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Revision | Author | Date | Message | Commit Date |
---|---|---|---|---|
01443f0 | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:25:28 UTC | Git 2.39.1 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 13 December 2022, 12:25:28 UTC |
96738bb | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:25:15 UTC | Sync with 2.38.3 | 13 December 2022, 12:25:15 UTC |
37ed7bf | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:24:14 UTC | Git 2.38.3 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 13 December 2022, 12:24:14 UTC |
fea9f60 | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:23:36 UTC | Sync with Git 2.37.5 | 13 December 2022, 12:23:36 UTC |
e43ac5f | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:20:47 UTC | Git 2.37.5 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 13 December 2022, 12:20:47 UTC |
431f6e6 | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:20:35 UTC | Merge branch 'maint-2.36' into maint-2.37 | 13 December 2022, 12:20:35 UTC |
ad949b2 | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:19:24 UTC | Git 2.36.4 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 13 December 2022, 12:19:24 UTC |
8253c00 | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:19:11 UTC | Merge branch 'maint-2.35' into maint-2.36 | 13 December 2022, 12:19:11 UTC |
02f4981 | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:17:26 UTC | Git 2.35.6 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 13 December 2022, 12:17:26 UTC |
fbabbc3 | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:17:10 UTC | Merge branch 'maint-2.34' into maint-2.35 | 13 December 2022, 12:17:10 UTC |
6c94669 | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:15:39 UTC | Git 2.34.6 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 13 December 2022, 12:15:39 UTC |
3748b5b | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:15:22 UTC | Merge branch 'maint-2.33' into maint-2.34 | 13 December 2022, 12:15:22 UTC |
7fe9bf5 | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:13:48 UTC | Git 2.33.6 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 13 December 2022, 12:13:48 UTC |
5f22dcc | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:13:11 UTC | Sync with Git 2.32.5 | 13 December 2022, 12:13:11 UTC |
d96ea53 | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:10:27 UTC | Git 2.32.5 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 13 December 2022, 12:10:27 UTC |
32e357b | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:09:56 UTC | Merge branch 'ps/attr-limits-with-fsck' into maint-2.32 | 13 December 2022, 12:09:56 UTC |
8a755ed | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:09:40 UTC | Sync with Git 2.31.6 | 13 December 2022, 12:09:40 UTC |
82689d5 | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:04:03 UTC | Git 2.31.6 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 13 December 2022, 12:04:03 UTC |
1612876 | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 12:02:20 UTC | Sync with Git 2.30.7 | 13 December 2022, 12:02:20 UTC |
b7b37a3 | Junio C Hamano | 13 December 2022, 11:56:43 UTC | Git 2.30.7 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 13 December 2022, 11:56:43 UTC |
c48035d | Junio C Hamano | 12 December 2022, 00:59:08 UTC | Git 2.39 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 12 December 2022, 00:59:08 UTC |
31cc8be | Junio C Hamano | 12 December 2022, 00:20:49 UTC | Merge tag 'l10n-2.39.0-rnd1' of https://github.com/git-l10n/git-po l10n-2.39.0-rnd1 * tag 'l10n-2.39.0-rnd1' of https://github.com/git-l10n/git-po: l10n: zh_TW.po: Git 2.39-rc2 l10n: tr: v2.39.0 updates l10n: Update Catalan translation l10n: bg.po: Updated Bulgarian translation (5501t) l10n: de.po: update German translation l10n: zh_CN v2.39.0 round 1 l10n: fr: v2.39 rnd 1 l10n: po-id for 2.39 (round 1) l10n: sv.po: Update Swedish translation (5501t0f0) | 12 December 2022, 00:20:49 UTC |
694cb1b | Junio C Hamano | 11 December 2022, 00:34:51 UTC | Sync with Git 2.38.2 | 11 December 2022, 00:34:51 UTC |
8706a59 | Junio C Hamano | 11 December 2022, 00:32:48 UTC | Git 2.38.2 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 11 December 2022, 00:32:48 UTC |
6d0497d | pan93412 | 10 December 2022, 17:16:20 UTC | l10n: zh_TW.po: Git 2.39-rc2 Signed-off-by: pan93412 <pan93412@gmail.com> | 10 December 2022, 17:27:25 UTC |
0ddd73f | Johannes Schindelin | 08 November 2022, 10:13:28 UTC | ci: use a newer `github-script` version The old version we currently use runs in node.js v12.x, which is being deprecated in GitHub Actions. The new version uses node.js v16.x. Incidentally, this also avoids the warning about the deprecated `::set-output::` workflow command because the newer version of the `github-script` Action uses the recommended new way to specify outputs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> | 10 December 2022, 07:32:16 UTC |
e71f00f | Junio C Hamano | 10 December 2022, 07:17:47 UTC | Merge branch 'jx/ci-ubuntu-fix' into maint-2.38 Adjust the GitHub CI to newer ubuntu release. * jx/ci-ubuntu-fix: ci: install python on ubuntu ci: use the same version of p4 on both Linux and macOS ci: remove the pipe after "p4 -V" to catch errors github-actions: run gcc-8 on ubuntu-20.04 image | 10 December 2022, 07:17:47 UTC |
bbfd79a | Junio C Hamano | 10 December 2022, 05:02:22 UTC | Sync with 'maint' | 10 December 2022, 05:02:22 UTC |
ec9816c | Junio C Hamano | 10 December 2022, 05:02:09 UTC | Merge branch 'js/ci-use-newer-up-down-artifact' into maint-2.38 CI fix. * js/ci-use-newer-up-down-artifact: ci: avoid using deprecated {up,down}load-artifacts Action | 10 December 2022, 05:02:09 UTC |
75efbc1 | Junio C Hamano | 10 December 2022, 05:02:09 UTC | Merge branch 'ab/ci-use-macos-12' into maint-2.38 CI fix. * ab/ci-use-macos-12: CI: upgrade to macos-12, and pin OSX version | 10 December 2022, 05:02:09 UTC |
634d026 | Junio C Hamano | 10 December 2022, 05:02:09 UTC | Merge branch 'ab/ci-retire-set-output' into maint-2.38 CI fix. * ab/ci-retire-set-output: CI: migrate away from deprecated "set-output" syntax | 10 December 2022, 05:02:09 UTC |
8972be0 | Junio C Hamano | 10 December 2022, 05:02:09 UTC | Merge branch 'ab/ci-musl-bash-fix' into maint-2.38 CI fix. * ab/ci-musl-bash-fix: CI: don't explicitly pick "bash" shell outside of Windows, fix regression | 10 December 2022, 05:02:09 UTC |
78c5de9 | Junio C Hamano | 10 December 2022, 05:02:09 UTC | Merge branch 'od/ci-use-checkout-v3-when-applicable' into maint-2.38 Update GitHub CI to use actions/checkout@v3; use of the older checkout@v2 gets annoying deprecation notices. * od/ci-use-checkout-v3-when-applicable: ci(main): upgrade actions/checkout to v3 | 10 December 2022, 05:02:09 UTC |
481d274 | Junio C Hamano | 10 December 2022, 05:01:06 UTC | Merge branch 'js/ci-use-newer-up-down-artifact' CI fix. * js/ci-use-newer-up-down-artifact: ci: avoid using deprecated {up,down}load-artifacts Action | 10 December 2022, 05:01:06 UTC |
0b32d1a | Junio C Hamano | 10 December 2022, 05:01:06 UTC | Merge branch 'ab/ci-use-macos-12' CI fix. * ab/ci-use-macos-12: CI: upgrade to macos-12, and pin OSX version | 10 December 2022, 05:01:06 UTC |
82444ea | Junio C Hamano | 10 December 2022, 05:01:05 UTC | Merge branch 'ab/ci-retire-set-output' CI fix. * ab/ci-retire-set-output: CI: migrate away from deprecated "set-output" syntax | 10 December 2022, 05:01:05 UTC |
a64bf54 | Junio C Hamano | 10 December 2022, 05:01:05 UTC | Merge branch 'ab/ci-musl-bash-fix' CI fix. * ab/ci-musl-bash-fix: CI: don't explicitly pick "bash" shell outside of Windows, fix regression | 10 December 2022, 05:01:05 UTC |
9044a39 | Junio C Hamano | 10 December 2022, 05:01:05 UTC | Merge branch 'od/ci-use-checkout-v3-when-applicable' Update GitHub CI to use actions/checkout@v3; use of the older checkout@v2 gets annoying deprecation notices. * od/ci-use-checkout-v3-when-applicable: ci(main): upgrade actions/checkout to v3 | 10 December 2022, 05:01:05 UTC |
38645f8 | Matheus Tavares | 09 December 2022, 23:35:16 UTC | mailmap: update email address of Matheus Tavares I haven't been very active in the community lately, but I'm soon going to lose access to my previous commit email (@usp.br); so add my current personal address to mailmap for any future message exchanges or patch contributions. Signed-off-by: Matheus Tavares <matheus.bernardino@usp.br> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 10 December 2022, 00:17:36 UTC |
