https://github.com/torvalds/linux
Revision 2127d22509aec3a83dffb2a3c736df7ba747a7ce authored by Miaohe Lin on 18 October 2021, 22:15:52 UTC, committed by Linus Torvalds on 19 October 2021, 06:22:03 UTC
Patch series "Fixups for slub". This series contains various bug fixes for slub. We fix memoryleak, use-afer-free, NULL pointer dereferencing and so on in slub. More details can be found in the respective changelogs. This patch (of 5): It's possible that __seq_open_private() will return NULL. So we should check it before using lest dereferencing NULL pointer. And in error paths, we forgot to release private buffer via seq_release_private(). Memory will leak in these paths. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210916123920.48704-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210916123920.48704-2-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: 64dd68497be7 ("mm: slub: move sysfs slab alloc/free interfaces to debugfs") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Faiyaz Mohammed <faiyazm@codeaurora.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
1 parent 6d2aec9
Tip revision: 2127d22509aec3a83dffb2a3c736df7ba747a7ce authored by Miaohe Lin on 18 October 2021, 22:15:52 UTC
mm, slub: fix two bugs in slab_debug_trace_open()
mm, slub: fix two bugs in slab_debug_trace_open()
Tip revision: 2127d22
zcrypt_ccamisc.h
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
/*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2019
* Author(s): Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
* Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
*
* Collection of CCA misc functions used by zcrypt and pkey
*/
#ifndef _ZCRYPT_CCAMISC_H_
#define _ZCRYPT_CCAMISC_H_
#include <asm/zcrypt.h>
#include <asm/pkey.h>
/* Key token types */
#define TOKTYPE_NON_CCA 0x00 /* Non-CCA key token */
#define TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL 0x01 /* CCA internal sym key token */
#define TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL_PKA 0x1f /* CCA internal asym key token */
/* For TOKTYPE_NON_CCA: */
#define TOKVER_PROTECTED_KEY 0x01 /* Protected key token */
#define TOKVER_CLEAR_KEY 0x02 /* Clear key token */
/* For TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL: */
#define TOKVER_CCA_AES 0x04 /* CCA AES key token */
#define TOKVER_CCA_VLSC 0x05 /* var length sym cipher key token */
/* Max size of a cca variable length cipher key token */
#define MAXCCAVLSCTOKENSIZE 725
/* header part of a CCA key token */
struct keytoken_header {
u8 type; /* one of the TOKTYPE values */
u8 res0[1];
u16 len; /* vlsc token: total length in bytes */
u8 version; /* one of the TOKVER values */
u8 res1[3];
} __packed;
/* inside view of a CCA secure key token (only type 0x01 version 0x04) */
struct secaeskeytoken {
u8 type; /* 0x01 for internal key token */
u8 res0[3];
u8 version; /* should be 0x04 */
u8 res1[1];
u8 flag; /* key flags */
u8 res2[1];
u64 mkvp; /* master key verification pattern */
u8 key[32]; /* key value (encrypted) */
u8 cv[8]; /* control vector */
u16 bitsize; /* key bit size */
u16 keysize; /* key byte size */
u8 tvv[4]; /* token validation value */
} __packed;
/* inside view of a variable length symmetric cipher AES key token */
struct cipherkeytoken {
u8 type; /* 0x01 for internal key token */
u8 res0[1];
u16 len; /* total key token length in bytes */
u8 version; /* should be 0x05 */
u8 res1[3];
u8 kms; /* key material state, 0x03 means wrapped with MK */
u8 kvpt; /* key verification pattern type, should be 0x01 */
u64 mkvp0; /* master key verification pattern, lo part */
u64 mkvp1; /* master key verification pattern, hi part (unused) */
u8 eskwm; /* encrypted section key wrapping method */
u8 hashalg; /* hash algorithmus used for wrapping key */
u8 plfver; /* pay load format version */
u8 res2[1];
