https://github.com/torvalds/linux
Revision 18f5ed365d3f188a91149d528c853000330a4a58 authored by Takashi Sakamoto on 05 August 2015, 00:21:05 UTC, committed by Takashi Iwai on 05 August 2015, 05:52:39 UTC
Fireworks uses TSB43CB43(IceLynx-Micro) as its IEC 61883-1/6 interface.
This chip includes ARM7 core, and loads and runs program. The firmware
is stored in on-board memory and loaded every powering-on from it.

Echo Audio ships several versions of firmwares for each model. These
firmwares have each quirk and the quirk changes a sequence of packets.

As long as I investigated, AudioFire2/AudioFire4/AudioFirePre8 have a
quirk to transfer a first packet with 0x02 in its dbc field. This causes
ALSA Fireworks driver to detect discontinuity. In this case, firmware
version 5.7.0, 5.7.3 and 5.8.0 are used.

Payload  CIP      CIP
quadlets header1  header2
02       00050002 90ffffff <-
42       0005000a 90013000
42       00050012 90014400
42       0005001a 90015800
02       0005001a 90ffffff
42       00050022 90019000
42       0005002a 9001a400
42       00050032 9001b800
02       00050032 90ffffff
42       0005003a 9001d000
42       00050042 9001e400
42       0005004a 9001f800
02       0005004a 90ffffff
(AudioFire2 with firmware version 5.7.)

$ dmesg
snd-fireworks fw1.0: Detect discontinuity of CIP: 00 02

These models, AudioFire8 (since Jul 2009 ) and Gibson Robot Interface
Pack series uses the same ARM binary as their firmware. Thus, this
quirk may be observed among them.

This commit adds a new member for AMDTP structure. This member represents
the value of dbc field in a first AMDTP packet. Drivers can set it with
a preferred value according to model's quirk.

Tested-by: Johannes Oertei <johannes.oertel@uni-due.de>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
1 parent c85523d
Raw File
Tip revision: 18f5ed365d3f188a91149d528c853000330a4a58 authored by Takashi Sakamoto on 05 August 2015, 00:21:05 UTC
ALSA: fireworks/firewire-lib: add support for recent firmware quirk
Tip revision: 18f5ed3
dcookies.c
/*
 * dcookies.c
 *
 * Copyright 2002 John Levon <levon@movementarian.org>
 *
 * Persistent cookie-path mappings. These are used by
 * profilers to convert a per-task EIP value into something
 * non-transitory that can be processed at a later date.
 * This is done by locking the dentry/vfsmnt pair in the
 * kernel until released by the tasks needing the persistent
 * objects. The tag is simply an unsigned long that refers
 * to the pair and can be looked up from userspace.
 */

#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/dcookies.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/path.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>

/* The dcookies are allocated from a kmem_cache and
 * hashed onto a small number of lists. None of the
 * code here is particularly performance critical
 */
struct dcookie_struct {
	struct path path;
	struct list_head hash_list;
};

static LIST_HEAD(dcookie_users);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(dcookie_mutex);
static struct kmem_cache *dcookie_cache __read_mostly;
static struct list_head *dcookie_hashtable __read_mostly;
static size_t hash_size __read_mostly;

static inline int is_live(void)
{
	return !(list_empty(&dcookie_users));
}


/* The dentry is locked, its address will do for the cookie */
static inline unsigned long dcookie_value(struct dcookie_struct * dcs)
{
	return (unsigned long)dcs->path.dentry;
}


static size_t dcookie_hash(unsigned long dcookie)
{
	return (dcookie >> L1_CACHE_SHIFT) & (hash_size - 1);
}


static struct dcookie_struct * find_dcookie(unsigned long dcookie)
{
	struct dcookie_struct *found = NULL;
	struct dcookie_struct * dcs;
	struct list_head * pos;
	struct list_head * list;

	list = dcookie_hashtable + dcookie_hash(dcookie);

	list_for_each(pos, list) {
		dcs = list_entry(pos, struct dcookie_struct, hash_list);
		if (dcookie_value(dcs) == dcookie) {
			found = dcs;
			break;
		}
	}

	return found;
}


static void hash_dcookie(struct dcookie_struct * dcs)
{
	struct list_head * list = dcookie_hashtable + dcookie_hash(dcookie_value(dcs));
	list_add(&dcs->hash_list, list);
}


static struct dcookie_struct *alloc_dcookie(struct path *path)
{
	struct dcookie_struct *dcs = kmem_cache_alloc(dcookie_cache,
							GFP_KERNEL);
	struct dentry *d;
	if (!dcs)
		return NULL;

	d = path->dentry;
	spin_lock(&d->d_lock);
	d->d_flags |= DCACHE_COOKIE;
	spin_unlock(&d->d_lock);

	dcs->path = *path;
	path_get(path);
	hash_dcookie(dcs);
	return dcs;
}


/* This is the main kernel-side routine that retrieves the cookie
 * value for a dentry/vfsmnt pair.
 */
int get_dcookie(struct path *path, unsigned long *cookie)
{
	int err = 0;
	struct dcookie_struct * dcs;

	mutex_lock(&dcookie_mutex);

	if (!is_live()) {
		err = -EINVAL;
		goto out;
	}

	if (path->dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_COOKIE) {
		dcs = find_dcookie((unsigned long)path->dentry);
	} else {
		dcs = alloc_dcookie(path);
		if (!dcs) {
			err = -ENOMEM;
			goto out;
		}
	}