93a7bc8 | Victoria Dye | 07 November 2022, 17:47:52 UTC | rebase --update-refs: avoid unintended ref deletion In b3b1a21d1a5 (sequencer: rewrite update-refs as user edits todo list, 2022-07-19), the 'todo_list_filter_update_refs()' step was added to handle the removal of 'update-ref' lines from a 'rebase-todo'. Specifically, it removes potential ref updates from the "update refs state" if a ref does not have a corresponding 'update-ref' line. However, because 'write_update_refs_state()' will not update the state if the 'refs_to_oids' list was empty, removing *all* 'update-ref' lines will result in the state remaining unchanged from how it was initialized (with all refs' "after" OID being null). Then, when the ref update is applied, all refs will be updated to null and consequently deleted. To fix this, delete the 'update-refs' state file when 'refs_to_oids' is empty. Additionally, add a tests covering "all update-ref lines removed" cases. Reported-by: herr.kaste <herr.kaste@gmail.com> Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk> Helped-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com> Signed-off-by: Victoria Dye <vdye@github.com> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> | 09 December 2022, 10:31:45 UTC |
27ab478 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:46:09 UTC | fsck: implement checks for gitattributes Recently, a vulnerability was reported that can lead to an out-of-bounds write when reading an unreasonably large gitattributes file. The root cause of this error are multiple integer overflows in different parts of the code when there are either too many lines, when paths are too long, when attribute names are too long, or when there are too many attributes declared for a pattern. As all of these are related to size, it seems reasonable to restrict the size of the gitattributes file via git-fsck(1). This allows us to both stop distributing known-vulnerable objects via common hosting platforms that have fsck enabled, and users to protect themselves by enabling the `fetch.fsckObjects` config. There are basically two checks: 1. We verify that size of the gitattributes file is smaller than 100MB. 2. We verify that the maximum line length does not exceed 2048 bytes. With the preceding commits, both of these conditions would cause us to either ignore the complete gitattributes file or blob in the first case, or the specific line in the second case. Now with these consistency checks added, we also grow the ability to stop distributing such files in the first place when `receive.fsckObjects` is enabled. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 08:07:04 UTC |
f8587c3 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:46:05 UTC | fsck: move checks for gitattributes Move the checks for gitattributes so that they can be extended more readily. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 08:05:00 UTC |
a59a8c6 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:46:01 UTC | fsck: pull out function to check a set of blobs In `fsck_finish()` we check all blobs for consistency that we have found during the tree walk, but that haven't yet been checked. This is only required for gitmodules right now, but will also be required for a new check for gitattributes. Pull out a function `fsck_blobs()` that allows the caller to check a set of blobs for consistency. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 08:05:00 UTC |
bb3a926 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:45:57 UTC | fsck: refactor `fsck_blob()` to allow for more checks In general, we don't need to validate blob contents as they are opaque blobs about whose content Git doesn't need to care about. There are some exceptions though when blobs are linked into trees so that they would be interpreted by Git. We only have a single such check right now though, which is the one for gitmodules that has been added in the context of CVE-2018-11235. Now we have found another vulnerability with gitattributes that can lead to out-of-bounds writes and reads. So let's refactor `fsck_blob()` so that it is more extensible and can check different types of blobs. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 08:05:00 UTC |
e0bfc0b | Junio C Hamano | 09 December 2022, 08:03:49 UTC | Merge branch 'ps/attr-limits' into maint-2.32 | 09 December 2022, 08:03:49 UTC |
6662a83 | Junio C Hamano | 09 December 2022, 07:05:52 UTC | Merge branch 'ps/attr-limits' into maint-2.30 | 09 December 2022, 07:05:52 UTC |
3305300 | Junio C Hamano | 09 December 2022, 07:02:39 UTC | Merge branch 'ps/format-padding-fix' into maint-2.30 | 09 December 2022, 07:02:39 UTC |
304a50a | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:47:23 UTC | pretty: restrict input lengths for padding and wrapping formats Both the padding and wrapping formatting directives allow the caller to specify an integer that ultimately leads to us adding this many chars to the result buffer. As a consequence, it is trivial to e.g. allocate 2GB of RAM via a single formatting directive and cause resource exhaustion on the machine executing this logic. Furthermore, it is debatable whether there are any sane usecases that require the user to pad data to 2GB boundaries or to indent wrapped data by 2GB. Restrict the input sizes to 16 kilobytes at a maximum to limit the amount of bytes that can be requested by the user. This is not meant as a fix because there are ways to trivially amplify the amount of data we generate via formatting directives; the real protection is achieved by the changes in previous steps to catch and avoid integer wraparound that causes us to under-allocate and access beyond the end of allocated memory reagions. But having such a limit significantly helps fuzzing the pretty format, because the fuzzer is otherwise quite fast to run out-of-memory as it discovers these formatters. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 05:26:21 UTC |
f930a23 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:47:15 UTC | utf8: refactor `strbuf_utf8_replace` to not rely on preallocated buffer In `strbuf_utf8_replace`, we preallocate the destination buffer and then use `memcpy` to copy bytes into it at computed offsets. This feels rather fragile and is hard to understand at times. Refactor the code to instead use `strbuf_add` and `strbuf_addstr` so that we can be sure that there is no possibility to perform an out-of-bounds write. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 05:26:21 UTC |
81c2d4c | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:47:10 UTC | utf8: fix checking for glyph width in `strbuf_utf8_replace()` In `strbuf_utf8_replace()`, we call `utf8_width()` to compute the width of the current glyph. If the glyph is a control character though it can be that `utf8_width()` returns `-1`, but because we assign this value to a `size_t` the conversion will cause us to underflow. This bug can easily be triggered with the following command: $ git log --pretty='format:xxx%<|(1,trunc)%x10' >From all I can see though this seems to be a benign underflow that has no security-related consequences. Fix the bug by using an `int` instead. When we see a control character, we now copy it into the target buffer but don't advance the current width of the string. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 05:26:21 UTC |
