Skip to main content

Browse the archive

Revision 7f453c24b95a085fc7bd35d53b33abc4dc5a048b authored by Peter Zijlstra on 21 July 2009, 11:19:40 UTC, committed by Peter Zijlstra on 22 July 2009, 16:05:56 UTC 
perf_counter: PERF_SAMPLE_ID and inherited counters
 
Anton noted that for inherited counters the counter-id as provided by
PERF_SAMPLE_ID isn't mappable to the id found through PERF_RECORD_ID
because each inherited counter gets its own id.

His suggestion was to always return the parent counter id, since that
is the primary counter id as exposed. However, these inherited
counters have a unique identifier so that events like
PERF_EVENT_PERIOD and PERF_EVENT_THROTTLE can be specific about which
counter gets modified, which is important when trying to normalize the
sample streams.

This patch removes PERF_EVENT_PERIOD in favour of PERF_SAMPLE_PERIOD,
which is more useful anyway, since changing periods became a lot more
common than initially thought -- rendering PERF_EVENT_PERIOD the less
useful solution (also, PERF_SAMPLE_PERIOD reports the more accurate
value, since it reports the value used to trigger the overflow,
whereas PERF_EVENT_PERIOD simply reports the requested period changed,
which might only take effect on the next cycle).

This still leaves us PERF_EVENT_THROTTLE to consider, but since that
_should_ be a rare occurrence, and linking it to a primary id is the
most useful bit to diagnose the problem, we introduce a
PERF_SAMPLE_STREAM_ID, for those few cases where the full
reconstruction is important.

[Does change the ABI a little, but I see no other way out]

Suggested-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
LKML-Reference: <1248095846.15751.8781.camel@twins>
1 parent 573402d
Raw File
seccomp.c 
/*
 * linux/kernel/seccomp.c
 *
 * Copyright 2004-2005  Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
 *
 * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing mode.
 */

#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>

/* #define SECCOMP_DEBUG 1 */
#define NR_SECCOMP_MODES 1

/*
 * Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn.
 * To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit
 * to limit the stack allocations too.
 */
static int mode1_syscalls[] = {
	__NR_seccomp_read, __NR_seccomp_write, __NR_seccomp_exit, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn,
	0, /* null terminated */
};

#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
	__NR_seccomp_read_32, __NR_seccomp_write_32, __NR_seccomp_exit_32, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32,
	0, /* null terminated */
};
#endif

void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
{
	int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
	int * syscall;

	switch (mode) {
	case 1:
		syscall = mode1_syscalls;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
		if (is_compat_task())
			syscall = mode1_syscalls_32;
#endif
		do {
			if (*syscall == this_syscall)
				return;
		} while (*++syscall);
		break;
	default:
		BUG();
	}

#ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
	dump_stack();
#endif
	do_exit(SIGKILL);
}

long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
{
	return current->seccomp.mode;
}

long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
{
	long ret;

	/* can set it only once to be even more secure */
	ret = -EPERM;
	if (unlikely(current->seccomp.mode))
		goto out;

	ret = -EINVAL;
	if (seccomp_mode && seccomp_mode <= NR_SECCOMP_MODES) {
		current->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
		set_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP);
#ifdef TIF_NOTSC
		disable_TSC();
#endif
		ret = 0;
	}

 out:
	return ret;
}
back to top