https://github.com/EasyCrypt/easycrypt
Revision 35acf2595fda4946fc871de5779b285ca0ef7b64 authored by Pierre-Yves Strub on 22 June 2014, 22:01:13 UTC, committed by Pierre-Yves Strub on 22 June 2014, 22:01:13 UTC
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Tip revision: 35acf2595fda4946fc871de5779b285ca0ef7b64 authored by Pierre-Yves Strub on 22 June 2014, 22:01:13 UTC
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Tip revision: 35acf25
hashed_elgamal.ec
require import Int.
require import Real.
require import FMap.
require import FSet.
require import CDH.
require (*--*) AWord.
require (*--*) ROM.
require (*--*) PKE.
(* The type of plaintexts: bitstrings of length k *)
type bits.
op k: int.
op uniform: bits distr.
op (^^): bits -> bits -> bits.
clone import AWord as Bitstring with
type word <- bits,
op length <- k,
op (^) <- (^^),
op Dword.dword <- uniform.
(* Upper bound on the number of calls to H *)
op qH: int.
axiom qH_pos: 0 < qH.
(* Assumption *)
clone Set_CDH as SCDH with
op n <- qH.
import Group.
type pkey = group.
type skey = int.
type plaintext = bits.
type ciphertext = group * bits.
clone import PKE as PKE_ with
type pkey <- pkey,
type skey <- skey,
type plaintext <- plaintext,
type ciphertext <- ciphertext.
module type Hash = {
proc init(): unit
proc hash(x:group): bits
}.
module Hashed_ElGamal (H:Hash): Scheme = {
proc kg(): pkey * skey = {
var sk;
H.init();
sk = $[0..q-1];
return (g ^ sk, sk);
}
proc enc(pk:pkey, m:plaintext): ciphertext = {
var y, h;
y = $[0..q-1];
h = H.hash(pk ^ y);
return (g ^ y, h ^^ m);
}
proc dec(sk:skey, c:ciphertext): plaintext option = {
var gy, h, hm;
(gy, hm) = c;
h = H.hash(gy ^ sk);
return Option.Some (h ^^ hm);
}
}.
clone import ROM.Lazy as RandOrcl_group with
type from <- group,
type to <- bits,
op dsample <- fun (x:group), uniform.
import Types.
(* Adversary Definitions *)
module type Adversary (O:ARO) = {
proc choose(pk:pkey) : plaintext * plaintext
proc guess(c:ciphertext): bool
}.
module Bounder(A:Adversary,O:ARO) = {
module ARO = {
var qs:group set
proc o(x:group): bits = {
var r = witness;
if (card qs < qH) {
r = O.o(x);
qs = add x qs;
}
return r;
}
}
module A' = A(ARO)
proc choose = A'.choose
proc guess = A'.guess
}.
(* Specializing and merging the hash function *)
module H:Hash = {
proc init(): unit = { RO.init(); Bounder.ARO.qs = FSet.empty; }
proc hash(x:group): bits = { var y; y = RO.o(x); return y; }
}.
(* The initial scheme *)
module S = Hashed_ElGamal(H).
(* Correctness result *)
hoare Correctness: Correctness(S).main: true ==> res.
proof. by proc; inline *; auto; progress; smt. qed.
(* The reduction *)
module SCDH_from_CPA(A:Adversary,O:ARO): SCDH.Adversary = {
module BA = Bounder(A,O)
proc solve(gx:group, gy:group): group set = {
var m0, m1, h, b';
H.init();
(m0,m1) = BA.choose(gx);
h = $uniform;
b' = BA.guess(gy, h);
return Bounder.ARO.qs;
}
}.
