Revision 7561cea5dbb97fecb952548a0fb74fb105bf4664 authored by Darrick J. Wong on 01 July 2022, 16:08:33 UTC, committed by Darrick J. Wong on 01 July 2022, 16:09:52 UTC
KASAN reported the following use after free bug when running generic/475: XFS (dm-0): Mounting V5 Filesystem XFS (dm-0): Starting recovery (logdev: internal) XFS (dm-0): Ending recovery (logdev: internal) Buffer I/O error on dev dm-0, logical block 20639616, async page read Buffer I/O error on dev dm-0, logical block 20639617, async page read XFS (dm-0): log I/O error -5 XFS (dm-0): Filesystem has been shut down due to log error (0x2). XFS (dm-0): Unmounting Filesystem XFS (dm-0): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s). ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_raw_spin_lock+0x246/0x270 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888109dd84c4 by task 3:1H/136 CPU: 3 PID: 136 Comm: 3:1H Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-xfsx #rc4 8e53ab5ad0fddeb31cee5e7063ff9c361915a9c4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: xfs-log/dm-0 xlog_ioend_work [xfs] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44 print_report.cold+0x2b8/0x661 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x246/0x270 kasan_report+0xab/0x120 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x246/0x270 do_raw_spin_lock+0x246/0x270 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 xlog_force_shutdown+0xf6/0x370 [xfs 4ad76ae0d6add7e8183a553e624c31e9ed567318] xlog_ioend_work+0x100/0x190 [xfs 4ad76ae0d6add7e8183a553e624c31e9ed567318] process_one_work+0x672/0x1040 worker_thread+0x59b/0xec0 ? __kthread_parkme+0xc6/0x1f0 ? process_one_work+0x1040/0x1040 ? process_one_work+0x1040/0x1040 kthread+0x29e/0x340 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 154099: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 kmem_alloc+0x8d/0x2e0 [xfs] xlog_cil_init+0x1f/0x540 [xfs] xlog_alloc_log+0xd1e/0x1260 [xfs] xfs_log_mount+0xba/0x640 [xfs] xfs_mountfs+0xf2b/0x1d00 [xfs] xfs_fs_fill_super+0x10af/0x1910 [xfs] get_tree_bdev+0x383/0x670 vfs_get_tree+0x7d/0x240 path_mount+0xdb7/0x1890 __x64_sys_mount+0x1fa/0x270 do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Freed by task 154151: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 ____kasan_slab_free+0x110/0x190 slab_free_freelist_hook+0xab/0x180 kfree+0xbc/0x310 xlog_dealloc_log+0x1b/0x2b0 [xfs] xfs_unmountfs+0x119/0x200 [xfs] xfs_fs_put_super+0x6e/0x2e0 [xfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x12b/0x3a0 kill_block_super+0x95/0xd0 deactivate_locked_super+0x80/0x130 cleanup_mnt+0x329/0x4d0 task_work_run+0xc5/0x160 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xd4/0xe0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 This appears to be a race between the unmount process, which frees the CIL and waits for in-flight iclog IO; and the iclog IO completion. When generic/475 runs, it starts fsstress in the background, waits a few seconds, and substitutes a dm-error device to simulate a disk falling out of a machine. If the fsstress encounters EIO on a pure data write, it will exit but the filesystem will still be online. The next thing the test does is unmount the filesystem, which tries to clean the log, free the CIL, and wait for iclog IO completion. If an iclog was being written when the dm-error switch occurred, it can race with log unmounting as follows: Thread 1 Thread 2 xfs_log_unmount xfs_log_clean xfs_log_quiesce xlog_ioend_work <observe error> xlog_force_shutdown test_and_set_bit(XLOG_IOERROR) xfs_log_force <log is shut down, nop> xfs_log_umount_write <log is shut down, nop> xlog_dealloc_log xlog_cil_destroy <wait for iclogs> spin_lock(&log->l_cilp->xc_push_lock) <KABOOM> Therefore, free the CIL after waiting for the iclogs to complete. I /think/ this race has existed for quite a few years now, though I don't remember the ~2014 era logging code well enough to know if it was a real threat then or if the actual race was exposed only more recently. Fixes: ac983517ec59 ("xfs: don't sleep in xlog_cil_force_lsn on shutdown") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
1 parent 8944c6f
sm4.c
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
/*
* SM4, as specified in
* https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ribose-cfrg-sm4-10.html
*
* Copyright (C) 2018 ARM Limited or its affiliates.