u8 adsver; /* associated data section version */
u8 res3[1];
u16 adslen; /* associated data section length */
u8 kllen; /* optional key label length */
u8 ieaslen; /* optional extended associated data length */
u8 uadlen; /* optional user definable associated data length */
u8 res4[1];
u16 wpllen; /* wrapped payload length in bits: */
/* plfver 0x00 0x01 */
/* AES-128 512 640 */
/* AES-192 576 640 */
/* AES-256 640 640 */
u8 res5[1];
u8 algtype; /* 0x02 for AES cipher */
u16 keytype; /* 0x0001 for 'cipher' */
u8 kufc; /* key usage field count */
u16 kuf1; /* key usage field 1 */
u16 kuf2; /* key usage field 2 */
u8 kmfc; /* key management field count */
u16 kmf1; /* key management field 1 */
u16 kmf2; /* key management field 2 */
u16 kmf3; /* key management field 3 */
u8 vdata[]; /* variable part data follows */
} __packed;
/* inside view of an CCA secure ECC private key */
struct eccprivkeytoken {
u8 type; /* 0x1f for internal asym key token */
u8 version; /* should be 0x00 */
u16 len; /* total key token length in bytes */
u8 res1[4];
u8 secid; /* 0x20 for ECC priv key section marker */
u8 secver; /* section version */
u16 seclen; /* section length */
u8 wtype; /* wrapping method, 0x00 clear, 0x01 AES */
u8 htype; /* hash method, 0x02 for SHA-256 */
u8 res2[2];
u8 kutc; /* key usage and translation control */
u8 ctype; /* curve type */
u8 kfs; /* key format and security */
u8 ksrc; /* key source */
u16 pbitlen; /* length of prime p in bits */
u16 ibmadlen; /* IBM associated data length in bytes */
u64 mkvp; /* master key verification pattern */
u8 opk[48]; /* encrypted object protection key data */
u16 adatalen; /* associated data length in bytes */
u16 fseclen; /* formated section length in bytes */
u8 more_data[]; /* more data follows */
} __packed;
/* Some defines for the CCA AES cipherkeytoken kmf1 field */
#define KMF1_XPRT_SYM 0x8000
#define KMF1_XPRT_UASY 0x4000
#define KMF1_XPRT_AASY 0x2000
#define KMF1_XPRT_RAW 0x1000
#define KMF1_XPRT_CPAC 0x0800
#define KMF1_XPRT_DES 0x0080
#define KMF1_XPRT_AES 0x0040
#define KMF1_XPRT_RSA 0x0008
/*
* Simple check if the token is a valid CCA secure AES data key
* token. If keybitsize is given, the bitsize of the key is
* also checked. Returns 0 on success or errno value on failure.
*/
int cca_check_secaeskeytoken(debug_info_t *dbg, int dbflvl,
const u8 *token, int keybitsize);
/*
* Simple check if the token is a valid CCA secure AES cipher key
* token. If keybitsize is given, the bitsize of the key is
* also checked. If checkcpacfexport is enabled, the key is also
* checked for the export flag to allow CPACF export.
* Returns 0 on success or errno value on failure.
*/
int cca_check_secaescipherkey(debug_info_t *dbg, int dbflvl,
const u8 *token, int keybitsize,
int checkcpacfexport);
/*
* Simple check if the token is a valid CCA secure ECC private
* key token. Returns 0 on success or errno value on failure.
*/
int cca_check_sececckeytoken(debug_info_t *dbg, int dbflvl,
const u8 *token, size_t keysize,
int checkcpacfexport);
/*
* Generate (random) CCA AES DATA secure key.
*/
int cca_genseckey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, u32 keybitsize, u8 *seckey);
/*
* Generate CCA AES DATA secure key with given clear key value.
*/
int cca_clr2seckey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, u32 keybitsize,
const u8 *clrkey, u8 *seckey);
/*
* Derive proteced key from an CCA AES DATA secure key.
*/
int cca_sec2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain,
const u8 *seckey, u8 *protkey, u32 *protkeylen,
u32 *protkeytype);
/*
* Generate (random) CCA AES CIPHER secure key.
*/
int cca_gencipherkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, u32 keybitsize, u32 keygenflags,
u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybufsize);
/*
* Derive proteced key from CCA AES cipher secure key.