(* We want to bound the probability of A winning CPA(Bounder(A,RO),S) in terms of
the probability of B = CDH_from_CPA(SCDH_from_CPA(A,RO)) winning CDH(B) *)
section.
declare module A: Adversary {RO, Bounder}.
axiom chooseL (O <: ARO {A}): islossless O.o => islossless A(O).choose.
axiom guessL (O <: ARO {A}) : islossless O.o => islossless A(O).guess.
local module BA = Bounder(A,RO).
local module G0 = {
var gxy:group
proc main(): bool = {
var m0, m1, c, b, b';
var x, y, h, gx;
H.init();
x = $[0..q-1];
y = $[0..q-1];
gx = g ^ x;
gxy = gx ^ y;
(m0,m1) = BA.choose(gx);
b = ${0,1};
h = H.hash(gxy);
c = (g ^ y, h ^^ (b ? m1 : m0));
b' = BA.guess(c);
return (b' = b);
}
}.
local equiv CPA_G0: CPA(S,BA).main ~ G0.main: ={glob A} ==> ={res}.
proof.
proc.
inline Hashed_ElGamal(H).kg Hashed_ElGamal(H).enc.
swap{1} 8 -5.
call (_: ={glob H, Bounder.ARO.qs}); first by sim.
wp; call (_: ={glob H}); first by sim.
wp; rnd.
call (_: ={glob H, Bounder.ARO.qs}); first by sim.
wp; do !rnd.
by call (_: true ==> ={glob H}); first by sim.
qed.
local lemma Pr_CPA_G0 &m:
Pr[CPA(S,BA).main() @ &m: res] = Pr[G0.main() @ &m: res]
by byequiv CPA_G0.
local module G1 = {
var gxy : group
proc main() : bool = {
var m0, m1, c, b, b';
var x, y, h, gx;
H.init();
x = $[0..q-1];
y = $[0..q-1];
gx = g ^ x;
gxy = gx ^ y;
(m0,m1) = BA.choose(gx);
b = ${0,1};
h = $uniform;
c = (g ^ y, h ^^ (b ? m1 : m0));
b' = BA.guess(c);
return (b' = b);
}
}.
local equiv G0_G1:
G0.main ~ G1.main: ={glob A} ==> !(mem G1.gxy Bounder.ARO.qs){2} => ={res}.
proof.
proc.
seq 7 7: (={glob BA, x, y, b, m0, m1} /\ G0.gxy{1} = G1.gxy{2} /\
(Bounder.ARO.qs = dom RO.m){2}).
rnd; call (_: ={glob Bounder, glob H} /\
(Bounder.ARO.qs = dom RO.m){2}).
by proc; sp; if=> //; inline RO.o; wp; rnd; wp; skip; smt.
by inline H.init RO.init; wp; do !rnd; wp; skip; smt.
call (_: (!mem G1.gxy Bounder.ARO.qs){2}
=> ={glob A, Bounder.ARO.qs, c}
/\ eq_except RO.m{1} RO.m{2} G1.gxy{2}
==> (!mem G1.gxy Bounder.ARO.qs){2}
=> ={glob A, Bounder.ARO.qs, res}
/\ eq_except RO.m{1} RO.m{2} G1.gxy{2})=> //.
proc (mem G1.gxy Bounder.ARO.qs) (={Bounder.ARO.qs} /\ eq_except RO.m{1} RO.m{2} G1.gxy{2})=> //.
smt.
smt.
by apply guessL.
by proc; sp; if=> //; inline RO.o; wp; rnd; wp; skip; progress; smt.
by progress; proc; sp; if=> //; wp; call (RO_o_ll _); first smt.
progress; proc; sp; if=> //; wp; call (RO_o_ll _); first smt.
by skip; smt.
by inline H.hash RO.o; auto; progress; smt.
qed.
local lemma Pr_G0_G1 &m:
Pr[G0.main() @ &m: res] <= Pr[G1.main() @ &m: res] + Pr[G1.main() @ &m: mem G1.gxy Bounder.ARO.qs].
proof.
cut: Pr[G0.main() @ &m: res] <= Pr[G1.main() @ &m: res \/ mem G1.gxy Bounder.ARO.qs].
by byequiv G0_G1=> //; smt.
by rewrite Pr [mu_or]; smt.
qed.
local module G2 = {
var gxy : group
proc main() : bool = {
var m0, m1, c, b, b';
var x, y, h, gx;
H.init();
x = $[0..q-1];
y = $[0..q-1];
gx = g ^ x;
gxy = gx ^ y;
(m0,m1) = BA.choose(gx);
h = $uniform;
c = (g ^ y, h);
b' = BA.guess(c);
b = ${0,1};
return (b' = b);
}
}.
