 0-RTT level. These four levels correspond to three packet number
spaces: Initial and Handshake encrypted packets use their own separate spaces;
0-RTT and 1-RTT packets use the application data packet number space.
QUIC takes the unprotected content of TLS handshake records as the content of
CRYPTO frames. TLS record protection is not used by QUIC. QUIC assembles
CRYPTO frames into QUIC packets, which are protected using QUIC packet
protection.
QUIC is only capable of conveying TLS handshake records in CRYPTO frames. TLS
alerts are turned into QUIC CONNECTION_CLOSE error codes; see {{tls-errors}}.
TLS application data and other message types cannot be carried by QUIC at any
encryption level; it is an error if they are received from the TLS stack.
When an endpoint receives a QUIC packet containing a CRYPTO frame from the
network, it proceeds as follows:
- If the packet uses the current TLS receiving encryption level, sequence the
data into the input flow as usual. As with STREAM frames, the offset is used
to find the proper location in the data sequence. If the result of this
process is that new data is available, then it is delivered to TLS in order.
- If the packet is from a previously installed encryption level, it MUST NOT
contain data that extends past the end of previously received data in that
flow. Implementations MUST treat any violations of this requirement as a
connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
- If the packet is from a new encryption level, it is saved for later processing
by TLS. Once TLS moves to receiving from this encryption level, saved data
can be provided to TLS. When TLS provides keys for a higher encryption level,
if there is data from a previous encryption level that TLS has not consumed,
this MUST be treated as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
Each time that TLS is provided with new data, new handshake bytes are requested
from TLS. TLS might not provide any bytes if the handshake messages it has
received are incomplete or it has no data to send.
The content of CRYPTO frames might either be processed incrementally by TLS or
buffered until complete messages or flights are available. TLS is responsible
for buffering handshake bytes that have arrived in order. QUIC is responsible
for buffering handshake bytes that arrive out of order or for encryption levels
that are not yet ready. QUIC does not provide any means of flow control for
CRYPTO frames; see Section 7.5 of {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}.
Once the TLS handshake is complete, this is indicated to QUIC along with any
final handshake bytes that TLS needs to send. TLS also provides QUIC with the
transport parameters that the peer advertised during the handshake.
Once the handshake is complete, TLS becomes passive. TLS can still receive data
from its peer and respond in kind, but it will not need to send more data unless
specifically requested - either by an application or QUIC. One reason to send
data is that the server might wish to provide additional or updated session
tickets to a client.
When the handshake is complete, QUIC only needs to provide TLS with any data
that arrives in CRYPTO streams. In the same way that is done during the
handshake, new data is requested from TLS after providing received data.
### Encryption Level Changes
As keys at a given encryption level become available to TLS, TLS indicates to
QUIC that reading or writing keys at that encryption level are available.
The availability of new keys is always a result of providing inputs to TLS. TLS
only provides new keys after being initialized (by a client) or when provided
with new handshake data.
However, a TLS implementation could perform some of its processing
asynchronously. In particular, the process of validating a certificate can take
some time. While waiting for TLS processing to complete, an endpoint SHOULD
buffer received packets if they might be processed using keys that aren't yet
available. These packets can be processed once keys are provided by TLS. An
endpoint SHOULD continue to respond to packets that can be processed during this
time.
After processing inputs, TLS might produce handshake bytes, keys for new
encryption levels, or both.
TLS provides QUIC with three items as a new encryption level becomes available:
* A secret
* An Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) function
* A Key Derivation Function (KDF)
These values are based on the values that TLS negotiates and are used by QUIC to
generate packet and header protection keys; see {{packet-protection}} and
{{header-protect}}.
If 0-RTT is possible, it is ready after the client sends a TLS ClientHello
message or the server receives that message. After providing a QUIC client with
the first handshake bytes, the TLS stack might signal the change to 0-RTT
keys. On the server, after receiving handshake bytes that contain a ClientHello
message, a TLS server might signal that 0-RTT keys are available.
Although TLS only uses one encryption level at a time, QUIC may use more than
one level. For instance, after sending its Finished message (using a CRYPTO
frame at the Handshake encryption level) an endpoint can send STREAM data (in
1-RTT encryption). If the Finished message is lost, the endpoint uses the
Handshake encryption level to retransmit the lost message. Reordering or loss
of packets can mean that QUIC will need to handle packets at multiple encryption
levels. During the handshake, this means potentially handling packets at higher
and lower encryption levels than the current encryption level used by TLS.
In particular, server implementations need to be able to read packets at the
Handshake encryption level at the same time as the 0-RTT encryption level. A
client could interleave ACK frames that are protected with Handshake keys with
0-RTT data and the server needs to process those acknowledgments in order to
detect lost Handshake packets.
QUIC also needs access to keys that might not ordinarily be available to a TLS
implementation. For instance, a client might need to acknowledge Handshake
packets before it is ready to send CRYPTO frames at that encryption level. TLS
therefore needs to provide keys to QUIC before it might produce them for its own
use.
### TLS Interface Summary
{{exchange-summary}} summarizes the exchange between QUIC and TLS for both
client and server. Solid arrows indicate packets that carry handshake data;
dashed arrows show where application data can be sent. Each arrow is tagged
with the encryption level used for that transmission.
~~~
Client Server
====== ======
Get Handshake
Initial ------------->
Install tx 0-RTT Keys
0-RTT - - - - - - - ->
Handshake Received
Get Handshake
<------------- Initial
Install rx 0-RTT keys
Install Handshake keys
Get Handshake
<----------- Handshake
Install tx 1-RTT keys
<- - - - - - - - 1-RTT
Handshake Received (Initial)
Install Handshake keys
Handshake Received (Handshake)
Get Handshake
Handshake ----------->
Handshake Complete
Install 1-RTT keys
1-RTT - - - - - - - ->
Handshake Received
Handshake Complete
Install rx 1-RTT keys
~~~
{: #exchange-summary title="Interaction Summary between QUIC and TLS"}
{{exchange-summary}} shows the multiple packets that form a single "flight" of
messages being processed individually, to show what incoming messages trigger
different actions. New handshake messages are requested after incoming packets
have been processed. This process varies based on the structure of endpoint
implementations and the order in which packets arrive; this is intended to
illustrate the steps involved in a single handshake exchange.
## TLS Version {#tls-version}
This document describes how TLS 1.3 {{!TLS13}} is used with QUIC.
In practice, the TLS handshake will negotiate a version of TLS to use. This
could result in a newer version of TLS than 1.3 being negotiated if both
endpoints support that version. This is acceptable provided that the features
of TLS 1.3 that are used by QUIC are supported by the newer version.
Clients MUST NOT offer TLS versions older than 1.3. A badly configured TLS
implementation could negotiate TLS 1.2 or another older version of TLS. An
endpoint MUST terminate the connection if a version of TLS older than 1.3 is
negotiated.
## ClientHello Size {#clienthello-size}
The first Initial packet from a client contains the start or all of its first
cryptographic handshake message, which for TLS is the ClientHello. Servers
might need to parse the entire ClientHello (e.g., to access extensions such as
Server Name Identification (SNI) or Application Layer Protocol Negotiation
(ALPN)) in order to decide whether to accept the new incoming QUIC connection.
If the ClientHello spans multiple Initial packets, such servers would need to
buffer the first received fragments, which could consume excessive resources if
the client's address has not yet been validated. To avoid this, servers MAY
use the Retry feature (see Section 8.1 of {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}) to only buffer
partial ClientHello messages from clients with a validated address.
QUIC packet and framing add at least 36 bytes of overhead to the ClientHello
message. That overhead increases if the client chooses a source connection ID
longer than zero bytes. Overheads also do not include the token or a
destination connection ID longer than 8 bytes, both of which might be required
if a server sends a Retry packet.
A typical TLS ClientHello can easily fit into a 1200-byte packet. However, in
addition to the overheads added by QUIC, there are several variables that could
cause this limit to be exceeded. Large session tickets, multiple or large key
shares, and long lists of supported ciphers, signature algorithms, versions,
QUIC transport parameters, and other negotiable parameters and extensions could
cause this message to grow.
For servers, in addition to connection IDs and tokens, the size of TLS session
tickets can have an effect on a client's ability to connect efficiently.
Minimizing the size of these values increases the probability that clients can
use them and still fit their ClientHello message in their first Initial packet.
The TLS implementation does not need to ensure that the ClientHello is
sufficiently large. QUIC PADDING frames are added to increase the size of the
packet as necessary.
## Peer Authentication
The requirements for authentication depend on the application protocol that is
in use. TLS provides server authentication and permits the server to request
client authentication.
A client MUST authenticate the identity of the server. This typically involves
verification that the identity of the server is included in a certificate and
that the certificate is issued by a trusted entity (see for example
{{?RFC2818}}).
Note:
: Where servers provide certificates for authentication, the size of
the certificate chain can consume a large number of bytes. Controlling the
size of certificate chains is critical to performance in QUIC as servers are
limited to sending 3 bytes for every byte received prior to validating the
client address; see Section 8.1 of {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}. The size of a
certificate chain can be managed by limiting the number of names or
extensions; using keys with small public key representations, like ECDSA; or
by using certificate compression
{{?COMPRESS=I-D.ietf-tls-certificate-compression}}.
A server MAY request that the client authenticate during the handshake. A server
MAY refuse a connection if the client is unable to authenticate when requested.
The requirements for client authentication vary based on application protocol
and deployment.
A server MUST NOT use post-handshake client authentication (as defined in
Section 4.6.2 of {{!TLS13}}), because the multiplexing offered by QUIC prevents
clients from correlating the certificate request with the application-level
event that triggered it (see {{?HTTP2-TLS13=RFC8740}}).
More specifically, servers MUST NOT send post-handshake TLS CertificateRequest
messages and clients MUST treat receipt of such messages as a connection error
of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
## Session Resumption {#resumption}
QUIC can use the session resumption feature of TLS 1.3. It does this by
carrying NewSessionTicket messages in CRYPTO frames after the handshake is
complete. Session resumption is the basis of 0-RTT, but can be used without
also enabling 0-RTT.
Endpoints that use session resumption might need to remember some information
about the current connection when creating a resumed connection. TLS requires
that some information be retained; see Section 4.6.1 of {{!TLS13}}. QUIC itself
does not depend on any state being retained when resuming a connection, unless
0-RTT is also used; see {{enable-0rtt}} and Section 7.4.1 of
{{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}. Application protocols could depend on state that is
retained between resumed connections.
Clients can store any state required for resumption along with the session
ticket. Servers can use the session ticket to help carry state.
