Revision 05a5869a01779e6fb55535aff9b01716aac42dcf authored by Keller Fuchs on 13 May 2016, 09:51:01 UTC, committed by Junio C Hamano on 13 May 2016, 19:37:44 UTC
Clarify that "merge --verify-signatures" checks the signature on the
tip commit of the history being merged.

Uniformise the vocabulary used wrt. key/signature validity with OpenPGP:
- a signature is valid if made by a key with a valid uid;
- in the default trust-model, a uid is valid if signed by a trusted key;
- a key is trusted if the (local) user set a trust level for it.

Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Keller Fuchs   <KellerFuchs@hashbang.sh>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
1 parent 90f7b16
Raw File
credential.h
#ifndef CREDENTIAL_H
#define CREDENTIAL_H

#include "string-list.h"

struct credential {
	struct string_list helpers;
	unsigned approved:1,
		 configured:1,
		 quit:1,
		 use_http_path:1;

	char *username;
	char *password;
	char *protocol;
	char *host;
	char *path;
};

#define CREDENTIAL_INIT { STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP }

void credential_init(struct credential *);
void credential_clear(struct credential *);

void credential_fill(struct credential *);
void credential_approve(struct credential *);
void credential_reject(struct credential *);

int credential_read(struct credential *, FILE *);
void credential_write(const struct credential *, FILE *);
void credential_from_url(struct credential *, const char *url);
int credential_match(const struct credential *have,
		     const struct credential *want);

#endif /* CREDENTIAL_H */
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