local equiv G1_G2:
G1.main ~ G2.main: ={glob A} ==> ={res, Bounder.ARO.qs} /\ G1.gxy{1} = G2.gxy{2}.
proof.
proc.
swap{2} 10 -3.
call (_: ={glob H} /\ G1.gxy{1} = G2.gxy{2});
first by sim.
wp.
rnd (fun h, h ^^ if b then m1 else m0){1}; rnd.
call (_: ={glob H} /\ G1.gxy{1} = G2.gxy{2}).
by sim.
inline H.init RO.init.
by auto; progress; smt.
qed.
local lemma Pr_G1_G2_res &m:
Pr[G1.main() @ &m: res] = Pr[G2.main() @ &m: res]
by byequiv G1_G2.
local lemma Pr_G1_G2_coll &m:
Pr[G1.main() @ &m: mem G1.gxy Bounder.ARO.qs] = Pr[G2.main() @ &m: mem G2.gxy Bounder.ARO.qs]
by byequiv G1_G2.
local lemma Pr_G2 &m: Pr[G2.main() @ &m: res] = 1%r / 2%r.
proof.
byphoare (_: true ==> _)=> //.
proc; rnd ((=) b').
call (_: true)=> //.
by apply guessL.
by proc; sp; if=> //; wp; call (RO_o_ll _); first smt.
wp; rnd; call (_ : true).
by apply chooseL.
by proc; sp; if=> //; wp; call (RO_o_ll _); first smt.
by inline H.init RO.init; auto; progress; smt.
qed.
local equiv G2_SCDH: G2.main ~ SCDH.SCDH(SCDH_from_CPA(A,RO)).main:
={glob A} ==> (mem G2.gxy Bounder.ARO.qs){1} = res{2} /\ card Bounder.ARO.qs{1} <= qH.
proof.
proc.
inline SCDH_from_CPA(A,RO).solve.
swap{2} 5 -4.
rnd{1}; wp.
seq 8 7: (={glob BA} /\
c{1} = (gy, h){2} /\
G2.gxy{1} = g ^ (x * y){2} /\
card Bounder.ARO.qs{1} <= qH).
wp; rnd; call (_: ={glob H} /\ card Bounder.ARO.qs{1} <= qH).
by proc; sp; if=> //; inline RO.o; auto; smt.
by inline H.init RO.init; auto; smt.
call (_: ={glob H} /\ card Bounder.ARO.qs{1} <= qH).
by proc; sp; if=> //; inline RO.o; auto; smt.
by skip; smt.
qed.
local lemma Pr_G2_SCDH &m :
Pr[G2.main() @ &m : mem G2.gxy Bounder.ARO.qs]
= Pr[SCDH.SCDH(SCDH_from_CPA(A,RO)).main() @ &m : res]
by byequiv G2_SCDH.
local lemma Reduction &m :
Pr[CPA(S,BA).main() @ &m : res] <=
1%r / 2%r + Pr[SCDH.SCDH(SCDH_from_CPA(A,RO)).main() @ &m : res].
proof.
rewrite (Pr_CPA_G0 &m).
apply (Trans _ (Pr[G1.main() @ &m : res] + Pr[G1.main() @ &m: mem G1.gxy Bounder.ARO.qs]));
first by apply (Pr_G0_G1 &m).
by rewrite (Pr_G1_G2_res &m) (Pr_G2 &m) (Pr_G1_G2_coll &m) (Pr_G2_SCDH &m).
qed.
lemma mult_inv_le_r (x y z:real) :
0%r < x => (1%r / x) * y <= z => y <= x * z
by [].
(** Composing reduction from CPA to SCDH with reduction from SCDH to CDH *)
lemma Security &m :
Pr[CPA(S,Bounder(A,RO)).main() @ &m: res] - 1%r / 2%r <=
qH%r * Pr[CDH.CDH(SCDH.CDH_from_SCDH(SCDH_from_CPA(A,RO))).main() @ &m: res].
proof.
apply (Trans _ (Pr[SCDH.SCDH(SCDH_from_CPA(A,RO)).main() @ &m: res]));
first smt.
apply mult_inv_le_r; first smt.
by apply (SCDH.Reduction (SCDH_from_CPA(A,RO)) &m); smt.
qed.
end section.
print axiom Security.
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