*/
int cca_cipher2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *ckey,
u8 *protkey, u32 *protkeylen, u32 *protkeytype);
/*
* Build CCA AES CIPHER secure key with a given clear key value.
*/
int cca_clr2cipherkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, u32 keybitsize, u32 keygenflags,
const u8 *clrkey, u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybufsize);
/*
* Derive proteced key from CCA ECC secure private key.
*/
int cca_ecc2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, const u8 *key,
u8 *protkey, u32 *protkeylen, u32 *protkeytype);
/*
* Query cryptographic facility from CCA adapter
*/
int cca_query_crypto_facility(u16 cardnr, u16 domain,
const char *keyword,
u8 *rarray, size_t *rarraylen,
u8 *varray, size_t *varraylen);
/*
* Search for a matching crypto card based on the Master Key
* Verification Pattern provided inside a secure key.
* Works with CCA AES data and cipher keys.
* Returns < 0 on failure, 0 if CURRENT MKVP matches and
* 1 if OLD MKVP matches.
*/
int cca_findcard(const u8 *key, u16 *pcardnr, u16 *pdomain, int verify);
/*
* Build a list of cca apqns meeting the following constrains:
* - apqn is online and is in fact a CCA apqn
* - if cardnr is not FFFF only apqns with this cardnr
* - if domain is not FFFF only apqns with this domainnr
* - if minhwtype > 0 only apqns with hwtype >= minhwtype
* - if cur_mkvp != 0 only apqns where cur_mkvp == mkvp
* - if old_mkvp != 0 only apqns where old_mkvp == mkvp
* - if verify is enabled and a cur_mkvp and/or old_mkvp
* value is given, then refetch the cca_info and make sure the current
* cur_mkvp or old_mkvp values of the apqn are used.
* The mktype determines which set of master keys to use:
* 0 = AES_MK_SET - AES MK set, 1 = APKA MK_SET - APKA MK set
* The array of apqn entries is allocated with kmalloc and returned in *apqns;
* the number of apqns stored into the list is returned in *nr_apqns. One apqn
* entry is simple a 32 bit value with 16 bit cardnr and 16 bit domain nr and
* may be casted to struct pkey_apqn. The return value is either 0 for success
* or a negative errno value. If no apqn meeting the criterias is found,
* -ENODEV is returned.
*/
int cca_findcard2(u32 **apqns, u32 *nr_apqns, u16 cardnr, u16 domain,
int minhwtype, int mktype, u64 cur_mkvp, u64 old_mkvp,
int verify);
#define AES_MK_SET 0
#define APKA_MK_SET 1
/* struct to hold info for each CCA queue */
struct cca_info {
int hwtype; /* one of the defined AP_DEVICE_TYPE_* */
char new_aes_mk_state; /* '1' empty, '2' partially full, '3' full */
char cur_aes_mk_state; /* '1' invalid, '2' valid */
char old_aes_mk_state; /* '1' invalid, '2' valid */
char new_apka_mk_state; /* '1' empty, '2' partially full, '3' full */
char cur_apka_mk_state; /* '1' invalid, '2' valid */
char old_apka_mk_state; /* '1' invalid, '2' valid */
u64 new_aes_mkvp; /* truncated sha256 of new aes master key */
u64 cur_aes_mkvp; /* truncated sha256 of current aes master key */
u64 old_aes_mkvp; /* truncated sha256 of old aes master key */
u64 new_apka_mkvp; /* truncated sha256 of new apka master key */
u64 cur_apka_mkvp; /* truncated sha256 of current apka mk */
u64 old_apka_mkvp; /* truncated sha256 of old apka mk */
char serial[9]; /* serial number (8 ascii numbers + 0x00) */
};
/*
* Fetch cca information about an CCA queue.
*/
int cca_get_info(u16 card, u16 dom, struct cca_info *ci, int verify);
void zcrypt_ccamisc_exit(void);
#endif /* _ZCRYPT_CCAMISC_H_ */
![swh spinner](/static/img/swh-spinner.gif)
Computing file changes ...