937b71c | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:47:04 UTC | utf8: fix overflow when returning string width The return type of both `utf8_strwidth()` and `utf8_strnwidth()` is `int`, but we operate on string lengths which are typically of type `size_t`. This means that when the string is longer than `INT_MAX`, we will overflow and thus return a negative result. This can lead to an out-of-bounds write with `--pretty=format:%<1)%B` and a commit message that is 2^31+1 bytes long: ================================================================= ==26009==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000001168 at pc 0x7f95c4e5f427 bp 0x7ffd8541c900 sp 0x7ffd8541c0a8 WRITE of size 2147483649 at 0x603000001168 thread T0 #0 0x7f95c4e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 #1 0x5612bbb1068c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1763 #2 0x5612bbb1087a in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #3 0x5612bbc33bab in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #4 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #5 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #6 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #7 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #8 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #9 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #10 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #11 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #12 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #13 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788 #14 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #15 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57 #16 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #17 0x7f95c4c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #18 0x5612bb5680e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x603000001168 is located 0 bytes to the right of 24-byte region [0x603000001150,0x603000001168) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f95c4ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x5612bbcdd556 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x5612bbc310a3 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x5612bbc32acd in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298 #4 0x5612bbc33aec in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418 #5 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #6 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #7 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #8 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #9 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #10 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #11 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #12 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #16 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff81d0: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa 0x0c067fff81e0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff81f0: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8200: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa 0x0c067fff8210: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd =>0x0c067fff8220: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00[fa]fa fa 0x0c067fff8230: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8240: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8250: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8260: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8270: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==26009==ABORTING Now the proper fix for this would be to convert both functions to return an `size_t` instead of an `int`. But given that this commit may be part of a security release, let's instead do the minimal viable fix and die in case we see an overflow. Add a test that would have previously caused us to crash. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 05:26:21 UTC |
17d23e8 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:47:00 UTC | utf8: fix returning negative string width The `utf8_strnwidth()` function calls `utf8_width()` in a loop and adds its returned width to the end result. `utf8_width()` can return `-1` though in case it reads a control character, which means that the computed string width is going to be wrong. In the worst case where there are more control characters than non-control characters, we may even return a negative string width. Fix this bug by treating control characters as having zero width. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 05:26:21 UTC |
522cc87 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:46:53 UTC | utf8: fix truncated string lengths in `utf8_strnwidth()` The `utf8_strnwidth()` function accepts an optional string length as input parameter. This parameter can either be set to `-1`, in which case we call `strlen()` on the input. Or it can be set to a positive integer that indicates a precomputed length, which callers typically compute by calling `strlen()` at some point themselves. The input parameter is an `int` though, whereas `strlen()` returns a `size_t`. This can lead to implementation-defined behaviour though when the `size_t` cannot be represented by the `int`. In the general case though this leads to wrap-around and thus to negative string sizes, which is sure enough to not lead to well-defined behaviour. Fix this by accepting a `size_t` instead of an `int` as string length. While this takes away the ability of callers to simply pass in `-1` as string length, it really is trivial enough to convert them to instead pass in `strlen()` instead. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 05:26:21 UTC |
48050c4 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:46:49 UTC | pretty: fix integer overflow in wrapping format The `%w(width,indent1,indent2)` formatting directive can be used to rewrap text to a specific width and is designed after git-shortlog(1)'s `-w` parameter. While the three parameters are all stored as `size_t` internally, `strbuf_add_wrapped_text()` accepts integers as input. As a result, the casted integers may overflow. As these now-negative integers are later on passed to `strbuf_addchars()`, we will ultimately run into implementation-defined behaviour due to casting a negative number back to `size_t` again. On my platform, this results in trying to allocate 9000 petabyte of memory. Fix this overflow by using `cast_size_t_to_int()` so that we reject inputs that cannot be represented as an integer. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 05:26:21 UTC |
1de69c0 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:46:39 UTC | pretty: fix adding linefeed when placeholder is not expanded When a formatting directive has a `+` or ` ` after the `%`, then we add either a line feed or space if the placeholder expands to a non-empty string. In specific cases though this logic doesn't work as expected, and we try to add the character even in the case where the formatting directive is empty. One such pattern is `%w(1)%+d%+w(2)`. `%+d` expands to reference names pointing to a certain commit, like in `git log --decorate`. For a tagged commit this would for example expand to `\n (tag: v1.0.0)`, which has a leading newline due to the `+` modifier and a space added by `%d`. Now the second wrapping directive will cause us to rewrap the text to `\n(tag:\nv1.0.0)`, which is one byte shorter due to the missing leading space. The code that handles the `+` magic now notices that the length has changed and will thus try to insert a leading line feed at the original posititon. But as the string was shortened, the original position is past the buffer's boundary and thus we die with an error. Now there are two issues here: 1. We check whether the buffer length has changed, not whether it has been extended. This causes us to try and add the character past the string boundary. 2. The current logic does not make any sense whatsoever. When the string got expanded due to the rewrap, putting the separator into the original position is likely to put it somewhere into the middle of the rewrapped contents. It is debatable whether `%+w()` makes any sense in the first place. Strictly speaking, the placeholder never expands to a non-empty string, and consequentially we shouldn't ever accept this combination. We thus fix the bug by simply refusing `%+w()`. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 05:26:21 UTC |
