https://github.com/torvalds/linux
Revision 29a5b8a137ac8eb410cc823653a29ac0e7b7e1b0 authored by Luís Henriques on 22 August 2022, 09:42:35 UTC, committed by Theodore Ts'o on 22 September 2022, 14:50:54 UTC
When walking through an inode extents, the ext4_ext_binsearch_idx() function
assumes that the extent header has been previously validated.  However, there
are no checks that verify that the number of entries (eh->eh_entries) is
non-zero when depth is > 0.  And this will lead to problems because the
EXT_FIRST_INDEX() and EXT_LAST_INDEX() will return garbage and result in this:

[  135.245946] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  135.247579] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents.c:2258!
[  135.249045] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[  135.250320] CPU: 2 PID: 238 Comm: tmp118 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ #4
[  135.252067] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
[  135.255065] RIP: 0010:ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xc20/0xcb0
[  135.256475] Code:
[  135.261433] RSP: 0018:ffffc900005939f8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  135.262847] RAX: 0000000000000024 RBX: ffffc90000593b70 RCX: 0000000000000023
[  135.264765] RDX: ffff8880038e5f10 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffff8880046e922c
[  135.266670] RBP: ffff8880046e9348 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888002ca580c
[  135.268576] R10: 0000000000002602 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000024
[  135.270477] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000024 R15: 0000000000000000
[  135.272394] FS:  00007fdabdc56740(0000) GS:ffff88807dd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  135.274510] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  135.276075] CR2: 00007ffc26bd4f00 CR3: 0000000006261004 CR4: 0000000000170ea0
[  135.277952] Call Trace:
[  135.278635]  <TASK>
[  135.279247]  ? preempt_count_add+0x6d/0xa0
[  135.280358]  ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x55/0xb0
[  135.281612]  ? _raw_read_unlock+0x18/0x30
[  135.282704]  ext4_map_blocks+0x294/0x5a0
[  135.283745]  ? xa_load+0x6f/0xa0
[  135.284562]  ext4_mpage_readpages+0x3d6/0x770
[  135.285646]  read_pages+0x67/0x1d0
[  135.286492]  ? folio_add_lru+0x51/0x80
[  135.287441]  page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x124/0x170
[  135.288510]  filemap_get_pages+0x23d/0x5a0
[  135.289457]  ? path_openat+0xa72/0xdd0
[  135.290332]  filemap_read+0xbf/0x300
[  135.291158]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x17/0x40
[  135.292192]  new_sync_read+0x103/0x170
[  135.293014]  vfs_read+0x15d/0x180
[  135.293745]  ksys_read+0xa1/0xe0
[  135.294461]  do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80
[  135.295284]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

This patch simply adds an extra check in __ext4_ext_check(), verifying that
eh_entries is not 0 when eh_depth is > 0.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215941
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216283
Cc: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220822094235.2690-1-lhenriques@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
1 parent 83e80a6
Raw File
Tip revision: 29a5b8a137ac8eb410cc823653a29ac0e7b7e1b0 authored by Luís Henriques on 22 August 2022, 09:42:35 UTC
ext4: fix bug in extents parsing when eh_entries == 0 and eh_depth > 0
Tip revision: 29a5b8a
anon_inodes.c
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
 *  fs/anon_inodes.c
 *
 *  Copyright (C) 2007  Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
 *
 *  Thanks to Arnd Bergmann for code review and suggestions.
 *  More changes for Thomas Gleixner suggestions.
 *
 */

#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
#include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>

#include <linux/uaccess.h>

static struct vfsmount *anon_inode_mnt __read_mostly;
static struct inode *anon_inode_inode;

/*
 * anon_inodefs_dname() is called from d_path().
 */
static char *anon_inodefs_dname(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, int buflen)
{
	return dynamic_dname(dentry, buffer, buflen, "anon_inode:%s",
				dentry->d_name.name);
}

static const struct dentry_operations anon_inodefs_dentry_operations = {
	.d_dname	= anon_inodefs_dname,
};

static int anon_inodefs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
{
	struct pseudo_fs_context *ctx = init_pseudo(fc, ANON_INODE_FS_MAGIC);
	if (!ctx)
		return -ENOMEM;
	ctx->dops = &anon_inodefs_dentry_operations;
	return 0;
}

static struct file_system_type anon_inode_fs_type = {
	.name		= "anon_inodefs",
	.init_fs_context = anon_inodefs_init_fs_context,
	.kill_sb	= kill_anon_super,
};

static struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode(
	const char *name,
	const struct inode *context_inode)
{
	struct inode *inode;
	const struct qstr qname = QSTR_INIT(name, strlen(name));
	int error;

	inode = alloc_anon_inode(anon_inode_mnt->mnt_sb);
	if (IS_ERR(inode))
		return inode;
	inode->i_flags &= ~S_PRIVATE;
	error =	security_inode_init_security_anon(inode, &qname, context_inode);
	if (error) {
		iput(inode);
		return ERR_PTR(error);
	}
	return inode;
}

static struct file *__anon_inode_getfile(const char *name,
					 const struct file_operations *fops,
					 void *priv, int flags,
					 const struct inode *context_inode,
					 bool secure)
{
	struct inode *inode;
	struct file *file;

	if (fops->owner && !try_module_get(fops->owner))
		return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);

	if (secure) {
		inode =	anon_inode_make_secure_inode(name, context_inode);
		if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
			file = ERR_CAST(inode);
			goto err;
		}
	} else {
		inode =	anon_inode_inode;
		if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
			file = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
			goto err;
		}
		/*
		 * We know the anon_inode inode count is always
		 * greater than zero, so ihold() is safe.
		 */
		ihold(inode);
	}

