https://github.com/torvalds/linux
Revision 140456f994195b568ecd7fc2287a34eadffef3ca authored by Andrey Ryabinin on 17 February 2021, 14:30:04 UTC, committed by Joerg Roedel on 04 March 2021, 12:15:56 UTC
increase_address_space() calls get_zeroed_page(gfp) under spin_lock with
disabled interrupts. gfp flags passed to increase_address_space() may allow
sleeping, so it comes to this:

 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/page_alloc.c:4342
 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, pid: 21555, name: epdcbbf1qnhbsd8

 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x66/0x8b
  ___might_sleep+0xec/0x110
  __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x104/0x300
  get_zeroed_page+0x15/0x40
  iommu_map_page+0xdd/0x3e0
  amd_iommu_map+0x50/0x70
  iommu_map+0x106/0x220
  vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl+0x76e/0x950 [vfio_iommu_type1]
  do_vfs_ioctl+0xa3/0x6f0
  ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
  do_syscall_64+0x4e/0x100
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fix this by moving get_zeroed_page() out of spin_lock/unlock section.

Fixes: 754265bcab ("iommu/amd: Fix race in increase_address_space()")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <arbn@yandex-team.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210217143004.19165-1-arbn@yandex-team.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
1 parent 45e606f
Raw File
Tip revision: 140456f994195b568ecd7fc2287a34eadffef3ca authored by Andrey Ryabinin on 17 February 2021, 14:30:04 UTC
iommu/amd: Fix sleeping in atomic in increase_address_space()
Tip revision: 140456f
dh_helper.c
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
 * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation
 * Authors: Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com>
 */
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <crypto/dh.h>
#include <crypto/kpp.h>

#define DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE (sizeof(struct kpp_secret) + 4 * sizeof(int))

static inline u8 *dh_pack_data(u8 *dst, u8 *end, const void *src, size_t size)
{
	if (!dst || size > end - dst)
		return NULL;
	memcpy(dst, src, size);
	return dst + size;
}

static inline const u8 *dh_unpack_data(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
{
	memcpy(dst, src, size);
	return src + size;
}

static inline unsigned int dh_data_size(const struct dh *p)
{
	return p->key_size + p->p_size + p->q_size + p->g_size;
}

unsigned int crypto_dh_key_len(const struct dh *p)
{
	return DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE + dh_data_size(p);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_dh_key_len);

int crypto_dh_encode_key(char *buf, unsigned int len, const struct dh *params)
{
	u8 *ptr = buf;
	u8 * const end = ptr + len;
	struct kpp_secret secret = {
		.type = CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_DH,
		.len = len
	};

	if (unlikely(!len))
		return -EINVAL;

	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, &secret, sizeof(secret));
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, &params->key_size,
			   sizeof(params->key_size));
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, &params->p_size, sizeof(params->p_size));
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, &params->q_size, sizeof(params->q_size));
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, &params->g_size, sizeof(params->g_size));
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, params->key, params->key_size);
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, params->p, params->p_size);
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, params->q, params->q_size);
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, params->g, params->g_size);
	if (ptr != end)
		return -EINVAL;
	return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_dh_encode_key);

int crypto_dh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len, struct dh *params)
{
	const u8 *ptr = buf;
	struct kpp_secret secret;

	if (unlikely(!buf || len < DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE))
		return -EINVAL;

	ptr = dh_unpack_data(&secret, ptr, sizeof(secret));
	if (secret.type != CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_DH)
		return -EINVAL;

	ptr = dh_unpack_data(&params->key_size, ptr, sizeof(params->key_size));
	ptr = dh_unpack_data(&params->p_size, ptr, sizeof(params->p_size));
	ptr = dh_unpack_data(&params->q_size, ptr, sizeof(params->q_size));
	ptr = dh_unpack_data(&params->g_size, ptr, sizeof(params->g_size));
	if (secret.len != crypto_dh_key_len(params))
		return -EINVAL;

	/*
	 * Don't permit the buffer for 'key' or 'g' to be larger than 'p', since
	 * some drivers assume otherwise.
	 */
	if (params->key_size > params->p_size ||
	    params->g_size > params->p_size || params->q_size > params->p_size)
		return -EINVAL;

	/* Don't allocate memory. Set pointers to data within
	 * the given buffer
	 */
	params->key = (void *)ptr;
	params->p = (void *)(ptr + params->key_size);
	params->q = (void *)(ptr + params->key_size + params->p_size);
	params->g = (void *)(ptr + params->key_size + params->p_size +
			     params->q_size);

	/*
	 * Don't permit 'p' to be 0.  It's not a prime number, and it's subject
	 * to corner cases such as 'mod 0' being undefined or
	 * crypto_kpp_maxsize() returning 0.
	 */
	if (memchr_inv(params->p, 0, params->p_size) == NULL)
		return -EINVAL;

	/* It is permissible to not provide Q. */
	if (params->q_size == 0)
		params->q = NULL;

	return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_dh_decode_key);
back to top