https://github.com/torvalds/linux
Revision 51246bfd189064079c54421507236fd2723b18f3 authored by Thomas Gleixner on 02 February 2010, 10:40:27 UTC, committed by Thomas Gleixner on 03 February 2010, 14:13:22 UTC
If the owner of a PI futex dies we fix up the pi_state and set
pi_state->owner to NULL. When a malicious or just sloppy programmed
user space application sets the futex value to 0 e.g. by calling
pthread_mutex_init(), then the futex can be acquired again. A new
waiter manages to enqueue itself on the pi_state w/o damage, but on
unlock the kernel dereferences pi_state->owner and oopses.

Prevent this by checking pi_state->owner in the unlock path. If
pi_state->owner is not current we know that user space manipulated the
futex value. Ignore the mess and return -EINVAL.

This catches the above case and also the case where a task hijacks the
futex by setting the tid value and then tries to unlock it.

Reported-by: Jermome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>

1 parent 5ecb01c
History
Tip revision: 51246bfd189064079c54421507236fd2723b18f3 authored by Thomas Gleixner on 02 February 2010, 10:40:27 UTC
futex: Handle user space corruption gracefully
Tip revision: 51246bf
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