Session resumption allows servers to link activity on the original connection
with the resumed connection, which might be a privacy issue for clients.
Clients can choose not to enable resumption to avoid creating this correlation.
Clients SHOULD NOT reuse tickets as that allows entities other than the server
to correlate connections; see Section C.4 of {{!TLS13}}.
## 0-RTT
The 0-RTT feature in QUIC allows a client to send application data before the
handshake is complete. This is made possible by reusing negotiated parameters
from a previous connection. To enable this, 0-RTT depends on the client
remembering critical parameters and providing the server with a TLS session
ticket that allows the server to recover the same information.
This information includes parameters that determine TLS state, as governed by
{{!TLS13}}, QUIC transport parameters, the chosen application protocol, and any
information the application protocol might need; see {{app-0rtt}}. This
information determines how 0-RTT packets and their contents are formed.
To ensure that the same information is available to both endpoints, all
information used to establish 0-RTT comes from the same connection. Endpoints
cannot selectively disregard information that might alter the sending or
processing of 0-RTT.
{{!TLS13}} sets a limit of 7 days on the time between the original connection
and any attempt to use 0-RTT. There are other constraints on 0-RTT usage,
notably those caused by the potential exposure to replay attack; see {{replay}}.
### Enabling 0-RTT {#enable-0rtt}
To communicate their willingness to process 0-RTT data, servers send a
NewSessionTicket message that contains the early_data extension with a
max_early_data_size of 0xffffffff. The TLS max_early_data_size parameter is not
used in QUIC. The amount of data that the client can send in 0-RTT is
controlled by the initial_max_data transport parameter supplied by the server.
Servers MUST NOT send the early_data extension with a max_early_data_size field
set to any value other than 0xffffffff. A client MUST treat receipt of a
NewSessionTicket that contains an early_data extension with any other value as
a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
A client that wishes to send 0-RTT packets uses the early_data extension in
the ClientHello message of a subsequent handshake; see Section 4.2.10 of
{{!TLS13}}. It then sends application data in 0-RTT packets.
A client that attempts 0-RTT might also provide an address validation token if
the server has sent a NEW_TOKEN frame; see Section 8.1 of {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}.
### Accepting and Rejecting 0-RTT
A server accepts 0-RTT by sending an early_data extension in the
EncryptedExtensions (see Section 4.2.10 of {{!TLS13}}). The server then
processes and acknowledges the 0-RTT packets that it receives.
A server rejects 0-RTT by sending the EncryptedExtensions without an early_data
extension. A server will always reject 0-RTT if it sends a TLS
HelloRetryRequest. When rejecting 0-RTT, a server MUST NOT process any 0-RTT
packets, even if it could. When 0-RTT was rejected, a client SHOULD treat
receipt of an acknowledgement for a 0-RTT packet as a connection error of type
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION, if it is able to detect the condition.
When 0-RTT is rejected, all connection characteristics that the client assumed
might be incorrect. This includes the choice of application protocol, transport
parameters, and any application configuration. The client therefore MUST reset
the state of all streams, including application state bound to those streams.
A client MAY reattempt 0-RTT if it receives a Retry or Version Negotiation
packet. These packets do not signify rejection of 0-RTT.
### Validating 0-RTT Configuration {#app-0rtt}
When a server receives a ClientHello with the early_data extension, it has to
decide whether to accept or reject early data from the client. Some of this
decision is made by the TLS stack (e.g., checking that the cipher suite being
resumed was included in the ClientHello; see Section 4.2.10 of {{!TLS13}}). Even
when the TLS stack has no reason to reject early data, the QUIC stack or the
application protocol using QUIC might reject early data because the
configuration of the transport or application associated with the resumed
session is not compatible with the server's current configuration.
QUIC requires additional transport state to be associated with a 0-RTT session
ticket. One common way to implement this is using stateless session tickets and
storing this state in the session ticket. Application protocols that use QUIC
might have similar requirements regarding associating or storing state. This
associated state is used for deciding whether early data must be rejected. For
example, HTTP/3 ({{QUIC-HTTP}}) settings determine how early data from the
client is interpreted. Other applications using QUIC could have different
requirements for determining whether to accept or reject early data.
## HelloRetryRequest
The HelloRetryRequest message (see Section 4.1.4 of {{!TLS13}}) can be used to
request that a client provide new information, such as a key share, or to
validate some characteristic of the client. From the perspective of QUIC,
HelloRetryRequest is not differentiated from other cryptographic handshake
messages that are carried in Initial packets. Although it is in principle
possible to use this feature for address verification, QUIC implementations
SHOULD instead use the Retry feature; see Section 8.1 of {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}.
## TLS Errors {#tls-errors}
If TLS experiences an error, it generates an appropriate alert as defined in
Section 6 of {{!TLS13}}.
A TLS alert is converted into a QUIC connection error. The alert description is
added to 0x100 to produce a QUIC error code from the range reserved for
CRYPTO_ERROR. The resulting value is sent in a QUIC CONNECTION_CLOSE frame of
type 0x1c.
The alert level of all TLS alerts is "fatal"; a TLS stack MUST NOT generate
alerts at the "warning" level.
QUIC permits the use of a generic code in place of a specific error code; see
Section 11 of {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}. For TLS alerts, this includes replacing any
alert with a generic alert, such as handshake_failure (0x128 in QUIC).
Endpoints MAY use a generic error code to avoid possibly exposing confidential
information.
## Discarding Unused Keys
After QUIC moves to a new encryption level, packet protection keys for previous
encryption levels can be discarded. This occurs several times during the
handshake, as well as when keys are updated; see {{key-update}}.
Packet protection keys are not discarded immediately when new keys are
available. If packets from a lower encryption level contain CRYPTO frames,
frames that retransmit that data MUST be sent at the same encryption level.
Similarly, an endpoint generates acknowledgements for packets at the same
encryption level as the packet being acknowledged. Thus, it is possible that
keys for a lower encryption level are needed for a short time after keys for a
newer encryption level are available.
An endpoint cannot discard keys for a given encryption level unless it has both
received and acknowledged all CRYPTO frames for that encryption level and when
all CRYPTO frames for that encryption level have been acknowledged by its peer.
However, this does not guarantee that no further packets will need to be
received or sent at that encryption level because a peer might not have received
all the acknowledgements necessary to reach the same state.
Though an endpoint might retain older keys, new data MUST be sent at the highest
currently-available encryption level. Only ACK frames and retransmissions of
data in CRYPTO frames are sent at a previous encryption level. These packets
MAY also include PADDING frames.
### Discarding Initial Keys
Packets protected with Initial secrets ({{initial-secrets}}) are not
authenticated, meaning that an attacker could spoof packets with the intent to
disrupt a connection. To limit these attacks, Initial packet protection keys
are discarded more aggressively than other keys.
The successful use of Handshake packets indicates that no more Initial packets
need to be exchanged, as these keys can only be produced after receiving all
CRYPTO frames from Initial packets. Thus, a client MUST discard Initial keys
when it first sends a Handshake packet and a server MUST discard Initial keys
when it first successfully processes a Handshake packet. Endpoints MUST NOT
send Initial packets after this point.
This results in abandoning loss recovery state for the Initial encryption level
and ignoring any outstanding Initial packets.
### Discarding Handshake Keys
An endpoint MUST discard its handshake keys when the TLS handshake is confirmed
({{handshake-confirmed}}). The server MUST send a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame as soon
as it completes the handshake.
### Discarding 0-RTT Keys
0-RTT and 1-RTT packets share the same packet number space, and clients do not
send 0-RTT packets after sending a 1-RTT packet ({{using-early-data}}).
Therefore, a client SHOULD discard 0-RTT keys as soon as it installs 1-RTT
keys, since they have no use after that moment.
Additionally, a server MAY discard 0-RTT keys as soon as it receives a 1-RTT
packet. However, due to packet reordering, a 0-RTT packet could arrive after
a 1-RTT packet. Servers MAY temporarily retain 0-RTT keys to allow decrypting
reordered packets without requiring their contents to be retransmitted with
1-RTT keys. After receiving a 1-RTT packet, servers MUST discard 0-RTT keys
within a short time; the RECOMMENDED time period is three times the Probe
Timeout (PTO, see {{QUIC-RECOVERY}}). A server MAY discard 0-RTT keys earlier
if it determines that it has received all 0-RTT packets, which can be done by
keeping track of missing packet numbers.
# Packet Protection {#packet-protection}
As with TLS over TCP, QUIC protects packets with keys derived from the TLS
handshake, using the AEAD algorithm {{!AEAD}} negotiated by TLS.
QUIC packets have varying protections depending on their type:
* Version Negotiation packets have no cryptographic protection.
* Retry packets use AEAD_AES_128_GCM to provide protection against accidental
modification or insertion by off-path adversaries; see
{{retry-integrity}}.
* Initial packets use AEAD_AES_128_GCM with keys derived from the Destination
Connection ID field of the first Initial packet sent by the client; see
{{initial-secrets}}.
* All other packets have strong cryptographic protections for confidentiality
and integrity, using keys and algorithms negotiated by TLS.
This section describes how packet protection is applied to Handshake packets,
0-RTT packets, and 1-RTT packets. The same packet protection process is applied
to Initial packets. However, as it is trivial to determine the keys used for
Initial packets, these packets are not considered to have confidentiality or
integrity protection. Retry packets use a fixed key and so similarly lack
confidentiality and integrity protection.
## Packet Protection Keys {#protection-keys}
QUIC derives packet protection keys in the same way that TLS derives record
protection keys.
Each encryption level has separate secret values for protection of packets sent
in each direction. These traffic secrets are derived by TLS (see Section 7.1 of
{{!TLS13}}) and are used by QUIC for all encryption levels except the Initial
encryption level. The secrets for the Initial encryption level are computed
based on the client's initial Destination Connection ID, as described in
{{initial-secrets}}.
The keys used for packet protection are computed from the TLS secrets using the
KDF provided by TLS. In TLS 1.3, the HKDF-Expand-Label function described in
Section 7.1 of {{!TLS13}} is used, using the hash function from the negotiated
cipher suite. Other versions of TLS MUST provide a similar function in order to
be used with QUIC.
The current encryption level secret and the label "quic key" are input to the
KDF to produce the AEAD key; the label "quic iv" is used to derive the
Initialization Vector (IV); see {{aead}}. The header protection key uses the
"quic hp" label; see {{header-protect}}. Using these labels provides key
separation between QUIC and TLS; see {{key-diversity}}.
The KDF used for initial secrets is always the HKDF-Expand-Label function from
TLS 1.3; see {{initial-secrets}}.