	*cookie = dcookie_value(dcs);

out:
	mutex_unlock(&dcookie_mutex);
	return err;
}


/* And here is where the userspace process can look up the cookie value
 * to retrieve the path.
 */
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(lookup_dcookie, u64, cookie64, char __user *, buf, size_t, len)
{
	unsigned long cookie = (unsigned long)cookie64;
	int err = -EINVAL;
	char * kbuf;
	char * path;
	size_t pathlen;
	struct dcookie_struct * dcs;

	/* we could leak path information to users
	 * without dir read permission without this
	 */
	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
		return -EPERM;

	mutex_lock(&dcookie_mutex);

	if (!is_live()) {
		err = -EINVAL;
		goto out;
	}

	if (!(dcs = find_dcookie(cookie)))
		goto out;

	err = -ENOMEM;
	kbuf = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!kbuf)
		goto out;

	/* FIXME: (deleted) ? */
	path = d_path(&dcs->path, kbuf, PAGE_SIZE);

	mutex_unlock(&dcookie_mutex);

	if (IS_ERR(path)) {
		err = PTR_ERR(path);
		goto out_free;
	}

	err = -ERANGE;
 
	pathlen = kbuf + PAGE_SIZE - path;
	if (pathlen <= len) {
		err = pathlen;
		if (copy_to_user(buf, path, pathlen))
			err = -EFAULT;
	}

out_free:
	kfree(kbuf);
	return err;
out:
	mutex_unlock(&dcookie_mutex);
	return err;
}

#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(lookup_dcookie, u32, w0, u32, w1, char __user *, buf, compat_size_t, len)
{
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
	return sys_lookup_dcookie(((u64)w0 << 32) | w1, buf, len);
#else
	return sys_lookup_dcookie(((u64)w1 << 32) | w0, buf, len);
#endif
}
#endif

static int dcookie_init(void)
{
	struct list_head * d;
	unsigned int i, hash_bits;
	int err = -ENOMEM;

	dcookie_cache = kmem_cache_create("dcookie_cache",
		sizeof(struct dcookie_struct),
		0, 0, NULL);

	if (!dcookie_cache)
		goto out;

	dcookie_hashtable = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!dcookie_hashtable)
		goto out_kmem;

	err = 0;

	/*
	 * Find the power-of-two list-heads that can fit into the allocation..
	 * We don't guarantee that "sizeof(struct list_head)" is necessarily
	 * a power-of-two.
	 */
	hash_size = PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct list_head);
	hash_bits = 0;
	do {
		hash_bits++;
	} while ((hash_size >> hash_bits) != 0);
	hash_bits--;

	/*
	 * Re-calculate the actual number of entries and the mask
	 * from the number of bits we can fit.
	 */
	hash_size = 1UL << hash_bits;

	/* And initialize the newly allocated array */
	d = dcookie_hashtable;
	i = hash_size;
	do {
		INIT_LIST_HEAD(d);
		d++;
		i--;
	} while (i);

out:
	return err;
out_kmem:
	kmem_cache_destroy(dcookie_cache);
	goto out;
}


static void free_dcookie(struct dcookie_struct * dcs)
{
	struct dentry *d = dcs->path.dentry;

	spin_lock(&d->d_lock);
	d->d_flags &= ~DCACHE_COOKIE;
	spin_unlock(&d->d_lock);

	path_put(&dcs->path);
	kmem_cache_free(dcookie_cache, dcs);
}


static void dcookie_exit(void)
{
	struct list_head * list;
	struct list_head * pos;
	struct list_head * pos2;
	struct dcookie_struct * dcs;
	size_t i;

	for (i = 0; i < hash_size; ++i) {
		list = dcookie_hashtable + i;
		list_for_each_safe(pos, pos2, list) {
			dcs = list_entry(pos, struct dcookie_struct, hash_list);
			list_del(&dcs->hash_list);
			free_dcookie(dcs);
		}
	}

	kfree(dcookie_hashtable);
	kmem_cache_destroy(dcookie_cache);
}


struct dcookie_user {
	struct list_head next;
};
 
struct dcookie_user * dcookie_register(void)
{
	struct dcookie_user * user;

	mutex_lock(&dcookie_mutex);

	user = kmalloc(sizeof(struct dcookie_user), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!user)
		goto out;

	if (!is_live() && dcookie_init())
		goto out_free;

	list_add(&user->next, &dcookie_users);

out:
	mutex_unlock(&dcookie_mutex);
	return user;
out_free:
	kfree(user);
	user = NULL;
	goto out;
}


void dcookie_unregister(struct dcookie_user * user)
{
	mutex_lock(&dcookie_mutex);

	list_del(&user->next);
	kfree(user);

	if (!is_live())
		dcookie_exit();

	mutex_unlock(&dcookie_mutex);
}

EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dcookie_register);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dcookie_unregister);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_dcookie);
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