Revision 0383bbb9015898cbc79abd7b64316484d7713b44 authored by Jeff King on 30 April 2018, 07:25:25 UTC, committed by Jeff King on 22 May 2018, 03:50:11 UTC
Submodule "names" come from the untrusted .gitmodules file,
but we blindly append them to $GIT_DIR/modules to create our
on-disk repo paths. This means you can do bad things by
putting "../" into the name (among other things).

Let's sanity-check these names to avoid building a path that
can be exploited. There are two main decisions:

  1. What should the allowed syntax be?

     It's tempting to reuse verify_path(), since submodule
     names typically come from in-repo paths. But there are
     two reasons not to:

       a. It's technically more strict than what we need, as
          we really care only about breaking out of the
          $GIT_DIR/modules/ hierarchy.  E.g., having a
          submodule named "foo/.git" isn't actually
          dangerous, and it's possible that somebody has
          manually given such a funny name.

       b. Since we'll eventually use this checking logic in
          fsck to prevent downstream repositories, it should
          be consistent across platforms. Because
          verify_path() relies on is_dir_sep(), it wouldn't
          block "foo\..\bar" on a non-Windows machine.

  2. Where should we enforce it? These days most of the
     .gitmodules reads go through submodule-config.c, so
     I've put it there in the reading step. That should
     cover all of the C code.

     We also construct the name for "git submodule add"
     inside the git-submodule.sh script. This is probably
     not a big deal for security since the name is coming
     from the user anyway, but it would be polite to remind
     them if the name they pick is invalid (and we need to
     expose the name-checker to the shell anyway for our
     test scripts).

     This patch issues a warning when reading .gitmodules
     and just ignores the related config entry completely.
     This will generally end up producing a sensible error,
     as it works the same as a .gitmodules file which is
     missing a submodule entry (so "submodule update" will
     barf, but "git clone --recurse-submodules" will print
     an error but not abort the clone.

     There is one minor oddity, which is that we print the
     warning once per malformed config key (since that's how
     the config subsystem gives us the entries). So in the
     new test, for example, the user would see three
     warnings. That's OK, since the intent is that this case
     should never come up outside of malicious repositories
     (and then it might even benefit the user to see the
     message multiple times).

Credit for finding this vulnerability and the proof of
concept from which the test script was adapted goes to
Etienne Stalmans.

Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
1 parent 42e6fde
Raw File
pack-write.c
#include "cache.h"
#include "pack.h"
#include "csum-file.h"

void reset_pack_idx_option(struct pack_idx_option *opts)
{
	memset(opts, 0, sizeof(*opts));
	opts->version = 2;
	opts->off32_limit = 0x7fffffff;
}

static int sha1_compare(const void *_a, const void *_b)
{
	struct pack_idx_entry *a = *(struct pack_idx_entry **)_a;
	struct pack_idx_entry *b = *(struct pack_idx_entry **)_b;
	return hashcmp(a->sha1, b->sha1);
}

static int cmp_uint32(const void *a_, const void *b_)
{
	uint32_t a = *((uint32_t *)a_);
	uint32_t b = *((uint32_t *)b_);

	return (a < b) ? -1 : (a != b);
}

static int need_large_offset(off_t offset, const struct pack_idx_option *opts)
{
	uint32_t ofsval;

	if ((offset >> 31) || (opts->off32_limit < offset))
		return 1;
	if (!opts->anomaly_nr)
		return 0;
	ofsval = offset;
	return !!bsearch(&ofsval, opts->anomaly, opts->anomaly_nr,
			 sizeof(ofsval), cmp_uint32);
}

