Revision 854145e0a8e9a05f7366d240e2f99d9c1ca6d6dd authored by Chunyu Hu on 03 May 2016, 11:34:34 UTC, committed by Steven Rostedt on 03 May 2016, 16:59:30 UTC
Currently register functions for events will be called
through the 'reg' field of event class directly without
any check when seting up triggers.

Triggers for events that don't support register through
debug fs (events under events/ftrace are for trace-cmd to
read event format, and most of them don't have a register
function except events/ftrace/functionx) can't be enabled
at all, and an oops will be hit when setting up trigger
for those events, so just not creating them is an easy way
to avoid the oops.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462275274-3911-1-git-send-email-chuhu@redhat.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.14+
Fixes: 85f2b08268c01 ("tracing: Add basic event trigger framework")
Signed-off-by: Chunyu Hu <chuhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
1 parent 04974df
Raw File
kcmp.c
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/fdtable.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/cache.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/kcmp.h>

#include <asm/unistd.h>

/*
 * We don't expose the real in-memory order of objects for security reasons.
 * But still the comparison results should be suitable for sorting. So we
 * obfuscate kernel pointers values and compare the production instead.
 *
 * The obfuscation is done in two steps. First we xor the kernel pointer with
 * a random value, which puts pointer into a new position in a reordered space.
 * Secondly we multiply the xor production with a large odd random number to
 * permute its bits even more (the odd multiplier guarantees that the product
 * is unique ever after the high bits are truncated, since any odd number is
 * relative prime to 2^n).
 *
 * Note also that the obfuscation itself is invisible to userspace and if needed
 * it can be changed to an alternate scheme.
 */
static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly;

static long kptr_obfuscate(long v, int type)
{
	return (v ^ cookies[type][0]) * cookies[type][1];
}

/*
 * 0 - equal, i.e. v1 = v2
 * 1 - less than, i.e. v1 < v2
 * 2 - greater than, i.e. v1 > v2
 * 3 - not equal but ordering unavailable (reserved for future)
 */
static int kcmp_ptr(void *v1, void *v2, enum kcmp_type type)
{
	long t1, t2;

	t1 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v1, type);
	t2 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v2, type);

	return (t1 < t2) | ((t1 > t2) << 1);
}

/* The caller must have pinned the task */
static struct file *
get_file_raw_ptr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int idx)
{
	struct file *file = NULL;

	task_lock(task);
	rcu_read_lock();

	if (task->files)
		file = fcheck_files(task->files, idx);

	rcu_read_unlock();
	task_unlock(task);

	return file;
}

static void kcmp_unlock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
{
	if (likely(m2 != m1))
		mutex_unlock(m2);
	mutex_unlock(m1);
}

static int kcmp_lock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
{
	int err;

	if (m2 > m1)
		swap(m1, m2);

	err = mutex_lock_killable(m1);
	if (!err && likely(m1 != m2)) {
		err = mutex_lock_killable_nested(m2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
		if (err)
			mutex_unlock(m1);
	}

	return err;
}

SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type,
		unsigned long, idx1, unsigned long, idx2)
{
	struct task_struct *task1, *task2;
	int ret;

	rcu_read_lock();

	/*
	 * Tasks are looked up in caller's PID namespace only.
	 */
	task1 = find_task_by_vpid(pid1);
	task2 = find_task_by_vpid(pid2);
	if (!task1 || !task2)
		goto err_no_task;

	get_task_struct(task1);
	get_task_struct(task2);

	rcu_read_unlock();

	/*
	 * One should have enough rights to inspect task details.
	 */
	ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
			&task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
	if (ret)
		goto err;
	if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS) ||
	    !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) {
		ret = -EPERM;
		goto err_unlock;
	}

	switch (type) {
	case KCMP_FILE: {
		struct file *filp1, *filp2;

		filp1 = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1);
		filp2 = get_file_raw_ptr(task2, idx2);

		if (filp1 && filp2)
			ret = kcmp_ptr(filp1, filp2, KCMP_FILE);
		else
			ret = -EBADF;
		break;
	}
	case KCMP_VM:
		ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->mm, task2->mm, KCMP_VM);
		break;
	case KCMP_FILES:
		ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->files, task2->files, KCMP_FILES);
		break;
	case KCMP_FS:
		ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->fs, task2->fs, KCMP_FS);
		break;
	case KCMP_SIGHAND:
		ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sighand, task2->sighand, KCMP_SIGHAND);
		break;
	case KCMP_IO:
		ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->io_context, task2->io_context, KCMP_IO);
		break;
	case KCMP_SYSVSEM:
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
		ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sysvsem.undo_list,
			       task2->sysvsem.undo_list,
			       KCMP_SYSVSEM);
#else
		ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
		break;
	default:
		ret = -EINVAL;
		break;
	}

err_unlock:
	kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
		    &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
err:
	put_task_struct(task1);
	put_task_struct(task2);

	return ret;

err_no_task:
	rcu_read_unlock();
	return -ESRCH;
}

static __init int kcmp_cookies_init(void)
{
	int i;

	get_random_bytes(cookies, sizeof(cookies));

	for (i = 0; i < KCMP_TYPES; i++)
		cookies[i][1] |= (~(~0UL >>  1) | 1);

	return 0;
}
arch_initcall(kcmp_cookies_init);
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