https://github.com/torvalds/linux
Revision 405386b02157ea1ee49ecb6917c2397985bb2a39 authored by Linus Torvalds on 15 July 2021, 18:56:07 UTC, committed by Linus Torvalds on 15 July 2021, 18:56:07 UTC
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:

 - Allow again loading KVM on 32-bit non-PAE builds

 - Fixes for host SMIs on AMD

 - Fixes for guest SMIs on AMD

 - Fixes for selftests on s390 and ARM

 - Fix memory leak

 - Enforce no-instrumentation area on vmentry when hardware breakpoints
   are in use.

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (25 commits)
  KVM: selftests: smm_test: Test SMM enter from L2
  KVM: nSVM: Restore nested control upon leaving SMM
  KVM: nSVM: Fix L1 state corruption upon return from SMM
  KVM: nSVM: Introduce svm_copy_vmrun_state()
  KVM: nSVM: Check that VM_HSAVE_PA MSR was set before VMRUN
  KVM: nSVM: Check the value written to MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA
  KVM: SVM: Fix sev_pin_memory() error checks in SEV migration utilities
  KVM: SVM: Return -EFAULT if copy_to_user() for SEV mig packet header fails
  KVM: SVM: add module param to control the #SMI interception
  KVM: SVM: remove INIT intercept handler
  KVM: SVM: #SMI interception must not skip the instruction
  KVM: VMX: Remove vmx_msr_index from vmx.h
  KVM: X86: Disable hardware breakpoints unconditionally before kvm_x86->run()
  KVM: selftests: Address extra memslot parameters in vm_vaddr_alloc
  kvm: debugfs: fix memory leak in kvm_create_vm_debugfs
  KVM: x86/pmu: Clear anythread deprecated bit when 0xa leaf is unsupported on the SVM
  KVM: mmio: Fix use-after-free Read in kvm_vm_ioctl_unregister_coalesced_mmio
  KVM: SVM: Revert clearing of C-bit on GPA in #NPF handler
  KVM: x86/mmu: Do not apply HPA (memory encryption) mask to GPAs
  KVM: x86: Use kernel's x86_phys_bits to handle reduced MAXPHYADDR
  ...
2 parent s f3523a2 + d951b22
Raw File
Tip revision: 405386b02157ea1ee49ecb6917c2397985bb2a39 authored by Linus Torvalds on 15 July 2021, 18:56:07 UTC
Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Tip revision: 405386b
dh_helper.c
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
 * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation
 * Authors: Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com>
 */
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <crypto/dh.h>
#include <crypto/kpp.h>

#define DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE (sizeof(struct kpp_secret) + 4 * sizeof(int))

static inline u8 *dh_pack_data(u8 *dst, u8 *end, const void *src, size_t size)
{
	if (!dst || size > end - dst)
		return NULL;
	memcpy(dst, src, size);
	return dst + size;
}

static inline const u8 *dh_unpack_data(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
{
	memcpy(dst, src, size);
	return src + size;
}

static inline unsigned int dh_data_size(const struct dh *p)
{
	return p->key_size + p->p_size + p->q_size + p->g_size;
}

unsigned int crypto_dh_key_len(const struct dh *p)
{
	return DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE + dh_data_size(p);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_dh_key_len);

int crypto_dh_encode_key(char *buf, unsigned int len, const struct dh *params)
{
	u8 *ptr = buf;
	u8 * const end = ptr + len;
	struct kpp_secret secret = {
		.type = CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_DH,
		.len = len
	};

	if (unlikely(!len))
		return -EINVAL;

	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, &secret, sizeof(secret));
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, &params->key_size,
			   sizeof(params->key_size));
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, &params->p_size, sizeof(params->p_size));
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, &params->q_size, sizeof(params->q_size));
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, &params->g_size, sizeof(params->g_size));
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, params->key, params->key_size);
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, params->p, params->p_size);
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, params->q, params->q_size);
	ptr = dh_pack_data(ptr, end, params->g, params->g_size);
	if (ptr != end)
		return -EINVAL;
	return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_dh_encode_key);

int crypto_dh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len, struct dh *params)
{
	const u8 *ptr = buf;
	struct kpp_secret secret;

	if (unlikely(!buf || len < DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE))
		return -EINVAL;

	ptr = dh_unpack_data(&secret, ptr, sizeof(secret));
	if (secret.type != CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_DH)
		return -EINVAL;

	ptr = dh_unpack_data(&params->key_size, ptr, sizeof(params->key_size));
	ptr = dh_unpack_data(&params->p_size, ptr, sizeof(params->p_size));
	ptr = dh_unpack_data(&params->q_size, ptr, sizeof(params->q_size));
	ptr = dh_unpack_data(&params->g_size, ptr, sizeof(params->g_size));
	if (secret.len != crypto_dh_key_len(params))
		return -EINVAL;

	/*
	 * Don't permit the buffer for 'key' or 'g' to be larger than 'p', since
	 * some drivers assume otherwise.
	 */
	if (params->key_size > params->p_size ||
	    params->g_size > params->p_size || params->q_size > params->p_size)
		return -EINVAL;

	/* Don't allocate memory. Set pointers to data within
	 * the given buffer
	 */
	params->key = (void *)ptr;
	params->p = (void *)(ptr + params->key_size);
	params->q = (void *)(ptr + params->key_size + params->p_size);
	params->g = (void *)(ptr + params->key_size + params->p_size +
			     params->q_size);

	/*
	 * Don't permit 'p' to be 0.  It's not a prime number, and it's subject
	 * to corner cases such as 'mod 0' being undefined or
	 * crypto_kpp_maxsize() returning 0.
	 */
	if (memchr_inv(params->p, 0, params->p_size) == NULL)
		return -EINVAL;

	/* It is permissible to not provide Q. */
	if (params->q_size == 0)
		params->q = NULL;

	return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_dh_decode_key);
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