* Copyright (c) 2021 Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <crypto/sm4.h>
static const u32 ____cacheline_aligned fk[4] = {
0xa3b1bac6, 0x56aa3350, 0x677d9197, 0xb27022dc
};
static const u32 ____cacheline_aligned ck[32] = {
0x00070e15, 0x1c232a31, 0x383f464d, 0x545b6269,
0x70777e85, 0x8c939aa1, 0xa8afb6bd, 0xc4cbd2d9,
0xe0e7eef5, 0xfc030a11, 0x181f262d, 0x343b4249,
0x50575e65, 0x6c737a81, 0x888f969d, 0xa4abb2b9,
0xc0c7ced5, 0xdce3eaf1, 0xf8ff060d, 0x141b2229,
0x30373e45, 0x4c535a61, 0x686f767d, 0x848b9299,
0xa0a7aeb5, 0xbcc3cad1, 0xd8dfe6ed, 0xf4fb0209,
0x10171e25, 0x2c333a41, 0x484f565d, 0x646b7279
};
static const u8 ____cacheline_aligned sbox[256] = {
0xd6, 0x90, 0xe9, 0xfe, 0xcc, 0xe1, 0x3d, 0xb7,
0x16, 0xb6, 0x14, 0xc2, 0x28, 0xfb, 0x2c, 0x05,
0x2b, 0x67, 0x9a, 0x76, 0x2a, 0xbe, 0x04, 0xc3,
0xaa, 0x44, 0x13, 0x26, 0x49, 0x86, 0x06, 0x99,
0x9c, 0x42, 0x50, 0xf4, 0x91, 0xef, 0x98, 0x7a,
0x33, 0x54, 0x0b, 0x43, 0xed, 0xcf, 0xac, 0x62,
0xe4, 0xb3, 0x1c, 0xa9, 0xc9, 0x08, 0xe8, 0x95,
0x80, 0xdf, 0x94, 0xfa, 0x75, 0x8f, 0x3f, 0xa6,
0x47, 0x07, 0xa7, 0xfc, 0xf3, 0x73, 0x17, 0xba,
0x83, 0x59, 0x3c, 0x19, 0xe6, 0x85, 0x4f, 0xa8,
0x68, 0x6b, 0x81, 0xb2, 0x71, 0x64, 0xda, 0x8b,
0xf8, 0xeb, 0x0f, 0x4b, 0x70, 0x56, 0x9d, 0x35,
0x1e, 0x24, 0x0e, 0x5e, 0x63, 0x58, 0xd1, 0xa2,
0x25, 0x22, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x01, 0x21, 0x78, 0x87,
0xd4, 0x00, 0x46, 0x57, 0x9f, 0xd3, 0x27, 0x52,
0x4c, 0x36, 0x02, 0xe7, 0xa0, 0xc4, 0xc8, 0x9e,
0xea, 0xbf, 0x8a, 0xd2, 0x40, 0xc7, 0x38, 0xb5,
0xa3, 0xf7, 0xf2, 0xce, 0xf9, 0x61, 0x15, 0xa1,
0xe0, 0xae, 0x5d, 0xa4, 0x9b, 0x34, 0x1a, 0x55,
0xad, 0x93, 0x32, 0x30, 0xf5, 0x8c, 0xb1, 0xe3,
0x1d, 0xf6, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x82, 0x66, 0xca, 0x60,
0xc0, 0x29, 0x23, 0xab, 0x0d, 0x53, 0x4e, 0x6f,
0xd5, 0xdb, 0x37, 0x45, 0xde, 0xfd, 0x8e, 0x2f,
0x03, 0xff, 0x6a, 0x72, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0x5b, 0x51,
0x8d, 0x1b, 0xaf, 0x92, 0xbb, 0xdd, 0xbc, 0x7f,
0x11, 0xd9, 0x5c, 0x41, 0x1f, 0x10, 0x5a, 0xd8,
0x0a, 0xc1, 0x31, 0x88, 0xa5, 0xcd, 0x7b, 0xbd,
0x2d, 0x74, 0xd0, 0x12, 0xb8, 0xe5, 0xb4, 0xb0,
0x89, 0x69, 0x97, 0x4a, 0x0c, 0x96, 0x77, 0x7e,
0x65, 0xb9, 0xf1, 0x09, 0xc5, 0x6e, 0xc6, 0x84,
0x18, 0xf0, 0x7d, 0xec, 0x3a, 0xdc, 0x4d, 0x20,
0x79, 0xee, 0x5f, 0x3e, 0xd7, 0xcb, 0x39, 0x48
};
extern const u32 crypto_sm4_fk[4] __alias(fk);
extern const u32 crypto_sm4_ck[32] __alias(ck);
extern const u8 crypto_sm4_sbox[256] __alias(sbox);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_sm4_fk);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_sm4_ck);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_sm4_sbox);
static inline u32 sm4_t_non_lin_sub(u32 x)
{
u32 out;
out = (u32)sbox[x & 0xff];
out |= (u32)sbox[(x >> 8) & 0xff] << 8;
out |= (u32)sbox[(x >> 16) & 0xff] << 16;
out |= (u32)sbox[(x >> 24) & 0xff] << 24;
return out;
}