## Initial Secrets {#initial-secrets}
Initial packets apply the packet protection process, but use a secret derived
from the Destination Connection ID field from the client's first Initial
packet.
This secret is determined by using HKDF-Extract (see Section 2.2 of
{{!HKDF=RFC5869}}) with a salt of 0xafbfec289993d24c9e9786f19c6111e04390a899
and a IKM of the Destination Connection ID field. This produces an intermediate
pseudorandom key (PRK) that is used to derive two separate secrets for sending
and receiving.
The secret used by clients to construct Initial packets uses the PRK and the
label "client in" as input to the HKDF-Expand-Label function to produce a 32
byte secret; packets constructed by the server use the same process with the
label "server in". The hash function for HKDF when deriving initial secrets
and keys is SHA-256 {{!SHA=DOI.10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4}}.
This process in pseudocode is:
~~~
initial_salt = 0xafbfec289993d24c9e9786f19c6111e04390a899
initial_secret = HKDF-Extract(initial_salt,
client_dst_connection_id)
client_initial_secret = HKDF-Expand-Label(initial_secret,
"client in", "",
Hash.length)
server_initial_secret = HKDF-Expand-Label(initial_secret,
"server in", "",
Hash.length)
~~~
The connection ID used with HKDF-Expand-Label is the Destination Connection ID
in the Initial packet sent by the client. This will be a randomly-selected
value unless the client creates the Initial packet after receiving a Retry
packet, where the Destination Connection ID is selected by the server.
Future versions of QUIC SHOULD generate a new salt value, thus ensuring that
the keys are different for each version of QUIC. This prevents a middlebox that
recognizes only one version of QUIC from seeing or modifying the contents of
packets from future versions.
The HKDF-Expand-Label function defined in TLS 1.3 MUST be used for Initial
packets even where the TLS versions offered do not include TLS 1.3.
The secrets used for constructing Initial packets change when a server sends a
Retry packet to use the connection ID value selected by the server. The secrets
do not change when a client changes the Destination Connection ID it uses in
response to an Initial packet from the server.
Note:
: The Destination Connection ID is of arbitrary length, and it could be zero
length if the server sends a Retry packet with a zero-length Source Connection
ID field. In this case, the Initial keys provide no assurance to the client
that the server received its packet; the client has to rely on the exchange
that included the Retry packet for that property.
{{test-vectors}} contains sample Initial packets.
## AEAD Usage {#aead}
The Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD; see {{!AEAD}}) function
used for QUIC packet protection is the AEAD that is negotiated for use with the
TLS connection. For example, if TLS is using the TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher
suite, the AEAD_AES_128_GCM function is used.
QUIC can use any of the cipher suites defined in {{!TLS13}} with the exception
of TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256. A cipher suite MUST NOT be negotiated unless a
header protection scheme is defined for the cipher suite. This document defines
a header protection scheme for all cipher suites defined in {{!TLS13}} aside
from TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256. These cipher suites have a 16-byte
authentication tag and produce an output 16 bytes larger than their input.
Note:
: An endpoint MUST NOT reject a ClientHello that offers a cipher suite that it
does not support, or it would be impossible to deploy a new cipher suite.
This also applies to TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256.
When constructing packets, the AEAD function is applied prior to applying
header protection; see {{header-protect}}. The unprotected packet header is part
of the associated data (A). When processing packets, an endpoint first
removes the header protection.
The key and IV for the packet are computed as described in {{protection-keys}}.
The nonce, N, is formed by combining the packet protection IV with the packet
number. The 62 bits of the reconstructed QUIC packet number in network byte
order are left-padded with zeros to the size of the IV. The exclusive OR of the
padded packet number and the IV forms the AEAD nonce.
The associated data, A, for the AEAD is the contents of the QUIC header,
starting from the first byte of either the short or long header, up to and
including the unprotected packet number.
The input plaintext, P, for the AEAD is the payload of the QUIC packet, as
described in {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}.
The output ciphertext, C, of the AEAD is transmitted in place of P.
Some AEAD functions have limits for how many packets can be encrypted under the
same key and IV; see {{aead-limits}}. This might be lower than the packet
number limit. An endpoint MUST initiate a key update ({{key-update}}) prior to
exceeding any limit set for the AEAD that is in use.
## Header Protection {#header-protect}
Parts of QUIC packet headers, in particular the Packet Number field, are
protected using a key that is derived separately from the packet protection key
and IV. The key derived using the "quic hp" label is used to provide
confidentiality protection for those fields that are not exposed to on-path
elements.
This protection applies to the least-significant bits of the first byte, plus
the Packet Number field. The four least-significant bits of the first byte are
protected for packets with long headers; the five least significant bits of the
first byte are protected for packets with short headers. For both header forms,
this covers the reserved bits and the Packet Number Length field; the Key Phase
bit is also protected for packets with a short header.
The same header protection key is used for the duration of the connection, with
the value not changing after a key update (see {{key-update}}). This allows
header protection to be used to protect the key phase.
This process does not apply to Retry or Version Negotiation packets, which do
not contain a protected payload or any of the fields that are protected by this
process.
### Header Protection Application
Header protection is applied after packet protection is applied (see {{aead}}).
The ciphertext of the packet is sampled and used as input to an encryption
algorithm. The algorithm used depends on the negotiated AEAD.
The output of this algorithm is a 5-byte mask that is applied to the protected
header fields using exclusive OR. The least significant bits of the first byte
of the packet are masked by the least significant bits of the first mask byte,
and the packet number is masked with the remaining bytes. Any unused bytes of
mask that might result from a shorter packet number encoding are unused.
{{pseudo-hp}} shows a sample algorithm for applying header protection. Removing
header protection only differs in the order in which the packet number length
(pn_length) is determined.
~~~
mask = header_protection(hp_key, sample)
pn_length = (packet[0] & 0x03) + 1
if (packet[0] & 0x80) == 0x80:
# Long header: 4 bits masked
packet[0] ^= mask[0] & 0x0f
else:
# Short header: 5 bits masked
packet[0] ^= mask[0] & 0x1f
# pn_offset is the start of the Packet Number field.
packet[pn_offset:pn_offset+pn_length] ^= mask[1:1+pn_length]
~~~
{: #pseudo-hp title="Header Protection Pseudocode"}
{{fig-sample}} shows an example long header packet (Initial) and a short header
packet. {{fig-sample}} shows the fields in each header that are covered by
header protection and the portion of the protected packet payload that is
sampled.
~~~
Initial Packet {
Header Form (1) = 1,
Fixed Bit (1) = 1,
Long Packet Type (2) = 0,
Reserved Bits (2), # Protected
Packet Number Length (2), # Protected
Version (32),
DCID Len (8),
Destination Connection ID (0..160),
SCID Len (8),
Source Connection ID (0..160),
Token Length (i),
Token (..),
Length (i),
Packet Number (8..32), # Protected
Protected Payload (0..24), # Skipped Part
Protected Payload (128), # Sampled Part
Protected Payload (..) # Remainder
}
Short Header Packet {
Header Form (1) = 0,
Fixed Bit (1) = 1,
Spin Bit (1),
Reserved Bits (2), # Protected
Key Phase (1), # Protected
Packet Number Length (2), # Protected
Destination Connection ID (0..160),
Packet Number (8..32), # Protected
Protected Payload (0..24), # Skipped Part
Protected Payload (128), # Sampled Part
Protected Payload (..), # Remainder
}
~~~
{: #fig-sample title="Header Protection and Ciphertext Sample"}
Before a TLS cipher suite can be used with QUIC, a header protection algorithm
MUST be specified for the AEAD used with that cipher suite. This document
defines algorithms for AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_128_CCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM (all
these AES AEADs are defined in {{!AEAD=RFC5116}}), and AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305
(defined in {{!CHACHA=RFC8439}}). Prior to TLS selecting a cipher suite, AES
header protection is used ({{hp-aes}}), matching the AEAD_AES_128_GCM packet
protection.
### Header Protection Sample {#hp-sample}
The header protection algorithm uses both the header protection key and a sample
of the ciphertext from the packet Payload field.
The same number of bytes are always sampled, but an allowance needs to be made
for the endpoint removing protection, which will not know the length of the
Packet Number field. In sampling the packet ciphertext, the Packet Number field
is assumed to be 4 bytes long (its maximum possible encoded length).
An endpoint MUST discard packets that are not long enough to contain a complete
sample.
To ensure that sufficient data is available for sampling, packets are padded so
that the combined lengths of the encoded packet number and protected payload is
at least 4 bytes longer than the sample required for header protection. The
cipher suites defined in {{!TLS13}} - other than TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, for
which a header protection scheme is not defined in this document - have 16-byte
expansions and 16-byte header protection samples. This results in needing at
least 3 bytes of frames in the unprotected payload if the packet number is
encoded on a single byte, or 2 bytes of frames for a 2-byte packet number
encoding.
The sampled ciphertext for a packet with a short header can be determined by the
following pseudocode:
~~~
sample_offset = 1 + len(connection_id) + 4
sample = packet[sample_offset..sample_offset+sample_length]
~~~
For example, for a packet with a short header, an 8-byte connection ID, and
protected with AEAD_AES_128_GCM, the sample takes bytes 13 to 28 inclusive
(using zero-based indexing).
A packet with a long header is sampled in the same way, noting that multiple
QUIC packets might be included in the same UDP datagram and that each one is
handled separately.
~~~
sample_offset = 7 + len(destination_connection_id) +
len(source_connection_id) +
len(payload_length) + 4
if packet_type == Initial:
sample_offset += len(token_length) +
len(token)
sample = packet[sample_offset..sample_offset+sample_length]
~~~
### AES-Based Header Protection {#hp-aes}
This section defines the packet protection algorithm for AEAD_AES_128_GCM,
AEAD_AES_128_CCM, and AEAD_AES_256_GCM. AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_128_CCM
use 128-bit AES in electronic code-book (ECB) mode. AEAD_AES_256_GCM uses
256-bit AES in ECB mode. AES is defined in {{!AES=DOI.10.6028/NIST.FIPS.197}}.
This algorithm samples 16 bytes from the packet ciphertext. This value is used
as the input to AES-ECB. In pseudocode:
~~~
mask = AES-ECB(hp_key, sample)
~~~
### ChaCha20-Based Header Protection {#hp-chacha}
When AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is in use, header protection uses the raw ChaCha20
function as defined in Section 2.4 of {{!CHACHA}}. This uses a 256-bit key and
16 bytes sampled from the packet protection output.