	file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, anon_inode_mnt, name,
				 flags & (O_ACCMODE | O_NONBLOCK), fops);
	if (IS_ERR(file))
		goto err_iput;

	file->f_mapping = inode->i_mapping;

	file->private_data = priv;

	return file;

err_iput:
	iput(inode);
err:
	module_put(fops->owner);
	return file;
}

/**
 * anon_inode_getfile - creates a new file instance by hooking it up to an
 *                      anonymous inode, and a dentry that describe the "class"
 *                      of the file
 *
 * @name:    [in]    name of the "class" of the new file
 * @fops:    [in]    file operations for the new file
 * @priv:    [in]    private data for the new file (will be file's private_data)
 * @flags:   [in]    flags
 *
 * Creates a new file by hooking it on a single inode. This is useful for files
 * that do not need to have a full-fledged inode in order to operate correctly.
 * All the files created with anon_inode_getfile() will share a single inode,
 * hence saving memory and avoiding code duplication for the file/inode/dentry
 * setup.  Returns the newly created file* or an error pointer.
 */
struct file *anon_inode_getfile(const char *name,
				const struct file_operations *fops,
				void *priv, int flags)
{
	return __anon_inode_getfile(name, fops, priv, flags, NULL, false);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(anon_inode_getfile);

/**
 * anon_inode_getfile_secure - Like anon_inode_getfile(), but creates a new
 *                             !S_PRIVATE anon inode rather than reuse the
 *                             singleton anon inode and calls the
 *                             inode_init_security_anon() LSM hook.  This
 *                             allows for both the inode to have its own
 *                             security context and for the LSM to enforce
 *                             policy on the inode's creation.
 *
 * @name:    [in]    name of the "class" of the new file
 * @fops:    [in]    file operations for the new file
 * @priv:    [in]    private data for the new file (will be file's private_data)
 * @flags:   [in]    flags
 * @context_inode:
 *           [in]    the logical relationship with the new inode (optional)
 *
 * The LSM may use @context_inode in inode_init_security_anon(), but a
 * reference to it is not held.  Returns the newly created file* or an error
 * pointer.  See the anon_inode_getfile() documentation for more information.
 */
struct file *anon_inode_getfile_secure(const char *name,
				       const struct file_operations *fops,
				       void *priv, int flags,
				       const struct inode *context_inode)
{
	return __anon_inode_getfile(name, fops, priv, flags,
				    context_inode, true);
}

static int __anon_inode_getfd(const char *name,
			      const struct file_operations *fops,
			      void *priv, int flags,
			      const struct inode *context_inode,
			      bool secure)
{
	int error, fd;
	struct file *file;

	error = get_unused_fd_flags(flags);
	if (error < 0)
		return error;
	fd = error;

	file = __anon_inode_getfile(name, fops, priv, flags, context_inode,
				    secure);
	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
		error = PTR_ERR(file);
		goto err_put_unused_fd;
	}
	fd_install(fd, file);

	return fd;

err_put_unused_fd:
	put_unused_fd(fd);
	return error;
}

/**
 * anon_inode_getfd - creates a new file instance by hooking it up to
 *                    an anonymous inode and a dentry that describe
 *                    the "class" of the file
 *
 * @name:    [in]    name of the "class" of the new file
 * @fops:    [in]    file operations for the new file
 * @priv:    [in]    private data for the new file (will be file's private_data)
 * @flags:   [in]    flags
 *
 * Creates a new file by hooking it on a single inode. This is
 * useful for files that do not need to have a full-fledged inode in
 * order to operate correctly.  All the files created with
 * anon_inode_getfd() will use the same singleton inode, reducing
 * memory use and avoiding code duplication for the file/inode/dentry
 * setup.  Returns a newly created file descriptor or an error code.
 */
int anon_inode_getfd(const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops,
		     void *priv, int flags)
{
	return __anon_inode_getfd(name, fops, priv, flags, NULL, false);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(anon_inode_getfd);

/**
 * anon_inode_getfd_secure - Like anon_inode_getfd(), but creates a new
 * !S_PRIVATE anon inode rather than reuse the singleton anon inode, and calls
 * the inode_init_security_anon() LSM hook. This allows the inode to have its
 * own security context and for a LSM to reject creation of the inode.
 *
 * @name:    [in]    name of the "class" of the new file
 * @fops:    [in]    file operations for the new file
 * @priv:    [in]    private data for the new file (will be file's private_data)
 * @flags:   [in]    flags
 * @context_inode:
 *           [in]    the logical relationship with the new inode (optional)
 *
 * The LSM may use @context_inode in inode_init_security_anon(), but a
 * reference to it is not held.
 */
int anon_inode_getfd_secure(const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops,
			    void *priv, int flags,
			    const struct inode *context_inode)
{
	return __anon_inode_getfd(name, fops, priv, flags, context_inode, true);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(anon_inode_getfd_secure);

static int __init anon_inode_init(void)
{
	anon_inode_mnt = kern_mount(&anon_inode_fs_type);
	if (IS_ERR(anon_inode_mnt))
		panic("anon_inode_init() kernel mount failed (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(anon_inode_mnt));

	anon_inode_inode = alloc_anon_inode(anon_inode_mnt->mnt_sb);
	if (IS_ERR(anon_inode_inode))
		panic("anon_inode_init() inode allocation failed (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(anon_inode_inode));

	return 0;
}

fs_initcall(anon_inode_init);

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