Revision 8db1e8743c0f1ed241f6a1b8bf55b6fef07d6751 authored by Johannes Schindelin on 28 March 2024, 18:21:06 UTC, committed by Johannes Schindelin on 19 April 2024, 10:38:23 UTC
Critical security issues typically combine relatively common
vulnerabilities such as case confusion in file paths with other
weaknesses in order to raise the severity of the attack.

One such weakness that has haunted the Git project in many a
submodule-related CVE is that any hooks that are found are executed
during a clone operation. Examples are the `post-checkout` and
`fsmonitor` hooks.

However, Git's design calls for hooks to be disabled by default, as only
disabled example hooks are copied over from the templates in
`<prefix>/share/git-core/templates/`.

As a defense-in-depth measure, let's prevent those hooks from running.

Obviously, administrators can choose to drop enabled hooks into the
template directory, though, _and_ it is also possible to override
`core.hooksPath`, in which case the new check needs to be disabled.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
1 parent 584de0b
Raw File
oidset.c
#include "cache.h"
#include "oidset.h"

void oidset_init(struct oidset *set, size_t initial_size)
{
	memset(&set->set, 0, sizeof(set->set));
	if (initial_size)
		kh_resize_oid_set(&set->set, initial_size);
}

int oidset_contains(const struct oidset *set, const struct object_id *oid)
{
	khiter_t pos = kh_get_oid_set(&set->set, *oid);
	return pos != kh_end(&set->set);
}

int oidset_insert(struct oidset *set, const struct object_id *oid)
{
	int added;
	kh_put_oid_set(&set->set, *oid, &added);
	return !added;
}

int oidset_remove(struct oidset *set, const struct object_id *oid)
{
	khiter_t pos = kh_get_oid_set(&set->set, *oid);
	if (pos == kh_end(&set->set))
		return 0;
	kh_del_oid_set(&set->set, pos);
	return 1;
}

void oidset_clear(struct oidset *set)
{
	kh_release_oid_set(&set->set);
	oidset_init(set, 0);
}

void oidset_parse_file(struct oidset *set, const char *path)
{
	oidset_parse_file_carefully(set, path, NULL, NULL);
}

void oidset_parse_file_carefully(struct oidset *set, const char *path,
				 oidset_parse_tweak_fn fn, void *cbdata)
{
	FILE *fp;
	struct strbuf sb = STRBUF_INIT;
	struct object_id oid;

	fp = fopen(path, "r");
	if (!fp)
		die("could not open object name list: %s", path);
	while (!strbuf_getline(&sb, fp)) {
		const char *p;
		const char *name;

		/*
		 * Allow trailing comments, leading whitespace
		 * (including before commits), and empty or whitespace
		 * only lines.
		 */
		name = strchr(sb.buf, '#');
		if (name)
			strbuf_setlen(&sb, name - sb.buf);
		strbuf_trim(&sb);
		if (!sb.len)
			continue;

		if (parse_oid_hex(sb.buf, &oid, &p) || *p != '\0')
			die("invalid object name: %s", sb.buf);
		if (fn && fn(&oid, cbdata))
			continue;
		oidset_insert(set, &oid);
	}
	if (ferror(fp))
		die_errno("Could not read '%s'", path);
	fclose(fp);
	strbuf_release(&sb);
}
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