/*
 * On entry *sha1 contains the pack content SHA1 hash, on exit it is
 * the SHA1 hash of sorted object names. The objects array passed in
 * will be sorted by SHA1 on exit.
 */
const char *write_idx_file(const char *index_name, struct pack_idx_entry **objects,
			   int nr_objects, const struct pack_idx_option *opts,
			   const unsigned char *sha1)
{
	struct sha1file *f;
	struct pack_idx_entry **sorted_by_sha, **list, **last;
	off_t last_obj_offset = 0;
	uint32_t array[256];
	int i, fd;
	uint32_t index_version;

	if (nr_objects) {
		sorted_by_sha = objects;
		list = sorted_by_sha;
		last = sorted_by_sha + nr_objects;
		for (i = 0; i < nr_objects; ++i) {
			if (objects[i]->offset > last_obj_offset)
				last_obj_offset = objects[i]->offset;
		}
		QSORT(sorted_by_sha, nr_objects, sha1_compare);
	}
	else
		sorted_by_sha = list = last = NULL;

	if (opts->flags & WRITE_IDX_VERIFY) {
		assert(index_name);
		f = sha1fd_check(index_name);
	} else {
		if (!index_name) {
			struct strbuf tmp_file = STRBUF_INIT;
			fd = odb_mkstemp(&tmp_file, "pack/tmp_idx_XXXXXX");
			index_name = strbuf_detach(&tmp_file, NULL);
		} else {
			unlink(index_name);
			fd = open(index_name, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, 0600);
			if (fd < 0)
				die_errno("unable to create '%s'", index_name);
		}
		f = sha1fd(fd, index_name);
	}

	/* if last object's offset is >= 2^31 we should use index V2 */
	index_version = need_large_offset(last_obj_offset, opts) ? 2 : opts->version;

	/* index versions 2 and above need a header */
	if (index_version >= 2) {
		struct pack_idx_header hdr;
		hdr.idx_signature = htonl(PACK_IDX_SIGNATURE);
		hdr.idx_version = htonl(index_version);
		sha1write(f, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
	}

	/*
	 * Write the first-level table (the list is sorted,
	 * but we use a 256-entry lookup to be able to avoid
	 * having to do eight extra binary search iterations).
	 */
	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
		struct pack_idx_entry **next = list;
		while (next < last) {
			struct pack_idx_entry *obj = *next;
			if (obj->sha1[0] != i)
				break;
			next++;
		}
		array[i] = htonl(next - sorted_by_sha);
		list = next;
	}
	sha1write(f, array, 256 * 4);

	/*
	 * Write the actual SHA1 entries..
	 */
	list = sorted_by_sha;
	for (i = 0; i < nr_objects; i++) {
		struct pack_idx_entry *obj = *list++;
		if (index_version < 2) {
			uint32_t offset = htonl(obj->offset);
			sha1write(f, &offset, 4);
		}
		sha1write(f, obj->sha1, 20);
		if ((opts->flags & WRITE_IDX_STRICT) &&
		    (i && !hashcmp(list[-2]->sha1, obj->sha1)))
			die("The same object %s appears twice in the pack",
			    sha1_to_hex(obj->sha1));
	}

	if (index_version >= 2) {
		unsigned int nr_large_offset = 0;

		/* write the crc32 table */
		list = sorted_by_sha;
		for (i = 0; i < nr_objects; i++) {
			struct pack_idx_entry *obj = *list++;
			uint32_t crc32_val = htonl(obj->crc32);
			sha1write(f, &crc32_val, 4);
		}

		/* write the 32-bit offset table */
		list = sorted_by_sha;
		for (i = 0; i < nr_objects; i++) {
			struct pack_idx_entry *obj = *list++;
			uint32_t offset;

			offset = (need_large_offset(obj->offset, opts)
				  ? (0x80000000 | nr_large_offset++)
				  : obj->offset);
			offset = htonl(offset);
			sha1write(f, &offset, 4);
		}

