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Revision 048f49809c526348775425420fb5b8e84fd9a133 authored by Sean Christopherson on 25 March 2021, 20:01:18 UTC, committed by Paolo Bonzini on 30 March 2021, 17:19:55 UTC 
KVM: x86/mmu: Ensure TLBs are flushed for TDP MMU during NX zapping
 
Honor the "flush needed" return from kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_gfn_range(), which
does the flush itself if and only if it yields (which it will never do in
this particular scenario), and otherwise expects the caller to do the
flush.  If pages are zapped from the TDP MMU but not the legacy MMU, then
no flush will occur.

Fixes: 29cf0f5007a2 ("kvm: x86/mmu: NX largepage recovery for TDP MMU")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210325200119.1359384-3-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
1 parent a835429
Raw File
aead_api.c 
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
 * Copyright 2003-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
 * Copyright 2005-2006, Devicescape Software, Inc.
 * Copyright 2014-2015, Qualcomm Atheros, Inc.
 *
 * Rewrite: Copyright (C) 2013 Linaro Ltd <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
 */

#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <crypto/aead.h>

#include "aead_api.h"

int aead_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
		 u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
{
	size_t mic_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
	struct scatterlist sg[3];
	struct aead_request *aead_req;
	int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);
	u8 *__aad;

	aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + aad_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
	if (!aead_req)
		return -ENOMEM;

	__aad = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize;
	memcpy(__aad, aad, aad_len);

	sg_init_table(sg, 3);
	sg_set_buf(&sg[0], __aad, aad_len);
	sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len);
	sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, mic_len);

	aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm);
	aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, data_len, b_0);
	aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);

	crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
	kfree_sensitive(aead_req);

	return 0;
}

int aead_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
		 u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
{
	size_t mic_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
	struct scatterlist sg[3];
	struct aead_request *aead_req;
	int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);
	u8 *__aad;
	int err;

	if (data_len == 0)
		return -EINVAL;

	aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + aad_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
	if (!aead_req)
		return -ENOMEM;

	__aad = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize;
	memcpy(__aad, aad, aad_len);

	sg_init_table(sg, 3);
	sg_set_buf(&sg[0], __aad, aad_len);
	sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len);
	sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, mic_len);

	aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm);
	aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, data_len + mic_len, b_0);
	aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);

	err = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
	kfree_sensitive(aead_req);

	return err;
}

struct crypto_aead *
aead_key_setup_encrypt(const char *alg, const u8 key[],
		       size_t key_len, size_t mic_len)
{
	struct crypto_aead *tfm;
	int err;

	tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
		return tfm;

	err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
	if (err)
		goto free_aead;
	err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, mic_len);
	if (err)
		goto free_aead;

	return tfm;

free_aead:
	crypto_free_aead(tfm);
	return ERR_PTR(err);
}

void aead_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
{
	crypto_free_aead(tfm);
}
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