static inline u32 sm4_key_lin_sub(u32 x)
{
return x ^ rol32(x, 13) ^ rol32(x, 23);
}
static inline u32 sm4_enc_lin_sub(u32 x)
{
return x ^ rol32(x, 2) ^ rol32(x, 10) ^ rol32(x, 18) ^ rol32(x, 24);
}
static inline u32 sm4_key_sub(u32 x)
{
return sm4_key_lin_sub(sm4_t_non_lin_sub(x));
}
static inline u32 sm4_enc_sub(u32 x)
{
return sm4_enc_lin_sub(sm4_t_non_lin_sub(x));
}
static inline u32 sm4_round(u32 x0, u32 x1, u32 x2, u32 x3, u32 rk)
{
return x0 ^ sm4_enc_sub(x1 ^ x2 ^ x3 ^ rk);
}
/**
* sm4_expandkey - Expands the SM4 key as described in GB/T 32907-2016
* @ctx: The location where the computed key will be stored.
* @in_key: The supplied key.
* @key_len: The length of the supplied key.
*
* Returns 0 on success. The function fails only if an invalid key size (or
* pointer) is supplied.
*/
int sm4_expandkey(struct sm4_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
u32 rk[4];
const u32 *key = (u32 *)in_key;
int i;
if (key_len != SM4_KEY_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
rk[0] = get_unaligned_be32(&key[0]) ^ fk[0];
rk[1] = get_unaligned_be32(&key[1]) ^ fk[1];
rk[2] = get_unaligned_be32(&key[2]) ^ fk[2];
rk[3] = get_unaligned_be32(&key[3]) ^ fk[3];
for (i = 0; i < 32; i += 4) {
rk[0] ^= sm4_key_sub(rk[1] ^ rk[2] ^ rk[3] ^ ck[i + 0]);
rk[1] ^= sm4_key_sub(rk[2] ^ rk[3] ^ rk[0] ^ ck[i + 1]);
rk[2] ^= sm4_key_sub(rk[3] ^ rk[0] ^ rk[1] ^ ck[i + 2]);
rk[3] ^= sm4_key_sub(rk[0] ^ rk[1] ^ rk[2] ^ ck[i + 3]);
ctx->rkey_enc[i + 0] = rk[0];
ctx->rkey_enc[i + 1] = rk[1];
ctx->rkey_enc[i + 2] = rk[2];
ctx->rkey_enc[i + 3] = rk[3];
ctx->rkey_dec[31 - 0 - i] = rk[0];
ctx->rkey_dec[31 - 1 - i] = rk[1];
ctx->rkey_dec[31 - 2 - i] = rk[2];
ctx->rkey_dec[31 - 3 - i] = rk[3];
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sm4_expandkey);
/**
* sm4_crypt_block - Encrypt or decrypt a single SM4 block
* @rk: The rkey_enc for encrypt or rkey_dec for decrypt
* @out: Buffer to store output data
* @in: Buffer containing the input data
*/
void sm4_crypt_block(const u32 *rk, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
{
u32 x[4], i;
x[0] = get_unaligned_be32(in + 0 * 4);
x[1] = get_unaligned_be32(in + 1 * 4);
x[2] = get_unaligned_be32(in + 2 * 4);
x[3] = get_unaligned_be32(in + 3 * 4);
for (i = 0; i < 32; i += 4) {
x[0] = sm4_round(x[0], x[1], x[2], x[3], rk[i + 0]);
x[1] = sm4_round(x[1], x[2], x[3], x[0], rk[i + 1]);
x[2] = sm4_round(x[2], x[3], x[0], x[1], rk[i + 2]);
x[3] = sm4_round(x[3], x[0], x[1], x[2], rk[i + 3]);
}
put_unaligned_be32(x[3 - 0], out + 0 * 4);
put_unaligned_be32(x[3 - 1], out + 1 * 4);
put_unaligned_be32(x[3 - 2], out + 2 * 4);
put_unaligned_be32(x[3 - 3], out + 3 * 4);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sm4_crypt_block);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Generic SM4 library");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
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