f6e0b9f | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:46:34 UTC | pretty: fix out-of-bounds read when parsing invalid padding format An out-of-bounds read can be triggered when parsing an incomplete padding format string passed via `--pretty=format` or in Git archives when files are marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute. This bug exists since we have introduced support for truncating output via the `trunc` keyword a7f01c6b4d (pretty: support truncating in %>, %< and %><, 2013-04-19). Before this commit, we used to find the end of the formatting string by using strchr(3P). This function returns a `NULL` pointer in case the character in question wasn't found. The subsequent check whether any character was found thus simply checked the returned pointer. After the commit we switched to strcspn(3P) though, which only returns the offset to the first found character or to the trailing NUL byte. As the end pointer is now computed by adding the offset to the start pointer it won't be `NULL` anymore, and as a consequence the check doesn't do anything anymore. The out-of-bounds data that is being read can in fact end up in the formatted string. As a consequence, it is possible to leak memory contents either by calling git-log(1) or via git-archive(1) when any of the archived files is marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute. ==10888==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000398 at pc 0x7f0356047cb2 bp 0x7fff3ffb95d0 sp 0x7fff3ffb8d78 READ of size 1 at 0x602000000398 thread T0 #0 0x7f0356047cb1 in __interceptor_strchrnul /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 #1 0x563b7cec9a43 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:417 #2 0x563b7cda7060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #3 0x563b7cda8d0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #4 0x563b7cca04c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #5 0x563b7cca36ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #6 0x563b7c927ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #7 0x563b7c92835b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #8 0x563b7c92b1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57 #14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x602000000398 is located 0 bytes to the right of 8-byte region [0x602000000390,0x602000000398) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f0356072faa in __interceptor_strdup /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x563b7cf7317c in xstrdup wrapper.c:39 #2 0x563b7cd9a06a in save_user_format pretty.c:40 #3 0x563b7cd9b3e5 in get_commit_format pretty.c:173 #4 0x563b7ce54ea0 in handle_revision_opt revision.c:2456 #5 0x563b7ce597c9 in setup_revisions revision.c:2850 #6 0x563b7c9269e0 in cmd_log_init_finish builtin/log.c:269 #7 0x563b7c927362 in cmd_log_init builtin/log.c:348 #8 0x563b7c92b193 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:882 #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57 #14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 in __interceptor_strchrnul Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8030: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8040: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 03 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8050: fa fa 00 01 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 01 0x0c047fff8060: fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa 05 fa =>0x0c047fff8070: fa fa 00[fa]fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8080: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa 0x0c047fff8090: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==10888==ABORTING Fix this bug by checking whether `end` points at the trailing NUL byte. Add a test which catches this out-of-bounds read and which demonstrates that we used to write out-of-bounds data into the formatted message. Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de> Original-patch-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 05:26:21 UTC |
b49f309 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:46:30 UTC | pretty: fix out-of-bounds read when left-flushing with stealing With the `%>>(<N>)` pretty formatter, you can ask git-log(1) et al to steal spaces. To do so we need to look ahead of the next token to see whether there are spaces there. This loop takes into account ANSI sequences that end with an `m`, and if it finds any it will skip them until it finds the first space. While doing so it does not take into account the buffer's limits though and easily does an out-of-bounds read. Add a test that hits this behaviour. While we don't have an easy way to verify this, the test causes the following failure when run with `SANITIZE=address`: ==37941==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000000baf at pc 0x55ba6f88e0d0 bp 0x7ffc84c50d20 sp 0x7ffc84c50d10 READ of size 1 at 0x603000000baf thread T0 #0 0x55ba6f88e0cf in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1712 #1 0x55ba6f88e7b4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #2 0x55ba6f9b1ae4 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #3 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #4 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #5 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #6 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #7 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #8 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #9 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #10 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #11 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #12 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788 #13 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #14 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57 #15 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #16 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #17 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x603000000baf is located 1 bytes to the left of 24-byte region [0x603000000bb0,0x603000000bc8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f2d08ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x55ba6fa5b494 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x55ba6f9aefdc in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x55ba6f9b0a06 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298 #4 0x55ba6f9b1a25 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418 #5 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #6 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #7 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #8 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #9 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #10 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #11 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #12 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #16 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #18 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #19 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow pretty.c:1712 in format_and_pad_commit Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff8120: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8130: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8140: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa 0x0c067fff8150: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8160: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa =>0x0c067fff8170: fd fd fd fa fa[fa]00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa 0x0c067fff8180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8190: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Luckily enough, this would only cause us to copy the out-of-bounds data into the formatted commit in case we really had an ANSI sequence preceding our buffer. So this bug likely has no security consequences. Fix it regardless by not traversing past the buffer's start. Reported-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Reported-by: Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 05:26:21 UTC |
81dc898 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:46:25 UTC | pretty: fix out-of-bounds write caused by integer overflow When using a padding specifier in the pretty format passed to git-log(1) we need to calculate the string length in several places. These string lengths are stored in `int`s though, which means that these can easily overflow when the input lengths exceeds 2GB. This can ultimately lead to an out-of-bounds write when these are used in a call to memcpy(3P): ==8340==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f1ec62f97fe at pc 0x7f2127e5f427 bp 0x7ffd3bd63de0 sp 0x7ffd3bd63588 WRITE of size 1 at 0x7f1ec62f97fe thread T0 #0 0x7f2127e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 #1 0x5628e96aa605 in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1762 #2 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #3 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #4 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #5 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #6 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #7 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #8 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #9 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #10 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #11 