		/* write the large offset table */
		list = sorted_by_sha;
		while (nr_large_offset) {
			struct pack_idx_entry *obj = *list++;
			uint64_t offset = obj->offset;
			uint32_t split[2];

			if (!need_large_offset(offset, opts))
				continue;
			split[0] = htonl(offset >> 32);
			split[1] = htonl(offset & 0xffffffff);
			sha1write(f, split, 8);
			nr_large_offset--;
		}
	}

	sha1write(f, sha1, 20);
	sha1close(f, NULL, ((opts->flags & WRITE_IDX_VERIFY)
			    ? CSUM_CLOSE : CSUM_FSYNC));
	return index_name;
}

off_t write_pack_header(struct sha1file *f, uint32_t nr_entries)
{
	struct pack_header hdr;

	hdr.hdr_signature = htonl(PACK_SIGNATURE);
	hdr.hdr_version = htonl(PACK_VERSION);
	hdr.hdr_entries = htonl(nr_entries);
	sha1write(f, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
	return sizeof(hdr);
}

/*
 * Update pack header with object_count and compute new SHA1 for pack data
 * associated to pack_fd, and write that SHA1 at the end.  That new SHA1
 * is also returned in new_pack_sha1.
 *
 * If partial_pack_sha1 is non null, then the SHA1 of the existing pack
 * (without the header update) is computed and validated against the
 * one provided in partial_pack_sha1.  The validation is performed at
 * partial_pack_offset bytes in the pack file.  The SHA1 of the remaining
 * data (i.e. from partial_pack_offset to the end) is then computed and
 * returned in partial_pack_sha1.
 *
 * Note that new_pack_sha1 is updated last, so both new_pack_sha1 and
 * partial_pack_sha1 can refer to the same buffer if the caller is not
 * interested in the resulting SHA1 of pack data above partial_pack_offset.
 */
void fixup_pack_header_footer(int pack_fd,
			 unsigned char *new_pack_sha1,
			 const char *pack_name,
			 uint32_t object_count,
			 unsigned char *partial_pack_sha1,
			 off_t partial_pack_offset)
{
	int aligned_sz, buf_sz = 8 * 1024;
	git_SHA_CTX old_sha1_ctx, new_sha1_ctx;
	struct pack_header hdr;
	char *buf;

	git_SHA1_Init(&old_sha1_ctx);
	git_SHA1_Init(&new_sha1_ctx);

	if (lseek(pack_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0)
		die_errno("Failed seeking to start of '%s'", pack_name);
	if (read_in_full(pack_fd, &hdr, sizeof(hdr)) != sizeof(hdr))
		die_errno("Unable to reread header of '%s'", pack_name);
	if (lseek(pack_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0)
		die_errno("Failed seeking to start of '%s'", pack_name);
	git_SHA1_Update(&old_sha1_ctx, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
	hdr.hdr_entries = htonl(object_count);
	git_SHA1_Update(&new_sha1_ctx, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
	write_or_die(pack_fd, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
	partial_pack_offset -= sizeof(hdr);

	buf = xmalloc(buf_sz);
	aligned_sz = buf_sz - sizeof(hdr);
	for (;;) {
		ssize_t m, n;
		m = (partial_pack_sha1 && partial_pack_offset < aligned_sz) ?
			partial_pack_offset : aligned_sz;
		n = xread(pack_fd, buf, m);
		if (!n)
			break;
		if (n < 0)
			die_errno("Failed to checksum '%s'", pack_name);
		git_SHA1_Update(&new_sha1_ctx, buf, n);

		aligned_sz -= n;
		if (!aligned_sz)
			aligned_sz = buf_sz;

		if (!partial_pack_sha1)
			continue;

		git_SHA1_Update(&old_sha1_ctx, buf, n);
		partial_pack_offset -= n;
		if (partial_pack_offset == 0) {
			unsigned char sha1[20];
			git_SHA1_Final(sha1, &old_sha1_ctx);
			if (hashcmp(sha1, partial_pack_sha1) != 0)
				die("Unexpected checksum for %s "
				    "(disk corruption?)", pack_name);
			/*
			 * Now let's compute the SHA1 of the remainder of the
			 * pack, which also means making partial_pack_offset
			 * big enough not to matter anymore.
			 */
			git_SHA1_Init(&old_sha1_ctx);
			partial_pack_offset = ~partial_pack_offset;
			partial_pack_offset -= MSB(partial_pack_offset, 1);
		}
	}
	free(buf);