The first 4 bytes of the sampled ciphertext are the block counter. A ChaCha20
implementation could take a 32-bit integer in place of a byte sequence, in
which case the byte sequence is interpreted as a little-endian value.
The remaining 12 bytes are used as the nonce. A ChaCha20 implementation might
take an array of three 32-bit integers in place of a byte sequence, in which
case the nonce bytes are interpreted as a sequence of 32-bit little-endian
integers.
The encryption mask is produced by invoking ChaCha20 to protect 5 zero bytes. In
pseudocode:
~~~
counter = sample[0..3]
nonce = sample[4..15]
mask = ChaCha20(hp_key, counter, nonce, {0,0,0,0,0})
~~~
## Receiving Protected Packets
Once an endpoint successfully receives a packet with a given packet number, it
MUST discard all packets in the same packet number space with higher packet
numbers if they cannot be successfully unprotected with either the same key, or
- if there is a key update - the next packet protection key (see
{{key-update}}). Similarly, a packet that appears to trigger a key update, but
cannot be unprotected successfully MUST be discarded.
Failure to unprotect a packet does not necessarily indicate the existence of a
protocol error in a peer or an attack. The truncated packet number encoding
used in QUIC can cause packet numbers to be decoded incorrectly if they are
delayed significantly.
## Use of 0-RTT Keys {#using-early-data}
If 0-RTT keys are available (see {{enable-0rtt}}), the lack of replay protection
means that restrictions on their use are necessary to avoid replay attacks on
the protocol.
A client MUST only use 0-RTT keys to protect data that is idempotent. A client
MAY wish to apply additional restrictions on what data it sends prior to the
completion of the TLS handshake. A client otherwise treats 0-RTT keys as
equivalent to 1-RTT keys, except that it MUST NOT send ACKs with 0-RTT keys.
A client that receives an indication that its 0-RTT data has been accepted by a
server can send 0-RTT data until it receives all of the server's handshake
messages. A client SHOULD stop sending 0-RTT data if it receives an indication
that 0-RTT data has been rejected.
A server MUST NOT use 0-RTT keys to protect packets; it uses 1-RTT keys to
protect acknowledgements of 0-RTT packets. A client MUST NOT attempt to
decrypt 0-RTT packets it receives and instead MUST discard them.
Once a client has installed 1-RTT keys, it MUST NOT send any more 0-RTT
packets.
Note:
: 0-RTT data can be acknowledged by the server as it receives it, but any
packets containing acknowledgments of 0-RTT data cannot have packet protection
removed by the client until the TLS handshake is complete. The 1-RTT keys
necessary to remove packet protection cannot be derived until the client
receives all server handshake messages.
## Receiving Out-of-Order Protected Packets {#pre-hs-protected}
Due to reordering and loss, protected packets might be received by an endpoint
before the final TLS handshake messages are received. A client will be unable
to decrypt 1-RTT packets from the server, whereas a server will be able to
decrypt 1-RTT packets from the client. Endpoints in either role MUST NOT
decrypt 1-RTT packets from their peer prior to completing the handshake.
Even though 1-RTT keys are available to a server after receiving the first
handshake messages from a client, it is missing assurances on the client state:
- The client is not authenticated, unless the server has chosen to use a
pre-shared key and validated the client's pre-shared key binder; see Section
4.2.11 of {{!TLS13}}.
- The client has not demonstrated liveness, unless the server has validated the
client's address with a Retry packet or other means; see Section 8.1 of
[QUIC-TRANSPORT].
- Any received 0-RTT data that the server responds to might be due to a replay
attack.
Therefore, the server's use of 1-RTT keys before the handshake is complete is
limited to sending data. A server MUST NOT process incoming 1-RTT protected
packets before the TLS handshake is complete. Because sending acknowledgments
indicates that all frames in a packet have been processed, a server cannot send
acknowledgments for 1-RTT packets until the TLS handshake is complete. Received
packets protected with 1-RTT keys MAY be stored and later decrypted and used
once the handshake is complete.
Note:
: TLS implementations might provide all 1-RTT secrets prior to handshake
completion. Even where QUIC implementations have 1-RTT read keys, those keys
cannot be used prior to completing the handshake.
The requirement for the server to wait for the client Finished message creates
a dependency on that message being delivered. A client can avoid the
potential for head-of-line blocking that this implies by sending its 1-RTT
packets coalesced with a Handshake packet containing a copy of the CRYPTO frame
that carries the Finished message, until one of the Handshake packets is
acknowledged. This enables immediate server processing for those packets.
A server could receive packets protected with 0-RTT keys prior to receiving a
TLS ClientHello. The server MAY retain these packets for later decryption in
anticipation of receiving a ClientHello.
A client generally receives 1-RTT keys at the same time as the handshake
completes. Even if it has 1-RTT secrets, a client MUST NOT process
incoming 1-RTT protected packets before the TLS handshake is complete.
## Retry Packet Integrity {#retry-integrity}
Retry packets (see the Retry Packet section of {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}) carry a
Retry Integrity Tag that provides two properties: it allows discarding
packets that have accidentally been corrupted by the network, and it diminishes
off-path attackers' ability to send valid Retry packets.
The Retry Integrity Tag is a 128-bit field that is computed as the output of
AEAD_AES_128_GCM ({{!AEAD}}) used with the following inputs:
- The secret key, K, is 128 bits equal to 0xccce187ed09a09d05728155a6cb96be1.
- The nonce, N, is 96 bits equal to 0xe54930f97f2136f0530a8c1c.
- The plaintext, P, is empty.
- The associated data, A, is the contents of the Retry Pseudo-Packet, as
illustrated in {{retry-pseudo}}:
The secret key and the nonce are values derived by calling HKDF-Expand-Label
using 0x8b0d37eb8535022ebc8d76a207d80df22646ec06dc809642c30a8baa2baaff4c as the
secret, with labels being "quic key" and "quic iv" ({{protection-keys}}).
~~~
Retry Pseudo-Packet {
ODCID Length (8),
Original Destination Connection ID (0..160),
Header Form (1) = 1,
Fixed Bit (1) = 1,
Long Packet Type (2) = 3,
Type-Specific Bits (4),
Version (32),
DCID Len (8),
Destination Connection ID (0..160),
SCID Len (8),
Source Connection ID (0..160),
Retry Token (..),
}
~~~
{: #retry-pseudo title="Retry Pseudo-Packet"}
The Retry Pseudo-Packet is not sent over the wire. It is computed by taking
the transmitted Retry packet, removing the Retry Integrity Tag and prepending
the two following fields:
ODCID Length:
: The ODCID Length field contains the length in bytes of the Original
Destination Connection ID field that follows it, encoded as an 8-bit unsigned
integer.
Original Destination Connection ID:
: The Original Destination Connection ID contains the value of the Destination
Connection ID from the Initial packet that this Retry is in response to. The
length of this field is given in ODCID Length. The presence of this field
mitigates an off-path attacker's ability to inject a Retry packet.
# Key Update
Once the handshake is confirmed (see {{handshake-confirmed}}), an endpoint MAY
initiate a key update.
The Key Phase bit indicates which packet protection keys are used to protect the
packet. The Key Phase bit is initially set to 0 for the first set of 1-RTT
packets and toggled to signal each subsequent key update.
The Key Phase bit allows a recipient to detect a change in keying material
without needing to receive the first packet that triggered the change. An
endpoint that notices a changed Key Phase bit updates keys and decrypts the
packet that contains the changed value.
This mechanism replaces the TLS KeyUpdate message. Endpoints MUST NOT send a
TLS KeyUpdate message. Endpoints MUST treat the receipt of a TLS KeyUpdate
message as a connection error of type 0x10a, equivalent to a fatal TLS alert of
unexpected_message (see {{tls-errors}}).
{{ex-key-update}} shows a key update process, where the initial set of keys used
(identified with @M) are replaced by updated keys (identified with @N). The
value of the Key Phase bit is indicated in brackets \[].
~~~
Initiating Peer Responding Peer
@M [0] QUIC Packets
... Update to @N
@N [1] QUIC Packets
-------->
Update to @N ...
QUIC Packets [1] @N
<--------
QUIC Packets [1] @N
containing ACK
<--------
... Key Update Permitted
@N [1] QUIC Packets
containing ACK for @N packets
-------->
Key Update Permitted ...
~~~
{: #ex-key-update title="Key Update"}
## Initiating a Key Update {#key-update-initiate}
Endpoints maintain separate read and write secrets for packet protection. An
endpoint initiates a key update by updating its packet protection write secret
and using that to protect new packets. The endpoint creates a new write secret
from the existing write secret as performed in Section 7.2 of {{!TLS13}}. This
uses the KDF function provided by TLS with a label of "quic ku". The
corresponding key and IV are created from that secret as defined in
{{protection-keys}}. The header protection key is not updated.
For example, to update write keys with TLS 1.3, HKDF-Expand-Label is used as:
~~~
secret_<n+1> = HKDF-Expand-Label(secret_<n>, "quic ku",
"", Hash.length)
~~~
The endpoint toggles the value of the Key Phase bit and uses the updated key and
IV to protect all subsequent packets.
An endpoint MUST NOT initiate a key update prior to having confirmed the
handshake ({{handshake-confirmed}}). An endpoint MUST NOT initiate a subsequent
key update unless it has received an acknowledgment for a packet that was sent
protected with keys from the current key phase. This ensures that keys are
available to both peers before another key update can be initiated. This can be
implemented by tracking the lowest packet number sent with each key phase, and
the highest acknowledged packet number in the 1-RTT space: once the latter is
higher than or equal to the former, another key update can be initiated.
Note:
: Keys of packets other than the 1-RTT packets are never updated; their keys are
derived solely from the TLS handshake state.
The endpoint that initiates a key update also updates the keys that it uses for
receiving packets. These keys will be needed to process packets the peer sends
after updating.
An endpoint MUST retain old keys until it has successfully unprotected a packet
sent using the new keys. An endpoint SHOULD retain old keys for some time
after unprotecting a packet sent using the new keys. Discarding old keys too
early can cause delayed packets to be discarded. Discarding packets will be
interpreted as packet loss by the peer and could adversely affect performance.
## Responding to a Key Update
A peer is permitted to initiate a key update after receiving an acknowledgement
of a packet in the current key phase. An endpoint detects a key update when
processing a packet with a key phase that differs from the value used to protect
the last packet it sent. To process this packet, the endpoint uses the next
packet protection key and IV. See {{receive-key-generation}} for considerations
about generating these keys.
If a packet is successfully processed using the next key and IV, then the peer
has initiated a key update. The endpoint MUST update its send keys to the
corresponding key phase in response, as described in {{key-update-initiate}}.