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #12 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #13 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #14 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #15 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57 #16 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #17 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #18 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x7f1ec62f97fe is located 2 bytes to the left of 4831838265-byte region [0x7f1ec62f9800,0x7f1fe62f9839) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f2127ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x5628e98774d4 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x5628e97cb01c in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x5628e97ccd42 in strbuf_addchars strbuf.c:327 #4 0x5628e96aa55c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1761 #5 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #6 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #7 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #8 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #9 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #10 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #11 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #12 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #13 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #14 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #15 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #16 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #17 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #18 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57 #19 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #20 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #21 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0fe458c572a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x0fe458c572f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa] 0x0fe458c57300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57310: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57320: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57330: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57340: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==8340==ABORTING The pretty format can also be used in `git archive` operations via the `export-subst` attribute. So this is what in our opinion makes this a critical issue in the context of Git forges which allow to download an archive of user supplied Git repositories. Fix this vulnerability by using `size_t` instead of `int` to track the string lengths. Add tests which detect this vulnerability when Git is compiled with the address sanitizer. Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com> Original-patch-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com> Modified-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttalorr.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 05:26:21 UTC |
a244dc5 | Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón | 02 November 2021, 15:46:06 UTC | test-lib: add prerequisite for 64-bit platforms Allow tests that assume a 64-bit `size_t` to be skipped in 32-bit platforms and regardless of the size of `long`. This imitates the `LONG_IS_64BIT` prerequisite. Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 05:26:04 UTC |
bd5df96 | Johannes Schindelin | 08 December 2022, 14:48:07 UTC | RelNotes: a couple of typofixes Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 09 December 2022, 04:36:49 UTC |
e5a9f4e | Jiang Xin | 08 December 2022, 00:25:27 UTC | Merge branch 'turkish' of github.com:bitigchi/git-po * 'turkish' of github.com:bitigchi/git-po: l10n: tr: v2.39.0 updates | 08 December 2022, 00:25:27 UTC |
31e19ec | Jiang Xin | 08 December 2022, 00:24:56 UTC | Merge branch 'catalan' of github.com:Softcatala/git-po * 'catalan' of github.com:Softcatala/git-po: l10n: Update Catalan translation | 08 December 2022, 00:24:56 UTC |
c72d15e | Jiang Xin | 08 December 2022, 00:22:57 UTC | Merge branch 'fz/po-zh_CN' of github.com:fangyi-zhou/git-po * 'fz/po-zh_CN' of github.com:fangyi-zhou/git-po: l10n: zh_CN v2.39.0 round 1 | 08 December 2022, 00:22:57 UTC |
f115c96 | Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason | 07 December 2022, 01:49:18 UTC | CI: migrate away from deprecated "set-output" syntax As noted in [1] and the warnings the CI itself is spewing echoing outputs to stdout is deprecated, and they should be written to "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" instead. 1. https://github.blog/changelog/2022-10-11-github-actions-deprecating-save-state-and-set-output-commands/ Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 07 December 2022, 23:47:22 UTC |
1f39844 | Johannes Schindelin | 07 December 2022, 14:34:39 UTC | ci: avoid using deprecated {up,down}load-artifacts Action The deprecated versions of these Actions still use node.js 12 whereas workflows will need to use node.js 16 to avoid problems going forward. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 07 December 2022, 23:15:23 UTC |
d8b21a0 | Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason | 07 December 2022, 12:03:15 UTC | CI: don't explicitly pick "bash" shell outside of Windows, fix regression When the "js/ci-github-workflow-markup" topic was originally merged in [1] it included a change to get rid of the "ci/print-test-failures.sh" step[2]. This was then brought back in [3] as part of a fix-up patches on top[4]. The problem was that [3] was not a revert of the relevant parts of [2], but rather copy/pasted the "ci/print-test-failures.sh" step that was present for the Windows job to all "ci/print-test-failures.sh" steps. The Windows steps specified "shell: bash", but the non-Windows ones did not. This broke the "ci/print/test-failures.sh" step for the "linux-musl" job, where we don't have a "bash" shell, just a "/bin/sh" (a "dash"). This breakage was reported at the time[5], but hadn't been fixed. It would be sufficient to change this only for "linux-musl", but let's change this for both "regular" and "dockerized" to omit the "shell" line entirely, as we did before [2]. Let's also change undo the "name" change that [3] made while copy/pasting the "print test failures" step for the Windows job. These steps are now the same as they were before [2], except that the "if" includes the "env.FAILED_TEST_ARTIFACTS" test. 1. fc5a070f591 (Merge branch 'js/ci-github-workflow-markup', 2022-06-07) 2. 08dccc8fc1f (ci: make it easier to find failed tests' logs in the GitHub workflow, 2022-05-21) 3. 5aeb145780f (ci(github): bring back the 'print test failures' step, 2022-06-08) 4. d0d96b8280f (Merge branch 'js/ci-github-workflow-markup', 2022-06-17) 5. https://lore.kernel.org/git/220725.86sfmpneqp.gmgdl@evledraar.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 07 December 2022, 23:06:00 UTC |
01e84b4 | Emir SARI | 07 December 2022, 15:00:57 UTC | l10n: tr: v2.39.0 updates Signed-off-by: Emir SARI <emir_sari@icloud.com> | 07 December 2022, 15:05:59 UTC |
bd390bc | Jordi Mas | 07 December 2022, 06:35:32 UTC | l10n: Update Catalan translation Signed-off-by: Jordi Mas <jmas@softcatala.org> | 07 December 2022, 06:35:32 UTC |
d111922 | Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason | 06 December 2022, 19:57:56 UTC | CI: upgrade to macos-12, and pin OSX version Per [1] and the warnings our CI is emitting GitHub is phasing in "macos-12" as their "macos-latest". As with [2], let's pin our image to a specific version so that we're not having it swept from under us, and our upgrade cycle can be more predictable than whenever GitHub changes their images. 1. https://github.com/actions/runner-images/issues/6384 2. 0178420b9ca (github-actions: run gcc-8 on ubuntu-20.04 image, 2022-11-25) Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 07 December 2022, 04:36:22 UTC |
c4f732b | Jiang Xin | 07 December 2022, 01:23:49 UTC | Merge branch 'master' of github.com:alshopov/git-po * 'master' of github.com:alshopov/git-po: l10n: bg.po: Updated Bulgarian translation (5501t) | 07 December 2022, 01:23:49 UTC |
84f7e2b | Jiang Xin | 07 December 2022, 01:23:24 UTC | Merge branch 'l10n-de-2.39' of github.com:ralfth/git * 'l10n-de-2.39' of github.com:ralfth/git: l10n: de.po: update German translation | 07 December 2022, 01:23:24 UTC |
