Revision 505608d2b9f3ab9e3ea0fd1b89b1cc560b91a7b5 authored by Linus Torvalds on 13 July 2013, 22:37:30 UTC, committed by Linus Torvalds on 13 July 2013, 22:37:30 UTC
Pull irq updates from Thomas Gleixner: - core fix for missing round up in the generic irq chip implementation - new irq chip for MOXA SoCs - a few fixes and cleanups in the irqchip drivers * 'irq-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: irqchip: Add support for MOXA ART SoCs genirq: generic chip: Use DIV_ROUND_UP to calculate numchips irqchip: nvic: Fix wrong num_ct argument for irq_alloc_domain_generic_chips() irqchip: sun4i: Staticize sun4i_irq_ack() irqchip: vt8500: Staticize local symbols
ima_api.c
/*
* Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
*
* Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
* License.
*
* File: ima_api.c
* Implements must_appraise_or_measure, collect_measurement,
* appraise_measurement, store_measurement and store_template.
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include "ima.h"
static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
/*
* ima_store_template - store ima template measurements
*
* Calculate the hash of a template entry, add the template entry
* to an ordered list of measurement entries maintained inside the kernel,
* and also update the aggregate integrity value (maintained inside the
* configured TPM PCR) over the hashes of the current list of measurement
* entries.
*
* Applications retrieve the current kernel-held measurement list through
* the securityfs entries in /sys/kernel/security/ima. The signed aggregate
* TPM PCR (called quote) can be retrieved using a TPM user space library
* and is used to validate the measurement list.
*
* Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise
*/
int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
int violation, struct inode *inode)
{
const char *op = "add_template_measure";
const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
int result;
memset(entry->digest, 0, sizeof(entry->digest));
entry->template_name = IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME;
entry->template_len = sizeof(entry->template);
if (!violation) {
result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(&entry->template,
entry->template_len,
entry->digest);
if (result < 0) {
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
entry->template_name, op,
audit_cause, result, 0);
return result;
}
}
result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode);
return result;
}
/*
* ima_add_violation - add violation to measurement list.
*
* Violations are flagged in the measurement list with zero hash values.
* By extending the PCR with 0xFF's instead of with zeroes, the PCR
* value is invalidated.
*/
void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
const char *op, const char *cause)
{
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
int violation = 1;
int result;
/* can overflow, only indicator */
atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);
entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entry) {
result = -ENOMEM;
goto err_out;
}
memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
if (result < 0)
kfree(entry);
err_out:
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
op, cause, result, 0);
}
/**
* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
* @inode: pointer to inode to measure
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
* @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK)
*
* The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
* subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
* func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
* mask: contains the permission mask
* fsmagic: hex value
*
* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
*
*/
int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE;
if (!ima_appraise)
flags &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, flags);
}
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
{
return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, IMA_MEASURE);
}
/*
* ima_collect_measurement - collect file measurement
*
* Calculate the file hash, if it doesn't already exist,
* storing the measurement and i_version in the iint.
*
* Must be called with iint->mutex held.
*
* Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
*/
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
int result = 0;
if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, iint->ima_xattr.digest);
if (!result) {
iint->version = i_version;
iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
}
}
if (result)
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
filename, "collect_data", "failed",
result, 0);
return result;
}
/*
* ima_store_measurement - store file measurement
*
* Create an "ima" template and then store the template by calling
* ima_store_template.
*
* We only get here if the inode has not already been measured,
* but the measurement could already exist:
* - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
* different filesystems.
* - the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info,
* containing the hashing info.
*
* Must be called with iint->mutex held.
*/
void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename)
{
const char *op = "add_template_measure";
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
int result = -ENOMEM;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
int violation = 0;
if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
return;
entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entry) {
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
op, audit_cause, result, 0);
return;
}
memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
strcpy(entry->template.file_name,
(strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
if (!result || result == -EEXIST)
iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
if (result < 0)
kfree(entry);
}
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const unsigned char *filename)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char hash[(IMA_DIGEST_SIZE * 2) + 1];
int i;
if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
return;
for (i = 0; i < IMA_DIGEST_SIZE; i++)
hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_xattr.digest[i]);
hash[i * 2] = '\0';
ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
if (!ab)
return;
audit_log_format(ab, "file=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, filename);
audit_log_format(ab, " hash=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, hash);
audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
audit_log_end(ab);
iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
}
const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf)
{
char *pathname = NULL;
/* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
*pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL);
if (*pathbuf) {
pathname = d_path(path, *pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11);
if (IS_ERR(pathname)) {
kfree(*pathbuf);
*pathbuf = NULL;
pathname = NULL;
}
}
return pathname;
}
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