	if (partial_pack_sha1)
		git_SHA1_Final(partial_pack_sha1, &old_sha1_ctx);
	git_SHA1_Final(new_pack_sha1, &new_sha1_ctx);
	write_or_die(pack_fd, new_pack_sha1, 20);
	fsync_or_die(pack_fd, pack_name);
}

char *index_pack_lockfile(int ip_out)
{
	char packname[46];

	/*
	 * The first thing we expect from index-pack's output
	 * is "pack\t%40s\n" or "keep\t%40s\n" (46 bytes) where
	 * %40s is the newly created pack SHA1 name.  In the "keep"
	 * case, we need it to remove the corresponding .keep file
	 * later on.  If we don't get that then tough luck with it.
	 */
	if (read_in_full(ip_out, packname, 46) == 46 && packname[45] == '\n') {
		const char *name;
		packname[45] = 0;
		if (skip_prefix(packname, "keep\t", &name))
			return xstrfmt("%s/pack/pack-%s.keep",
				       get_object_directory(), name);
	}
	return NULL;
}

/*
 * The per-object header is a pretty dense thing, which is
 *  - first byte: low four bits are "size", then three bits of "type",
 *    and the high bit is "size continues".
 *  - each byte afterwards: low seven bits are size continuation,
 *    with the high bit being "size continues"
 */
int encode_in_pack_object_header(unsigned char *hdr, int hdr_len,
				 enum object_type type, uintmax_t size)
{
	int n = 1;
	unsigned char c;

	if (type < OBJ_COMMIT || type > OBJ_REF_DELTA)
		die("bad type %d", type);

	c = (type << 4) | (size & 15);
	size >>= 4;
	while (size) {
		if (n == hdr_len)
			die("object size is too enormous to format");
		*hdr++ = c | 0x80;
		c = size & 0x7f;
		size >>= 7;
		n++;
	}
	*hdr = c;
	return n;
}

struct sha1file *create_tmp_packfile(char **pack_tmp_name)
{
	struct strbuf tmpname = STRBUF_INIT;
	int fd;

	fd = odb_mkstemp(&tmpname, "pack/tmp_pack_XXXXXX");
	*pack_tmp_name = strbuf_detach(&tmpname, NULL);
	return sha1fd(fd, *pack_tmp_name);
}

void finish_tmp_packfile(struct strbuf *name_buffer,
			 const char *pack_tmp_name,
			 struct pack_idx_entry **written_list,
			 uint32_t nr_written,
			 struct pack_idx_option *pack_idx_opts,
			 unsigned char sha1[])
{
	const char *idx_tmp_name;
	int basename_len = name_buffer->len;

	if (adjust_shared_perm(pack_tmp_name))
		die_errno("unable to make temporary pack file readable");

	idx_tmp_name = write_idx_file(NULL, written_list, nr_written,
				      pack_idx_opts, sha1);
	if (adjust_shared_perm(idx_tmp_name))
		die_errno("unable to make temporary index file readable");

	strbuf_addf(name_buffer, "%s.pack", sha1_to_hex(sha1));

	if (rename(pack_tmp_name, name_buffer->buf))
		die_errno("unable to rename temporary pack file");

	strbuf_setlen(name_buffer, basename_len);

	strbuf_addf(name_buffer, "%s.idx", sha1_to_hex(sha1));
	if (rename(idx_tmp_name, name_buffer->buf))
		die_errno("unable to rename temporary index file");

	strbuf_setlen(name_buffer, basename_len);

	free((void *)idx_tmp_name);
}
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