87292b4 | Jiang Xin | 07 December 2022, 01:22:17 UTC | Merge branch 'po-id' of github.com:bagasme/git-po * 'po-id' of github.com:bagasme/git-po: l10n: po-id for 2.39 (round 1) | 07 December 2022, 01:22:17 UTC |
b50a9a8 | Jiang Xin | 07 December 2022, 01:21:49 UTC | Merge branch 'master' of github.com:nafmo/git-l10n-sv * 'master' of github.com:nafmo/git-l10n-sv: l10n: sv.po: Update Swedish translation (5501t0f0) | 07 December 2022, 01:21:49 UTC |
08714ee | Jiang Xin | 07 December 2022, 01:21:25 UTC | Merge branch 'fr_v2.39_rnd1' of github.com:jnavila/git * 'fr_v2.39_rnd1' of github.com:jnavila/git: l10n: fr: v2.39 rnd 1 | 07 December 2022, 01:21:25 UTC |
3457ed7 | Alexander Shopov | 06 December 2022, 15:00:37 UTC | l10n: bg.po: Updated Bulgarian translation (5501t) Signed-off-by: Alexander Shopov <ash@kambanaria.org> | 06 December 2022, 16:17:34 UTC |
2e71cbb | Junio C Hamano | 06 December 2022, 00:49:31 UTC | Git 2.39-rc2 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 06 December 2022, 00:49:31 UTC |
6cf4d90 | Oscar Dominguez | 05 December 2022, 10:01:14 UTC | ci(main): upgrade actions/checkout to v3 To be up to date with actions/checkout opens the door to use the latest features if necessary and get the latest security patches. This also avoids a couple of deprecation warnings in the CI runs. Note: The `actions/checkout` Action has been known to be broken in i686 containers as of v2, therefore we keep forcing it to v1 there. See actions/runner#2115 for more details. Signed-off-by: Oscar Dominguez <dominguez.celada@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 05 December 2022, 23:22:15 UTC |
3c50032 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:45:53 UTC | attr: ignore overly large gitattributes files Similar as with the preceding commit, start ignoring gitattributes files that are overly large to protect us against out-of-bounds reads and writes caused by integer overflows. Unfortunately, we cannot just define "overly large" in terms of any preexisting limits in the codebase. Instead, we choose a very conservative limit of 100MB. This is plenty of room for specifying gitattributes, and incidentally it is also the limit for blob sizes for GitHub. While we don't want GitHub to dictate limits here, it is still sensible to use this fact for an informed decision given that it is hosting a huge set of repositories. Furthermore, over at GitLab we scanned a subset of repositories for their root-level attribute files. We found that 80% of them have a gitattributes file smaller than 100kB, 99.99% have one smaller than 1MB, and only a single repository had one that was almost 3MB in size. So enforcing a limit of 100MB seems to give us ample of headroom. With this limit in place we can be reasonably sure that there is no easy way to exploit the gitattributes file via integer overflows anymore. Furthermore, it protects us against resource exhaustion caused by allocating the in-memory data structures required to represent the parsed attributes. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 05 December 2022, 06:50:03 UTC |
dfa6b32 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:45:48 UTC | attr: ignore attribute lines exceeding 2048 bytes There are two different code paths to read gitattributes: once via a file, and once via the index. These two paths used to behave differently because when reading attributes from a file, we used fgets(3P) with a buffer size of 2kB. Consequentially, we silently truncate line lengths when lines are longer than that and will then parse the remainder of the line as a new pattern. It goes without saying that this is entirely unexpected, but it's even worse that the behaviour depends on how the gitattributes are parsed. While this is simply wrong, the silent truncation saves us with the recently discovered vulnerabilities that can cause out-of-bound writes or reads with unreasonably long lines due to integer overflows. As the common path is to read gitattributes via the worktree file instead of via the index, we can assume that any gitattributes file that had lines longer than that is already broken anyway. So instead of lifting the limit here, we can double down on it to fix the vulnerabilities. Introduce an explicit line length limit of 2kB that is shared across all paths that read attributes and ignore any line that hits this limit while printing a warning. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 05 December 2022, 06:33:07 UTC |
d74b1fd | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:45:44 UTC | attr: fix silently splitting up lines longer than 2048 bytes When reading attributes from a file we use fgets(3P) with a buffer size of 2048 bytes. This means that as soon as a line exceeds the buffer size we split it up into multiple parts and parse each of them as a separate pattern line. This is of course not what the user intended, and even worse the behaviour is inconsistent with how we read attributes from the index. Fix this bug by converting the code to use `strbuf_getline()` instead. This will indeed read in the whole line, which may theoretically lead to an out-of-memory situation when the gitattributes file is huge. We're about to reject any gitattributes files larger than 100MB in the next commit though, which makes this less of a concern. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 05 December 2022, 06:29:30 UTC |
a60a66e | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:45:40 UTC | attr: harden allocation against integer overflows When parsing an attributes line, we need to allocate an array that holds all attributes specified for the given file pattern. The calculation to determine the number of bytes that need to be allocated was prone to an overflow though when there was an unreasonable amount of attributes. Harden the allocation by instead using the `st_` helper functions that cause us to die when we hit an integer overflow. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 05 December 2022, 06:14:16 UTC |
e1e12e9 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:45:36 UTC | attr: fix integer overflow with more than INT_MAX macros Attributes have a field that tracks the position in the `all_attrs` array they're stored inside. This field gets set via `hashmap_get_size` when adding the attribute to the global map of attributes. But while the field is of type `int`, the value returned by `hashmap_get_size` is an `unsigned int`. It can thus happen that the value overflows, where we would now dereference teh `all_attrs` array at an out-of-bounds value. We do have a sanity check for this overflow via an assert that verifies the index matches the new hashmap's size. But asserts are not a proper mechanism to detect against any such overflows as they may not in fact be compiled into production code. Fix this by using an `unsigned int` to track the index and convert the assert to a call `die()`. Reported-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 05 December 2022, 06:14:16 UTC |
447ac90 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:45:31 UTC | attr: fix out-of-bounds read with unreasonable amount of patterns The `struct attr_stack` tracks the stack of all patterns together with their attributes. When parsing a gitattributes file that has more than 2^31 such patterns though we may trigger multiple out-of-bounds reads on 64 bit platforms. This is because while the `num_matches` variable is an unsigned integer, we always use a signed integer to iterate over them. I have not been able to reproduce this issue due to memory constraints on my systems. But despite the out-of-bounds reads, the worst thing that can seemingly happen is to call free(3P) with a garbage pointer when calling `attr_stack_free()`. Fix this bug by using unsigned integers to iterate over the array. While this makes the iteration somewhat awkward when iterating in reverse, it is at least better than knowingly running into an out-of-bounds read. While at it, convert the call to `ALLOC_GROW` to use `ALLOC_GROW_BY` instead. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 05 December 2022, 06:14:16 UTC |