Sending keys MUST be updated before sending an acknowledgement for the packet
that was received with updated keys. By acknowledging the packet that triggered
the key update in a packet protected with the updated keys, the endpoint signals
that the key update is complete.
An endpoint can defer sending the packet or acknowledgement according to its
normal packet sending behaviour; it is not necessary to immediately generate a
packet in response to a key update. The next packet sent by the endpoint will
use the updated keys. The next packet that contains an acknowledgement will
cause the key update to be completed. If an endpoint detects a second update
before it has sent any packets with updated keys containing an
acknowledgement for the packet that initiated the key update, it indicates that
its peer has updated keys twice without awaiting confirmation. An endpoint MAY
treat consecutive key updates as a connection error of type KEY_UPDATE_ERROR.
An endpoint that receives an acknowledgement that is carried in a packet
protected with old keys where any acknowledged packet was protected with newer
keys MAY treat that as a connection error of type KEY_UPDATE_ERROR. This
indicates that a peer has received and acknowledged a packet that initiates a
key update, but has not updated keys in response.
## Timing of Receive Key Generation {#receive-key-generation}
Endpoints responding to an apparent key update MUST NOT generate a timing
side-channel signal that might indicate that the Key Phase bit was invalid (see
{{header-protect-analysis}}). Endpoints can use dummy packet protection keys in
place of discarded keys when key updates are not yet permitted. Using dummy
keys will generate no variation in the timing signal produced by attempting to
remove packet protection, and results in all packets with an invalid Key Phase
bit being rejected.
The process of creating new packet protection keys for receiving packets could
reveal that a key update has occurred. An endpoint MAY perform this process as
part of packet processing, but this creates a timing signal that can be used by
an attacker to learn when key updates happen and thus the value of the Key Phase
bit in certain packets. Endpoints MAY instead defer the creation of the next
set of receive packet protection keys until some time after a key update
completes, up to three times the PTO; see {{old-keys-recv}}.
Once generated, the next set of packet protection keys SHOULD be retained, even
if the packet that was received was subsequently discarded. Packets containing
apparent key updates are easy to forge and - while the process of key update
does not require significant effort - triggering this process could be used by
an attacker for DoS.
For this reason, endpoints MUST be able to retain two sets of packet protection
keys for receiving packets: the current and the next. Retaining the previous
keys in addition to these might improve performance, but this is not essential.
## Sending with Updated Keys {#old-keys-send}
An endpoint always sends packets that are protected with the newest keys. Keys
used for packet protection can be discarded immediately after switching to newer
keys.
Packets with higher packet numbers MUST be protected with either the same or
newer packet protection keys than packets with lower packet numbers. An
endpoint that successfully removes protection with old keys when newer keys were
used for packets with lower packet numbers MUST treat this as a connection error
of type KEY_UPDATE_ERROR.
## Receiving with Different Keys {#old-keys-recv}
For receiving packets during a key update, packets protected with older keys
might arrive if they were delayed by the network. Retaining old packet
protection keys allows these packets to be successfully processed.
As packets protected with keys from the next key phase use the same Key Phase
value as those protected with keys from the previous key phase, it can be
necessary to distinguish between the two. This can be done using packet
numbers. A recovered packet number that is lower than any packet number from
the current key phase uses the previous packet protection keys; a recovered
packet number that is higher than any packet number from the current key phase
requires the use of the next packet protection keys.
Some care is necessary to ensure that any process for selecting between
previous, current, and next packet protection keys does not expose a timing side
channel that might reveal which keys were used to remove packet protection. See
{{hp-side-channel}} for more information.
Alternatively, endpoints can retain only two sets of packet protection keys,
swapping previous for next after enough time has passed to allow for reordering
in the network. In this case, the Key Phase bit alone can be used to select
keys.
An endpoint MAY allow a period of approximately the Probe Timeout (PTO; see
{{QUIC-RECOVERY}}) after receiving a packet that uses the new key generation
before it creates the next set of packet protection keys. These updated keys
MAY replace the previous keys at that time. With the caveat that PTO is a
subjective measure - that is, a peer could have a different view of the RTT -
this time is expected to be long enough that any reordered packets would be
declared lost by a peer even if they were acknowledged and short enough to
allow for subsequent key updates.
Endpoints need to allow for the possibility that a peer might not be able to
decrypt packets that initiate a key update during the period when it retains old
keys. Endpoints SHOULD wait three times the PTO before initiating a key update
after receiving an acknowledgment that confirms that the previous key update was
received. Failing to allow sufficient time could lead to packets being
discarded.
An endpoint SHOULD retain old read keys for no more than three times the PTO
after having received a packet protected using the new keys. After this period,
old read keys and their corresponding secrets SHOULD be discarded.
## Limits on AEAD Usage {#aead-limits}
This document sets usage limits for AEAD algorithms to ensure that overuse does
not give an adversary a disproportionate advantage in attacking the
confidentiality and integrity of communications when using QUIC.
The usage limits defined in TLS 1.3 exist for protection against attacks
on confidentiality and apply to successful applications of AEAD protection. The
integrity protections in authenticated encryption also depend on limiting the
number of attempts to forge packets. TLS achieves this by closing connections
after any record fails an authentication check. In comparison, QUIC ignores any
packet that cannot be authenticated, allowing multiple forgery attempts.
QUIC accounts for AEAD confidentiality and integrity limits separately. The
confidentiality limit applies to the number of packets encrypted with a given
key. The integrity limit applies to the number of packets decrypted within a
given connection. Details on enforcing these limits for each AEAD algorithm
follow below.
Endpoints MUST count the number of encrypted packets for each set of keys. If
the total number of encrypted packets with the same key exceeds the
confidentiality limit for the selected AEAD, the endpoint MUST stop using those
keys. Endpoints MUST initiate a key update before sending more protected packets
than the confidentiality limit for the selected AEAD permits. If a key update
is not possible or integrity limits are reached, the endpoint MUST stop using
the connection and only send stateless resets in response to receiving packets.
It is RECOMMENDED that endpoints immediately close the connection with a
connection error of type AEAD_LIMIT_REACHED before reaching a state where key
updates are not possible.
For AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM, the confidentiality limit is 2^25
encrypted packets; see {{gcm-bounds}}. For AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305, the
confidentiality limit is greater than the number of possible packets (2^62) and
so can be disregarded. For AEAD_AES_128_CCM, the confidentiality limit is 2^23.5
encrypted packets; see {{ccm-bounds}}. Applying a limit reduces the probability
that an attacker can distinguish the AEAD in use from a random permutation; see
{{AEBounds}}, {{ROBUST}}, and {{?GCM-MU=DOI.10.1145/3243734.3243816}}.
In addition to counting packets sent, endpoints MUST count the number of
received packets that fail authentication during the lifetime of a connection.
If the total number of received packets that fail authentication within the
connection, across all keys, exceeds the integrity limit for the selected AEAD,
the endpoint MUST immediately close the connection with a connection error of
type AEAD_LIMIT_REACHED and not process any more packets.
For AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM, the integrity limit is 2^54 invalid
packets; see {{gcm-bounds}}. For AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305, the integrity limit is
2^36 invalid packets; see {{AEBounds}}. For AEAD_AES_128_CCM, the integrity
limit is 2^23.5 invalid packets; see {{ccm-bounds}}. Applying this limit reduces
the probability that an attacker can successfully forge a packet; see
{{AEBounds}}, {{ROBUST}}, and {{?GCM-MU}}.
Future analyses and specifications MAY relax confidentiality or integrity limits
for an AEAD.
Note:
: These limits were originally calculated using assumptions about the
limits on TLS record size. The maximum size of a TLS record is 2^14 bytes.
In comparison, QUIC packets can be up to 2^16 bytes. However, it is
expected that QUIC packets will generally be smaller than TLS records.
Where packets might be larger than 2^14 bytes in length, smaller limits might
be needed.
Any TLS cipher suite that is specified for use with QUIC MUST define limits on
the use of the associated AEAD function that preserves margins for
confidentiality and integrity. That is, limits MUST be specified for the number
of packets that can be authenticated and for the number of packets that can fail
authentication. Providing a reference to any analysis upon which values are
based - and any assumptions used in that analysis - allows limits to be adapted
to varying usage conditions.
## Key Update Error Code {#key-update-error}
The KEY_UPDATE_ERROR error code (0xe) is used to signal errors related to key
updates.
# Security of Initial Messages
Initial packets are not protected with a secret key, so they are subject to
potential tampering by an attacker. QUIC provides protection against attackers
that cannot read packets, but does not attempt to provide additional protection
against attacks where the attacker can observe and inject packets. Some forms
of tampering -- such as modifying the TLS messages themselves -- are detectable,
but some -- such as modifying ACKs -- are not.
For example, an attacker could inject a packet containing an ACK frame that
makes it appear that a packet had not been received or to create a false
impression of the state of the connection (e.g., by modifying the ACK Delay).
Note that such a packet could cause a legitimate packet to be dropped as a
duplicate. Implementations SHOULD use caution in relying on any data that is
contained in Initial packets that is not otherwise authenticated.
It is also possible for the attacker to tamper with data that is carried in
Handshake packets, but because that tampering requires modifying TLS handshake
messages, that tampering will cause the TLS handshake to fail.
# QUIC-Specific Adjustments to the TLS Handshake
Certain aspects of the TLS handshake are different when used with QUIC.
QUIC also requires additional features from TLS. In addition to negotiation of
cryptographic parameters, the TLS handshake carries and authenticates values for
QUIC transport parameters.
## Protocol Negotiation {#protocol-negotiation}
QUIC requires that the cryptographic handshake provide authenticated protocol
negotiation. TLS uses Application Layer Protocol Negotiation
({{!ALPN=RFC7301}}) to select an application protocol. Unless another mechanism
is used for agreeing on an application protocol, endpoints MUST use ALPN for
this purpose.
When using ALPN, endpoints MUST immediately close a connection (see Section
10.2 of {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}) with a no_application_protocol TLS alert (QUIC error
code 0x178; see {{tls-errors}}) if an application protocol is not negotiated.
While {{!ALPN}} only specifies that servers use this alert, QUIC clients MUST
use error 0x178 to terminate a connection when ALPN negotiation fails.
An application protocol MAY restrict the QUIC versions that it can operate over.
Servers MUST select an application protocol compatible with the QUIC version
that the client has selected. The server MUST treat the inability to select a
compatible application protocol as a connection error of type 0x178
(no_application_protocol). Similarly, a client MUST treat the selection of an
incompatible application protocol by a server as a connection error of type
0x178.
