Revision 8db1e8743c0f1ed241f6a1b8bf55b6fef07d6751 authored by Johannes Schindelin on 28 March 2024, 18:21:06 UTC, committed by Johannes Schindelin on 19 April 2024, 10:38:23 UTC
Critical security issues typically combine relatively common vulnerabilities such as case confusion in file paths with other weaknesses in order to raise the severity of the attack. One such weakness that has haunted the Git project in many a submodule-related CVE is that any hooks that are found are executed during a clone operation. Examples are the `post-checkout` and `fsmonitor` hooks. However, Git's design calls for hooks to be disabled by default, as only disabled example hooks are copied over from the templates in `<prefix>/share/git-core/templates/`. As a defense-in-depth measure, let's prevent those hooks from running. Obviously, administrators can choose to drop enabled hooks into the template directory, though, _and_ it is also possible to override `core.hooksPath`, in which case the new check needs to be disabled. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
1 parent 584de0b
midx.h
#ifndef MIDX_H
#define MIDX_H
#include "repository.h"
#include "string-list.h"
struct object_id;
struct pack_entry;
struct repository;
#define GIT_TEST_MULTI_PACK_INDEX "GIT_TEST_MULTI_PACK_INDEX"
#define GIT_TEST_MULTI_PACK_INDEX_WRITE_BITMAP \
"GIT_TEST_MULTI_PACK_INDEX_WRITE_BITMAP"
struct multi_pack_index {
struct multi_pack_index *next;
const unsigned char *data;
size_t data_len;
const uint32_t *revindex_data;
const uint32_t *revindex_map;
size_t revindex_len;
uint32_t signature;
unsigned char version;
unsigned char hash_len;
unsigned char num_chunks;
uint32_t num_packs;
uint32_t num_objects;
int local;
const unsigned char *chunk_pack_names;
const uint32_t *chunk_oid_fanout;
const unsigned char *chunk_oid_lookup;
const unsigned char *chunk_object_offsets;
const unsigned char *chunk_large_offsets;
const unsigned char *chunk_revindex;
const char **pack_names;
struct packed_git **packs;
char object_dir[FLEX_ARRAY];
};
#define MIDX_PROGRESS (1 << 0)
#define MIDX_WRITE_REV_INDEX (1 << 1)
#define MIDX_WRITE_BITMAP (1 << 2)
#define MIDX_WRITE_BITMAP_HASH_CACHE (1 << 3)
#define MIDX_WRITE_BITMAP_LOOKUP_TABLE (1 << 4)
const unsigned char *get_midx_checksum(struct multi_pack_index *m);
void get_midx_filename(struct strbuf *out, const char *object_dir);
void get_midx_rev_filename(struct strbuf *out, struct multi_pack_index *m);
struct multi_pack_index *load_multi_pack_index(const char *object_dir, int local);
int prepare_midx_pack(struct repository *r, struct multi_pack_index *m, uint32_t pack_int_id);
int bsearch_midx(const struct object_id *oid, struct multi_pack_index *m, uint32_t *result);
off_t nth_midxed_offset(struct multi_pack_index *m, uint32_t pos);
uint32_t nth_midxed_pack_int_id(struct multi_pack_index *m, uint32_t pos);
struct object_id *nth_midxed_object_oid(struct object_id *oid,
struct multi_pack_index *m,
uint32_t n);
int fill_midx_entry(struct repository *r, const struct object_id *oid, struct pack_entry *e, struct multi_pack_index *m);
int midx_contains_pack(struct multi_pack_index *m, const char *idx_or_pack_name);
int prepare_multi_pack_index_one(struct repository *r, const char *object_dir, int local);
/*
* Variant of write_midx_file which writes a MIDX containing only the packs
* specified in packs_to_include.
*/
int write_midx_file(const char *object_dir,
const char *preferred_pack_name,
const char *refs_snapshot,
unsigned flags);
int write_midx_file_only(const char *object_dir,
struct string_list *packs_to_include,
const char *preferred_pack_name,
const char *refs_snapshot,
unsigned flags);
void clear_midx_file(struct repository *r);
int verify_midx_file(struct repository *r, const char *object_dir, unsigned flags);
int expire_midx_packs(struct repository *r, const char *object_dir, unsigned flags);
int midx_repack(struct repository *r, const char *object_dir, size_t batch_size, unsigned flags);
void close_midx(struct multi_pack_index *m);
#endif
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