34ace8b | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:45:27 UTC | attr: fix out-of-bounds write when parsing huge number of attributes It is possible to trigger an integer overflow when parsing attribute names when there are more than 2^31 of them for a single pattern. This can either lead to us dying due to trying to request too many bytes: blob=$(perl -e 'print "f" . " a=" x 2147483649' | git hash-object -w --stdin) git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes git attr-check --all file ================================================================= ==1022==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: requested allocation size 0xfffffff800000032 (0xfffffff800001038 after adjustments for alignment, red zones etc.) exceeds maximum supported size of 0x10000000000 (thread T0) #0 0x7fd3efabf411 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77 #1 0x5563a0a1e3d3 in xcalloc wrapper.c:150 #2 0x5563a058d005 in parse_attr_line attr.c:384 #3 0x5563a058e661 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #4 0x5563a058eddb in read_attr_from_index attr.c:769 #5 0x5563a058ef12 in read_attr attr.c:797 #6 0x5563a058f24c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:867 #7 0x5563a058f4a3 in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:902 #8 0x5563a05905da in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1097 #9 0x5563a059093d in git_all_attrs attr.c:1128 #10 0x5563a02f636e in check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:67 #11 0x5563a02f6c12 in cmd_check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:183 #12 0x5563a02aa993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x5563a02ab397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x5563a02abb2b in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x5563a02ac991 in cmd_main git.c:926 #16 0x5563a05432bd in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7fd3ef82228f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) ==1022==HINT: if you don't care about these errors you may set allocator_may_return_null=1 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: allocation-size-too-big /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77 in __interceptor_calloc ==1022==ABORTING Or, much worse, it can lead to an out-of-bounds write because we underallocate and then memcpy(3P) into an array: perl -e ' print "A " . "\rh="x2000000000; print "\rh="x2000000000; print "\rh="x294967294 . "\n" ' >.gitattributes git add .gitattributes git commit -am "evil attributes" $ git clone --quiet /path/to/repo ================================================================= ==15062==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000002550 at pc 0x5555559884d5 bp 0x7fffffffbc60 sp 0x7fffffffbc58 WRITE of size 8 at 0x602000002550 thread T0 #0 0x5555559884d4 in parse_attr_line attr.c:393 #1 0x5555559884d4 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #2 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:784 #3 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:747 #4 0x555555988a1d in read_attr attr.c:800 #5 0x555555989b0c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:882 #6 0x555555989b0c in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:917 #7 0x555555989b0c in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1112 #8 0x55555598b141 in git_check_attr attr.c:1126 #9 0x555555a13004 in convert_attrs convert.c:1311 #10 0x555555a95e04 in checkout_entry_ca entry.c:553 #11 0x555555d58bf6 in checkout_entry entry.h:42 #12 0x555555d58bf6 in check_updates unpack-trees.c:480 #13 0x555555d5eb55 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:2040 #14 0x555555785ab7 in checkout builtin/clone.c:724 #15 0x555555785ab7 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1384 #16 0x55555572443c in run_builtin git.c:466 #17 0x55555572443c in handle_builtin git.c:721 #18 0x555555727872 in run_argv git.c:788 #19 0x555555727872 in cmd_main git.c:926 #20 0x555555721fa0 in main common-main.c:57 #21 0x7ffff73f1d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #22 0x555555723f39 in _start (git+0x1cff39) 0x602000002552 is located 0 bytes to the right of 2-byte region [0x602000002550,0x602000002552) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7ffff768c037 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x555555d7fff7 in xcalloc wrapper.c:150 #2 0x55555598815f in parse_attr_line attr.c:384 #3 0x55555598815f in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #4 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:784 #5 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:747 #6 0x555555988a1d in read_attr attr.c:800 #7 0x555555989b0c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:882 #8 0x555555989b0c in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:917 #9 0x555555989b0c in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1112 #10 0x55555598b141 in git_check_attr attr.c:1126 #11 0x555555a13004 in convert_attrs convert.c:1311 #12 0x555555a95e04 in checkout_entry_ca entry.c:553 #13 0x555555d58bf6 in checkout_entry entry.h:42 #14 0x555555d58bf6 in check_updates unpack-trees.c:480 #15 0x555555d5eb55 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:2040 #16 0x555555785ab7 in checkout builtin/clone.c:724 #17 0x555555785ab7 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1384 #18 0x55555572443c in run_builtin git.c:466 #19 0x55555572443c in handle_builtin git.c:721 #20 0x555555727872 in run_argv git.c:788 #21 0x555555727872 in cmd_main git.c:926 #22 0x555555721fa0 in main common-main.c:57 #23 0x7ffff73f1d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow attr.c:393 in parse_attr_line Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff8450: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 00 07 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8460: fa fa 02 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa 0x0c047fff8470: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa 0x0c047fff8480: fa fa 07 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 02 0x0c047fff8490: fa fa 00 03 fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 03 =>0x0c047fff84a0: fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 02 fa fa[02]fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==15062==ABORTING Fix this bug by using `size_t` instead to count the number of attributes so that this value cannot reasonably overflow without running out of memory before already. Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 05 December 2022, 06:14:16 UTC |
2455720 | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:45:23 UTC | attr: fix integer overflow when parsing huge attribute names It is possible to trigger an integer overflow when parsing attribute names that are longer than 2^31 bytes because we assign the result of strlen(3P) to an `int` instead of to a `size_t`. This can lead to an abort in vsnprintf(3P) with the following reproducer: blob=$(perl -e 'print "A " . "B"x2147483648 . "\n"' | git hash-object -w --stdin) git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes git check-attr --all path BUG: strbuf.c:400: your vsnprintf is broken (returned -1) But furthermore, assuming that the attribute name is even longer than that, it can cause us to silently truncate the attribute and thus lead to wrong results. Fix this integer overflow by using a `size_t` instead. This fixes the silent truncation of attribute names, but it only partially fixes the BUG we hit: even though the initial BUG is fixed, we can still hit a BUG when parsing invalid attribute lines via `report_invalid_attr()`. This is due to an underlying design issue in vsnprintf(3P) which only knows to return an `int`, and thus it may always overflow with large inputs. This issue is benign though: the worst that can happen is that the error message is misreported to be either truncated or too long, but due to the buffer being NUL terminated we wouldn't ever do an out-of-bounds read here. Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 05 December 2022, 06:14:16 UTC |