## QUIC Transport Parameters Extension {#quic_parameters}
QUIC transport parameters are carried in a TLS extension. Different versions of
QUIC might define a different method for negotiating transport configuration.
Including transport parameters in the TLS handshake provides integrity
protection for these values.
~~~
enum {
quic_transport_parameters(0xffa5), (65535)
} ExtensionType;
~~~
The extension_data field of the quic_transport_parameters extension contains a
value that is defined by the version of QUIC that is in use.
The quic_transport_parameters extension is carried in the ClientHello and the
EncryptedExtensions messages during the handshake. Endpoints MUST send the
quic_transport_parameters extension; endpoints that receive ClientHello or
EncryptedExtensions messages without the quic_transport_parameters extension
MUST close the connection with an error of type 0x16d (equivalent to a fatal TLS
missing_extension alert, see {{tls-errors}}).
While the transport parameters are technically available prior to the completion
of the handshake, they cannot be fully trusted until the handshake completes,
and reliance on them should be minimized. However, any tampering with the
parameters will cause the handshake to fail.
Endpoints MUST NOT send this extension in a TLS connection that does not use
QUIC (such as the use of TLS with TCP defined in {{!TLS13}}). A fatal
unsupported_extension alert MUST be sent by an implementation that supports this
extension if the extension is received when the transport is not QUIC.
## Removing the EndOfEarlyData Message {#remove-eoed}
The TLS EndOfEarlyData message is not used with QUIC. QUIC does not rely on
this message to mark the end of 0-RTT data or to signal the change to Handshake
keys.
Clients MUST NOT send the EndOfEarlyData message. A server MUST treat receipt
of a CRYPTO frame in a 0-RTT packet as a connection error of type
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
As a result, EndOfEarlyData does not appear in the TLS handshake transcript.
## Prohibit TLS Middlebox Compatibility Mode {#compat-mode}
Appendix D.4 of {{!TLS13}} describes an alteration to the TLS 1.3 handshake as
a workaround for bugs in some middleboxes. The TLS 1.3 middlebox compatibility
mode involves setting the legacy_session_id field to a 32-byte value in the
ClientHello and ServerHello, then sending a change_cipher_spec record. Both
field and record carry no semantic content and are ignored.
This mode has no use in QUIC as it only applies to middleboxes that interfere
with TLS over TCP. QUIC also provides no means to carry a change_cipher_spec
record. A client MUST NOT request the use of the TLS 1.3 compatibility mode. A
server SHOULD treat the receipt of a TLS ClientHello with a non-empty
legacy_session_id field as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
# Security Considerations
All of the security considerations that apply to TLS also apply to the use of
TLS in QUIC. Reading all of {{!TLS13}} and its appendices is the best way to
gain an understanding of the security properties of QUIC.
This section summarizes some of the more important security aspects specific to
the TLS integration, though there are many security-relevant details in the
remainder of the document.
## Session Linkability
Use of TLS session tickets allows servers and possibly other entities to
correlate connections made by the same client; see {{resumption}} for details.
## Replay Attacks with 0-RTT {#replay}
As described in Section 8 of {{!TLS13}}, use of TLS early data comes with an
exposure to replay attack. The use of 0-RTT in QUIC is similarly vulnerable to
replay attack.
Endpoints MUST implement and use the replay protections described in {{!TLS13}},
however it is recognized that these protections are imperfect. Therefore,
additional consideration of the risk of replay is needed.
QUIC is not vulnerable to replay attack, except via the application protocol
information it might carry. The management of QUIC protocol state based on the
frame types defined in {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}} is not vulnerable to replay.
Processing of QUIC frames is idempotent and cannot result in invalid connection
states if frames are replayed, reordered or lost. QUIC connections do not
produce effects that last beyond the lifetime of the connection, except for
those produced by the application protocol that QUIC serves.
Note:
: TLS session tickets and address validation tokens are used to carry QUIC
configuration information between connections. Specifically, to enable a
server to efficiently recover state that is used in connection establishment
and address validation. These MUST NOT be used to communicate application
semantics between endpoints; clients MUST treat them as opaque values. The
potential for reuse of these tokens means that they require stronger
protections against replay.
A server that accepts 0-RTT on a connection incurs a higher cost than accepting
a connection without 0-RTT. This includes higher processing and computation
costs. Servers need to consider the probability of replay and all associated
costs when accepting 0-RTT.
Ultimately, the responsibility for managing the risks of replay attacks with
0-RTT lies with an application protocol. An application protocol that uses QUIC
MUST describe how the protocol uses 0-RTT and the measures that are employed to
protect against replay attack. An analysis of replay risk needs to consider
all QUIC protocol features that carry application semantics.
Disabling 0-RTT entirely is the most effective defense against replay attack.
QUIC extensions MUST describe how replay attacks affect their operation, or
prohibit their use in 0-RTT. Application protocols MUST either prohibit the use
of extensions that carry application semantics in 0-RTT or provide replay
mitigation strategies.
## Packet Reflection Attack Mitigation {#reflection}
A small ClientHello that results in a large block of handshake messages from a
server can be used in packet reflection attacks to amplify the traffic generated
by an attacker.
QUIC includes three defenses against this attack. First, the packet containing a
ClientHello MUST be padded to a minimum size. Second, if responding to an
unverified source address, the server is forbidden to send more than three times
as many bytes as the number of bytes it has received (see Section 8.1 of
{{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}). Finally, because acknowledgements of Handshake packets are
authenticated, a blind attacker cannot forge them. Put together, these defenses
limit the level of amplification.
## Header Protection Analysis {#header-protect-analysis}
{{?NAN=DOI.10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9}} analyzes authenticated encryption
algorithms that provide nonce privacy, referred to as "Hide Nonce" (HN)
transforms. The general header protection construction in this document is
one of those algorithms (HN1). Header protection uses the output of the packet
protection AEAD to derive `sample`, and then encrypts the header field using
a pseudorandom function (PRF) as follows:
~~~
protected_field = field XOR PRF(hp_key, sample)
~~~
The header protection variants in this document use a pseudorandom permutation
(PRP) in place of a generic PRF. However, since all PRPs are also PRFs {{IMC}},
these variants do not deviate from the HN1 construction.
As `hp_key` is distinct from the packet protection key, it follows that header
protection achieves AE2 security as defined in {{NAN}} and therefore guarantees
privacy of `field`, the protected packet header. Future header protection
variants based on this construction MUST use a PRF to ensure equivalent
security guarantees.
Use of the same key and ciphertext sample more than once risks compromising
header protection. Protecting two different headers with the same key and
ciphertext sample reveals the exclusive OR of the protected fields. Assuming
that the AEAD acts as a PRF, if L bits are sampled, the odds of two ciphertext
samples being identical approach 2^(-L/2), that is, the birthday bound. For the
algorithms described in this document, that probability is one in 2^64.
To prevent an attacker from modifying packet headers, the header is transitively
authenticated using packet protection; the entire packet header is part of the
authenticated additional data. Protected fields that are falsified or modified
can only be detected once the packet protection is removed.
## Header Protection Timing Side-Channels {#hp-side-channel}
An attacker could guess values for packet numbers or Key Phase and have an
endpoint confirm guesses through timing side channels. Similarly, guesses for
the packet number length can be tried and exposed. If the recipient of a
packet discards packets with duplicate packet numbers without attempting to
remove packet protection they could reveal through timing side-channels that the
packet number matches a received packet. For authentication to be free from
side-channels, the entire process of header protection removal, packet number
recovery, and packet protection removal MUST be applied together without timing
and other side-channels.
For the sending of packets, construction and protection of packet payloads and
packet numbers MUST be free from side-channels that would reveal the packet
number or its encoded size.
During a key update, the time taken to generate new keys could reveal through
timing side-channels that a key update has occurred. Alternatively, where an
attacker injects packets this side-channel could reveal the value of the Key
Phase on injected packets. After receiving a key update, an endpoint SHOULD
generate and save the next set of receive packet protection keys, as described
in {{receive-key-generation}}. By generating new keys before a key update is
received, receipt of packets will not create timing signals that leak the value
of the Key Phase.
This depends on not doing this key generation during packet processing and it
can require that endpoints maintain three sets of packet protection keys for
receiving: for the previous key phase, for the current key phase, and for the
next key phase. Endpoints can instead choose to defer generation of the next
receive packet protection keys until they discard old keys so that only two sets
of receive keys need to be retained at any point in time.
## Key Diversity
In using TLS, the central key schedule of TLS is used. As a result of the TLS
handshake messages being integrated into the calculation of secrets, the
inclusion of the QUIC transport parameters extension ensures that handshake and
1-RTT keys are not the same as those that might be produced by a server running
TLS over TCP. To avoid the possibility of cross-protocol key synchronization,
additional measures are provided to improve key separation.
The QUIC packet protection keys and IVs are derived using a different label than
the equivalent keys in TLS.
To preserve this separation, a new version of QUIC SHOULD define new labels for
key derivation for packet protection key and IV, plus the header protection
keys. This version of QUIC uses the string "quic". Other versions can use a
version-specific label in place of that string.
The initial secrets use a key that is specific to the negotiated QUIC version.
New QUIC versions SHOULD define a new salt value used in calculating initial
secrets.
# IANA Considerations
This document registers the quic_transport_parameters extension found in
{{quic_parameters}} in the TLS ExtensionType Values Registry
{{!TLS-REGISTRIES=RFC8447}}.
The Recommended column is to be marked Yes. The TLS 1.3 Column is to include CH
and EE.
--- back
# Sample Packet Protection {#test-vectors}
This section shows examples of packet protection so that implementations can be
verified incrementally. Samples of Initial packets from both client and server,
plus a Retry packet are defined. These packets use an 8-byte client-chosen
Destination Connection ID of 0x8394c8f03e515708. Some intermediate values are
included. All values are shown in hexadecimal.
## Keys
The labels generated by the HKDF-Expand-Label function are:
client in:
: 00200f746c73313320636c69656e7420696e00
server in:
: 00200f746c7331332073657276657220696e00
quic key:
: 00100e746c7331332071756963206b657900
quic iv:
: 000c0d746c733133207175696320697600
quic hp:
: 00100d746c733133207175696320687000
The initial secret is common:
~~~
initial_secret = HKDF-Extract(initial_salt, cid)
= 1e7e7764529715b1e0ddc8e9753c6157
6769605187793ed366f8bbf8c9e986eb
~~~
The secrets for protecting client packets are:
~~~
client_initial_secret
= HKDF-Expand-Label(initial_secret, "client in", _, 32)
= 0088119288f1d866733ceeed15ff9d50
902cf82952eee27e9d4d4918ea371d87
key = HKDF-Expand-Label(client_initial_secret, "quic key", _, 16)
= 175257a31eb09dea9366d8bb79ad80ba
iv = HKDF-Expand-Label(client_initial_secret, "quic iv", _, 12)
= 6b26114b9cba2b63a9e8dd4f
hp = HKDF-Expand-Label(client_initial_secret, "quic hp", _, 16)
= 9ddd12c994c0698b89374a9c077a3077
~~~
The secrets for protecting server packets are:
~~~
server_initial_secret
= HKDF-Expand-Label(initial_secret, "server in", _, 32)
= 006f881359244dd9ad1acf85f595bad6
7c13f9f5586f5e64e1acae1d9ea8f616
key = HKDF-Expand-Label(server_initial_secret, "quic key", _, 16)
= 149d0b1662ab871fbe63c49b5e655a5d
iv = HKDF-Expand-Label(server_initial_secret, "quic iv", _, 12)
= bab2b12a4c76016ace47856d
hp = HKDF-Expand-Label(server_initial_secret, "quic hp", _, 16)
= c0c499a65a60024a18a250974ea01dfa
~~~
## Client Initial {#sample-client-initial}
The client sends an Initial packet. The unprotected payload of this packet
contains the following CRYPTO frame, plus enough PADDING frames to make a 1162
byte payload:
~~~
060040f1010000ed0303ebf8fa56f129 39b9584a3896472ec40bb863cfd3e868
04fe3a47f06a2b69484c000004130113 02010000c000000010000e00000b6578
616d706c652e636f6dff01000100000a 00080006001d00170018001000070005
04616c706e0005000501000000000033 00260024001d00209370b2c9caa47fba
baf4559fedba753de171fa71f50f1ce1 5d43e994ec74d748002b000302030400
0d0010000e0403050306030203080408 050806002d00020101001c00024001ff
a500320408ffffffffffffffff050480 00ffff07048000ffff08011001048000
75300901100f088394c8f03e51570806 048000ffff
~~~
The unprotected header includes the connection ID and a 4-byte packet number
encoding for a packet number of 2:
~~~
c3ff00001d088394c8f03e5157080000449e00000002
~~~
Protecting the payload produces output that is sampled for header protection.
Because the header uses a 4-byte packet number encoding, the first 16 bytes of
the protected payload is sampled, then applied to the header:
~~~
sample = fb66bc6a93032b50dd8973972d149421
mask = AES-ECB(hp, sample)[0..4]
= 1e9cdb9909
header[0] ^= mask[0] & 0x0f
= cd
header[18..21] ^= mask[1..4]
= 9cdb990b
header = cdff00001d088394c8f03e5157080000449e9cdb990b
~~~
The resulting protected packet is:
~~~
cdff00001f088394c8f03e5157080000 449e9cdb990bfb66bc6a93032b50dd89
73972d149421874d3849e3708d71354e a33bcdc356f3ea6e2a1a1bd7c3d14003
8d3e784d04c30a2cdb40c32523aba2da fe1c1bf3d27a6be38fe38ae033fbb071
3c1c73661bb6639795b42b97f77068ea d51f11fbf9489af2501d09481e6c64d4
b8551cd3cea70d830ce2aeeec789ef55 1a7fbe36b3f7e1549a9f8d8e153b3fac
3fb7b7812c9ed7c20b4be190ebd89956 26e7f0fc887925ec6f0606c5d36aa81b
ebb7aacdc4a31bb5f23d55faef5c5190 5783384f375a43235b5c742c78ab1bae
0a188b75efbde6b3774ed61282f9670a 9dea19e1566103ce675ab4e21081fb58
60340a1e88e4f10e39eae25cd685b109 29636d4f02e7fad2a5a458249f5c0298
a6d53acbe41a7fc83fa7cc01973f7a74 d1237a51974e097636b6203997f921d0
7bc1940a6f2d0de9f5a11432946159ed 6cc21df65c4ddd1115f86427259a196c
7148b25b6478b0dc7766e1c4d1b1f515 9f90eabc61636226244642ee148b464c
9e619ee50a5e3ddc836227cad938987c 4ea3c1fa7c75bbf88d89e9ada642b2b8
8fe8107b7ea375b1b64889a4e9e5c38a 1c896ce275a5658d250e2d76e1ed3a34
ce7e3a3f383d0c996d0bed106c2899ca 6fc263ef0455e74bb6ac1640ea7bfedc
59f03fee0e1725ea150ff4d69a7660c5 542119c71de270ae7c3ecfd1af2c4ce5
51986949cc34a66b3e216bfe18b347e6 c05fd050f85912db303a8f054ec23e38
f44d1c725ab641ae929fecc8e3cefa56 19df4231f5b4c009fa0c0bbc60bc75f7
6d06ef154fc8577077d9d6a1d2bd9bf0 81dc783ece60111bea7da9e5a9748069
d078b2bef48de04cabe3755b197d52b3 2046949ecaa310274b4aac0d008b1948
c1082cdfe2083e386d4fd84c0ed0666d 3ee26c4515c4fee73433ac703b690a9f
7bf278a77486ace44c489a0c7ac8dfe4 d1a58fb3a730b993ff0f0d61b4d89557
831eb4c752ffd39c10f6b9f46d8db278 da624fd800e4af85548a294c1518893a
8778c4f6d6d73c93df200960104e062b 388ea97dcf4016bced7f62b4f062cb6c
04c20693d9a0e3b74ba8fe74cc012378 84f40d765ae56a51688d985cf0ceaef4
3045ed8c3f0c33bced08537f6882613a cd3b08d665fce9dd8aa73171e2d3771a
61dba2790e491d413d93d987e2745af2 9418e428be34941485c93447520ffe23
1da2304d6a0fd5d07d08372202369661 59bef3cf904d722324dd852513df39ae
030d8173908da6364786d3c1bfcb19ea 77a63b25f1e7fc661def480c5d00d444
56269ebd84efd8e3a8b2c257eec76060 682848cbf5194bc99e49ee75e4d0d254
bad4bfd74970c30e44b65511d4ad0e6e c7398e08e01307eeeea14e46ccd87cf3
6b285221254d8fc6a6765c524ded0085 dca5bd688ddf722e2c0faf9d0fb2ce7a
0c3f2cee19ca0ffba461ca8dc5d2c817 8b0762cf67135558494d2a96f1a139f0
edb42d2af89a9c9122b07acbc29e5e72 2df8615c343702491098478a389c9872
a10b0c9875125e257c7bfdf27eef4060 bd3d00f4c14fd3e3496c38d3c5d1a566
8c39350effbc2d16ca17be4ce29f02ed 969504dda2a8c6b9ff919e693ee79e09
089316e7d1d89ec099db3b2b268725d8 88536a4b8bf9aee8fb43e82a4d919d48
395781bc0a3e8125b4dd506ca025eb37
~~~
## Server Initial
The server sends the following payload in response, including an ACK frame, a
CRYPTO frame, and no PADDING frames:
~~~
02000000000600405a020000560303ee fce7f7b37ba1d1632e96677825ddf739
88cfc79825df566dc5430b9a045a1200 130100002e00330024001d00209d3c94
0d89690b84d08a60993c144eca684d10 81287c834d5311bcf32bb9da1a002b00
020304
~~~
The header from the server includes a new connection ID and a 2-byte packet
number encoding for a packet number of 1:
~~~
c1ff00001d0008f067a5502a4262b50040740001
~~~
As a result, after protection, the header protection sample is taken starting
from the third protected octet:
~~~
sample = 823a5d3a1207c86ee49132824f046524
mask = abaaf34fdc
header = caff00001d0008f067a5502a4262b5004074aaf2
~~~
The final protected packet is then:
~~~
c7ff00001f0008f067a5502a4262b500 4075fb12ff07823a5d24534d906ce4c7
6782a2167e3479c0f7f6395dc2c91676 302fe6d70bb7cbeb117b4ddb7d173498
44fd61dae200b8338e1b932976b61d91 e64a02e9e0ee72e3a6f63aba4ceeeec5
be2f24f2d86027572943533846caa13e 6f163fb257473d76f0e78487aca6427b
da2e7e70a7ee48
~~~
## Retry
This shows a Retry packet that might be sent in response to the Initial packet
in {{sample-client-initial}}. The integrity check includes the client-chosen
connection ID value of 0x8394c8f03e515708, but that value is not
included in the final Retry packet:
~~~
ffff00001f0008f067a5502a4262b574 6f6b656ec70ce5de430b4bdb7df1a383
3a75f986
~~~
## ChaCha20-Poly1305 Short Header Packet
This example shows some of the steps required to protect a packet with
a short header. This example uses AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305.
In this example, TLS produces an application write secret from which a server
uses HKDF-Expand-Label to produce four values: a key, an IV, a header
protection key, and the secret that will be used after keys are updated (this
last value is not used further in this example).
~~~
secret
= 9ac312a7f877468ebe69422748ad00a1
5443f18203a07d6060f688f30f21632b
key = HKDF-Expand-Label(secret, "quic key", _, 32)
= c6d98ff3441c3fe1b2182094f69caa2e
d4b716b65488960a7a984979fb23e1c8
iv = HKDF-Expand-Label(secret, "quic iv", _, 12)
= e0459b3474bdd0e44a41c144
hp = HKDF-Expand-Label(secret, "quic hp", _, 32)
= 25a282b9e82f06f21f488917a4fc8f1b
73573685608597d0efcb076b0ab7a7a4
ku = HKDF-Expand-Label(secret, "quic ku", _, 32)
= 1223504755036d556342ee9361d25342
1a826c9ecdf3c7148684b36b714881f9
~~~
The following shows the steps involved in protecting a minimal packet with an
empty Destination Connection ID. This packet contains a single PING frame (that
is, a payload of just 0x01) and has a packet number of 654360564. In this
example, using a packet number of length 3 (that is, 49140 is encoded) avoids
having to pad the payload of the packet; PADDING frames would be needed if the
packet number is encoded on fewer octets.
~~~
pn = 654360564 (decimal)
nonce = e0459b3474bdd0e46d417eb0
unprotected header = 4200bff4
payload plaintext = 01
payload ciphertext = 655e5cd55c41f69080575d7999c25a5bfb
~~~
The resulting ciphertext is the minimum size possible. One byte is skipped to
produce the sample for header protection.
~~~
sample = 5e5cd55c41f69080575d7999c25a5bfb
mask = aefefe7d03
header = 4cfe4189
~~~
The protected packet is the smallest possible packet size of 21 bytes.