8d0d48c | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:45:19 UTC | attr: fix out-of-bounds read with huge attribute names There is an out-of-bounds read possible when parsing gitattributes that have an attribute that is 2^31+1 bytes long. This is caused due to an integer overflow when we assign the result of strlen(3P) to an `int`, where we use the wrapped-around value in a subsequent call to memcpy(3P). The following code reproduces the issue: blob=$(perl -e 'print "a" x 2147483649 . " attr"' | git hash-object -w --stdin) git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes git check-attr --all file AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==8451==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7f93efa00800 (pc 0x7f94f1f8f082 bp 0x7ffddb59b3a0 sp 0x7ffddb59ab28 T0) ==8451==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7f94f1f8f082 (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x176082) #1 0x7f94f2047d9c in __interceptor_strspn /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:752 #2 0x560e190f7f26 in parse_attr_line attr.c:375 #3 0x560e190f9663 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #4 0x560e190f9ddd in read_attr_from_index attr.c:769 #5 0x560e190f9f14 in read_attr attr.c:797 #6 0x560e190fa24e in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:867 #7 0x560e190fa4a5 in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:902 #8 0x560e190fb5dc in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1097 #9 0x560e190fb93f in git_all_attrs attr.c:1128 #10 0x560e18e6136e in check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:67 #11 0x560e18e61c12 in cmd_check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:183 #12 0x560e18e15993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x560e18e16397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x560e18e16b2b in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x560e18e17991 in cmd_main git.c:926 #16 0x560e190ae2bd in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f94f1e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #18 0x7f94f1e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #19 0x560e18e110e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x176082) ==8451==ABORTING Fix this bug by converting the variable to a `size_t` instead. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 05 December 2022, 06:14:16 UTC |
eb22e7d | Patrick Steinhardt | 01 December 2022, 14:45:15 UTC | attr: fix overflow when upserting attribute with overly long name The function `git_attr_internal()` is called to upsert attributes into the global map. And while all callers pass a `size_t`, the function itself accepts an `int` as the attribute name's length. This can lead to an integer overflow in case the attribute name is longer than `INT_MAX`. Now this overflow seems harmless as the first thing we do is to call `attr_name_valid()`, and that function only succeeds in case all chars in the range of `namelen` match a certain small set of chars. We thus can't do an out-of-bounds read as NUL is not part of that set and all strings passed to this function are NUL-terminated. And furthermore, we wouldn't ever read past the current attribute name anyway due to the same reason. And if validation fails we will return early. On the other hand it feels fragile to rely on this behaviour, even more so given that we pass `namelen` to `FLEX_ALLOC_MEM()`. So let's instead just do the correct thing here and accept a `size_t` as line length. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 05 December 2022, 06:14:16 UTC |
e77b88f | Ralf Thielow | 02 December 2022, 16:28:32 UTC | l10n: de.po: update German translation Reviewed-by: Matthias Rüster <matthias.ruester@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ralf Thielow <ralf.thielow@gmail.com> | 02 December 2022, 16:28:32 UTC |
4594195 | Fangyi Zhou | 02 December 2022, 14:04:41 UTC | l10n: zh_CN v2.39.0 round 1 - Revise translation of 'stale' Reviewed-by: 依云 <lilydjwg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Fangyi Zhou <me@fangyi.io> | 02 December 2022, 14:04:41 UTC |
805265f | Junio C Hamano | 01 December 2022, 09:38:07 UTC | Merge branch 'ab/fewer-the-index-macros' Squelch warnings from Coccinelle * ab/fewer-the-index-macros: cocci: avoid "should ... be a metavariable" warnings | 01 December 2022, 09:38:07 UTC |
215ae4f | Junio C Hamano | 01 December 2022, 09:38:07 UTC | Merge branch 'ab/gnumake-4.4-fix' Adjust our Makefiles for GNUmake 4.4 * ab/gnumake-4.4-fix: Makefiles: change search through $(MAKEFLAGS) for GNU make 4.4 | 01 December 2022, 09:38:07 UTC |
cddd68a | Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason | 30 November 2022, 08:28:23 UTC | cocci: avoid "should ... be a metavariable" warnings Since [1] running "make coccicheck" has resulted in [2] being emitted to the *.log files for the "spatch" run, and in the case of "make coccicheck-test" we'd emit these to the user's terminal. Nothing was broken as a result, but let's refactor the relevant rules to eliminate the ambiguity between a possible variable and an identifier. 1. 0e6550a2c63 (cocci: add a index-compatibility.pending.cocci, 2022-11-19) 2. warning: line 257: should active_cache be a metavariable? warning: line 260: should active_cache_changed be a metavariable? warning: line 263: should active_cache_tree be a metavariable? warning: line 271: should active_nr be a metavariable? Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 30 November 2022, 22:25:57 UTC |
67b3687 | Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason | 30 November 2022, 08:23:49 UTC | Makefiles: change search through $(MAKEFLAGS) for GNU make 4.4 Since GNU make 4.4 the semantics of the $(MAKEFLAGS) variable has changed in a backward-incompatible way, as its "NEWS" file notes: Previously only simple (one-letter) options were added to the MAKEFLAGS variable that was visible while parsing makefiles. Now, all options are available in MAKEFLAGS. If you want to check MAKEFLAGS for a one-letter option, expanding "$(firstword -$(MAKEFLAGS))" is a reliable way to return the set of one-letter options which can be examined via findstring, etc. This upstream change meant that e.g.: make man Would become very noisy, because in shared.mak we rely on extracting "s" from the $(MAKEFLAGS), which now contains long options like "--jobserver-auth=fifo:<path>", which we'll conflate with the "-s" option. So, let's change this idiom we've been carrying since [1], [2] and [3] as the "NEWS" suggests. Note that the "-" in "-$(MAKEFLAGS)" is critical here, as the variable will always contain leading whitespace if there are no short options, but long options are present. Without it e.g. "make --debug=all" would yield "--debug=all" as the first word, but with it we'll get "-" as intended. Then "-s" for "-s", "-Bs" for "-s -B" etc. 1. 0c3b4aac8ec (git-gui: Support of "make -s" in: do not output anything of the build itself, 2007-03-07) 2. b777434383b (Support of "make -s": do not output anything of the build itself, 2007-03-07) 3. bb2300976ba (Documentation/Makefile: make most operations "quiet", 2009-03-27) Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 30 November 2022, 22:24:12 UTC |
fe20a5e | Jean-Noël Avila | 26 November 2022, 14:51:31 UTC | l10n: fr: v2.39 rnd 1 Signed-off-by: Jean-Noël Avila <jn.avila@free.fr> | 30 November 2022, 18:43:02 UTC |
1fe8077 | Bagas Sanjaya | 27 November 2022, 08:55:35 UTC | l10n: po-id for 2.39 (round 1) All of updates are new strings translation. Update following components: * builtin/bundle.c * builtin/clone.c * builtin/commit.c * builtin/describe.c * builtin/diff.c * builtin/fsck.c * builtin/gc.c * builtin/merge-tree.c * builtin/repack.c * builtin/revert.c * builtin/stash.c * builtin/upload-pack.c * builtin/worktree.c * bundle-uri.c * push.c * revision.c * scalar.c Translate following new components: * builtin/patch-id.c * t/helper/test-cache-tree.c * t/helper/test-fast-rebase.c * t/helper/test-reach.c * t/helper/test-serve-v2.c * t/helper/test-simple-ipc.c Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com> po revision bump Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com> | 30 November 2022, 13:45:30 UTC |
7452749 | Junio C Hamano | 30 November 2022, 02:00:35 UTC | Git 2.39-rc1 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 30 November 2022, 02:00:35 UTC |
4615d3e | Junio C Hamano | 30 November 2022, 01:57:19 UTC | Merge branch 'ps/gnumake-4.4-fix' * ps/gnumake-4.4-fix: Makefile: avoid multiple patterns when recipes generate one file | 30 November 2022, 01:57:19 UTC |
c80046d | Peter Krefting | 29 November 2022, 21:46:18 UTC | l10n: sv.po: Update Swedish translation (5501t0f0) Signed-off-by: Peter Krefting <peter@softwolves.pp.se> | 29 November 2022, 21:51:11 UTC |
083e012 | Junio C Hamano | 29 November 2022, 01:40:38 UTC | A bit more before -rc1 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 29 November 2022, 01:41:06 UTC |
fd8dcbb | Junio C Hamano | 29 November 2022, 01:41:06 UTC | Merge branch 'ab/doc-synopsis-and-cmd-usage' Doc and message fix. * ab/doc-synopsis-and-cmd-usage: i18n: fix command template placeholder format | 29 November 2022, 01:41:06 UTC |