~~~
packet = 4cfe4189655e5cd55c41f69080575d7999c25a5bfb
~~~
# AEAD Algorithm Analysis
This section documents analyses used in deriving AEAD algorithm limits for
AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_128_CCM, and AEAD_AES_256_GCM. The analyses that
follow use symbols for multiplication (*), division (/), and exponentiation (^),
plus parentheses for establishing precedence. The following symbols are also
used:
t:
: The size of the authentication tag in bits. For this cipher, t is 128.
n:
: The size of the block function in bits. For this cipher, n is 128.
l:
: The number of blocks in each packet (see below).
q:
: The number of genuine packets created and protected by endpoints. This value
is the bound on the number of packets that can be protected before updating
keys.
v:
: The number of forged packets that endpoints will accept. This value is the
bound on the number of forged packets that an endpoint can reject before
updating keys.
o:
: The amount of offline ideal cipher queries made by an adversary.
The analyses that follow rely on a count of the number of block operations
involved in producing each message. For simplicity, and to match the analysis of
other AEAD functions in {{AEBounds}}, this analysis assumes a packet length of
2^10 blocks; that is, a packet size limit of 2^14 bytes.
For AEAD_AES_128_CCM, the total number of block cipher operations is the sum
of: the length of the associated data in blocks, the length of the ciphertext
in blocks, the length of the plaintext in blocks, plus 1. In this analysis,
this is simplified to a value of twice the length of the packet in blocks (that
is, `2l = 2^11`). This simplification is based on the packet containing all of
the associated data and ciphertext. This results in a negligible 1 to 3 block
overestimation of the number of operations.
## Analysis of AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM Usage Limits {#gcm-bounds}
{{?GCM-MU}} specify concrete bounds for AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM as
used in TLS 1.3 and QUIC. This section documents this analysis using several
simplifying assumptions:
- The number of ciphertext blocks an attacker uses in forgery attempts is
bounded by v * l, the number of forgery attempts and the size of each packet (in
blocks).
- The amount of offline work done by an attacker does not dominate other factors
in the analysis.
The bounds in {{?GCM-MU}} are tighter and more complete than those used in
{{AEBounds}}, which allows for larger limits than those described in {{?TLS13}}.
### Confidentiality Limit
For confidentiality, Theorum (4.3) in {{?GCM-MU}} establishes that - for a
single user that does not repeat nonces - the dominant term in determining the
distinguishing advantage between a real and random AEAD algorithm gained by an
attacker is:
~~~
2 * (q * l)^2 / 2^128
~~~
For a target advantage of 2^-57, this results in the relation:
~~~
q <= 2^25
~~~
Thus, endpoints cannot protect more than 2^25 packets in a single connection
without causing an attacker to gain an larger advantage than the target of
2^-57.
### Integrity Limit
For integrity, Theorem (4.3) in {{?GCM-MU}} establishes that an attacker gains
an advantage in successfully forging a packet of no more than:
~~~
(1 / 2^(8 * n)) + ((2 * v) / 2^(2 * n))
+ ((2 * o * v) / 2^(k + n)) + (n * (v + (v * l)) / 2^k)
~~~
The goal is to limit this advantage to 2^-57. For AEAD_AES_128_GCM, the fourth
term in this inequality dominates the rest, so the others can be removed without
significant effect on the result. This produces the following approximation:
~~~
v <= 2^54
~~~
For AEAD_AES_256_GCM, the second and fourth terms dominate the rest, so the
others can be removed without affecting the result. This produces the following
approximation:
~~~
v <= 2^182
~~~
This is substantially larger than the limit for AEAD_AES_128_GCM. However, this
document recommends that the same limit be applied to both functions as either
limit is acceptably large.
## Analysis of AEAD_AES_128_CCM Usage Limits {#ccm-bounds}
TLS {{?TLS13}} and {{AEBounds}} do not specify limits on usage
for AEAD_AES_128_CCM. However, any AEAD that is used with QUIC requires limits
on use that ensure that both confidentiality and integrity are preserved. This
section documents that analysis.
{{?CCM-ANALYSIS=DOI.10.1007/3-540-36492-7_7}} is used as the basis of this
analysis. The results of that analysis are used to derive usage limits that are
based on those chosen in {{?TLS13}}.
### Confidentiality Limits
For confidentiality, Theorem 2 in {{?CCM-ANALYSIS}} establishes that an attacker
gains a distinguishing advantage over an ideal pseudorandom permutation (PRP) of
no more than:
~~~
(2l * q)^2 / 2^n
~~~
For a target advantage of 2^-57, this results in the relation:
~~~
q <= 2^24.5
~~~
That is, endpoints cannot protect more than 2^23 packets with the same set of
keys without causing an attacker to gain a larger advantage than the target of
2^-57. Note however that the integrity limits further constrain this value.
### Integrity Limits
For integrity, Theorem 1 in {{?CCM-ANALYSIS}} establishes that an attacker
gains an advantage over an ideal PRP of no more than:
~~~
v / 2^t + (2l * (v + q))^2 / 2^n
~~~
The goal is to limit this advantage to 2^-57. As `t` and `n` are both 128, the
first term is negligible relative to the second, so that term can be removed
without a significant effect on the result. This produces the relation:
~~~
v + q <= 2^24.5
~~~
Assuming `q = v`, endpoints cannot attempt to protect or authenticate more than
2^23.5 packets with the same set of keys without causing an attacker to gain a
larger advantage in forging packets than the target of 2^-57.
# Change Log
> **RFC Editor's Note:** Please remove this section prior to publication of a
> final version of this document.
Issue and pull request numbers are listed with a leading octothorp.
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-30
- Add a new error code for AEAD_LIMIT_REACHED code to avoid conflict (#4087,
#4088)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-29
- Updated limits on packet protection (#3788, #3789)
- Allow for packet processing to continue while waiting for TLS to provide
keys (#3821, #3874)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-28
- Defined limits on the number of packets that can be protected with a single
key and limits on the number of packets that can fail authentication (#3619,
#3620)
- Update Initial salt, Retry keys, and samples (#3711)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-27
- Allowed CONNECTION_CLOSE in any packet number space, with restrictions on
use of the application-specific variant (#3430, #3435, #3440)
- Prohibit the use of the compatibility mode from TLS 1.3 (#3594, #3595)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-26
- No changes
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-25
- No changes
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-24
- Rewrite key updates (#3050)
- Allow but don't recommend deferring key updates (#2792, #3263)
- More completely define received behavior (#2791)
- Define the label used with HKDF-Expand-Label (#3054)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-23
- Key update text update (#3050):
- Recommend constant-time key replacement (#2792)
- Provide explicit labels for key update key derivation (#3054)
- Allow first Initial from a client to span multiple packets (#2928, #3045)
- PING can be sent at any encryption level (#3034, #3035)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-22
- Update the salt used for Initial secrets (#2887, #2980)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-21
- No changes
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-20
- Mandate the use of the QUIC transport parameters extension (#2528, #2560)
- Define handshake completion and confirmation; define clearer rules when it
encryption keys should be discarded (#2214, #2267, #2673)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-18
- Increased the set of permissible frames in 0-RTT (#2344, #2355)
- Transport parameter extension is mandatory (#2528, #2560)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-17
- Endpoints discard initial keys as soon as handshake keys are available (#1951,
#2045)
- Use of ALPN or equivalent is mandatory (#2263, #2284)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-14
- Update the salt used for Initial secrets (#1970)
- Clarify that TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 isn't supported (#2019)
- Change header protection
- Sample from a fixed offset (#1575, #2030)
- Cover part of the first byte, including the key phase (#1322, #2006)
- TLS provides an AEAD and KDF function (#2046)
- Clarify that the TLS KDF is used with TLS (#1997)
- Change the labels for calculation of QUIC keys (#1845, #1971, #1991)
- Initial keys are discarded once Handshake keys are available (#1951, #2045)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-13
- Updated to TLS 1.3 final (#1660)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-12
- Changes to integration of the TLS handshake (#829, #1018, #1094, #1165, #1190,
#1233, #1242, #1252, #1450)
- The cryptographic handshake uses CRYPTO frames, not stream 0
- QUIC packet protection is used in place of TLS record protection
- Separate QUIC packet number spaces are used for the handshake
- Changed Retry to be independent of the cryptographic handshake
- Limit the use of HelloRetryRequest to address TLS needs (like key shares)
- Changed codepoint of TLS extension (#1395, #1402)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-11
- Encrypted packet numbers.
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-10
- No significant changes.
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-09
- Cleaned up key schedule and updated the salt used for handshake packet
protection (#1077)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-08
- Specify value for max_early_data_size to enable 0-RTT (#942)
- Update key derivation function (#1003, #1004)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-07
- Handshake errors can be reported with CONNECTION_CLOSE (#608, #891)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-05
No significant changes.
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-04
- Update labels used in HKDF-Expand-Label to match TLS 1.3 (#642)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-03
No significant changes.
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-02
- Updates to match changes in transport draft
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-01
- Use TLS alerts to signal TLS errors (#272, #374)
- Require ClientHello to fit in a single packet (#338)
- The second client handshake flight is now sent in the clear (#262, #337)
- The QUIC header is included as AEAD Associated Data (#226, #243, #302)
- Add interface necessary for client address validation (#275)
- Define peer authentication (#140)
- Require at least TLS 1.3 (#138)
- Define transport parameters as a TLS extension (#122)
- Define handling for protected packets before the handshake completes (#39)
- Decouple QUIC version and ALPN (#12)
## Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-00
- Changed bit used to signal key phase
- Updated key phase markings during the handshake
- Added TLS interface requirements section
- Moved to use of TLS exporters for key derivation
- Moved TLS error code definitions into this document
## Since draft-thomson-quic-tls-01
- Adopted as base for draft-ietf-quic-tls
- Updated authors/editors list
- Added status note
# Contributors
{:numbered="false"}
The IETF QUIC Working Group received an enormous amount of support from many
people. The following people provided substantive contributions to this
document:
- Adam Langley
- Alessandro Ghedini
- Christian Huitema
- Christopher Wood
- David Schinazi
- Dragana Damjanovic
- Eric Rescorla
- Felix Günther
- Ian Swett
- Jana Iyengar
- <t><t><contact asciiFullname="Kazuho Oku" fullname="奥 一穂"/></t></t>
- Marten Seemann
- Martin Duke
- Mike Bishop
- <t><t><contact fullname="Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen"/></t></t>
- Nick Banks
- Nick Harper
- Roberto Peon
- Rui Paulo
- Ryan Hamilton
- Victor Vasiliev
