Revision 8db1e8743c0f1ed241f6a1b8bf55b6fef07d6751 authored by Johannes Schindelin on 28 March 2024, 18:21:06 UTC, committed by Johannes Schindelin on 19 April 2024, 10:38:23 UTC
Critical security issues typically combine relatively common vulnerabilities such as case confusion in file paths with other weaknesses in order to raise the severity of the attack. One such weakness that has haunted the Git project in many a submodule-related CVE is that any hooks that are found are executed during a clone operation. Examples are the `post-checkout` and `fsmonitor` hooks. However, Git's design calls for hooks to be disabled by default, as only disabled example hooks are copied over from the templates in `<prefix>/share/git-core/templates/`. As a defense-in-depth measure, let's prevent those hooks from running. Obviously, administrators can choose to drop enabled hooks into the template directory, though, _and_ it is also possible to override `core.hooksPath`, in which case the new check needs to be disabled. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
1 parent 584de0b
nettle.h
#ifndef SHA256_NETTLE_H
#define SHA256_NETTLE_H
#include <nettle/sha2.h>
typedef struct sha256_ctx nettle_SHA256_CTX;
static inline void nettle_SHA256_Init(nettle_SHA256_CTX *ctx)
{
sha256_init(ctx);
}
static inline void nettle_SHA256_Update(nettle_SHA256_CTX *ctx,
const void *data,
size_t len)
{
sha256_update(ctx, len, data);
}
static inline void nettle_SHA256_Final(unsigned char *digest,
nettle_SHA256_CTX *ctx)
{
sha256_digest(ctx, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, digest);
}
#define platform_SHA256_CTX nettle_SHA256_CTX
#define platform_SHA256_Init nettle_SHA256_Init
#define platform_SHA256_Update nettle_SHA256_Update
#define platform_SHA256_Final nettle_SHA256_Final
#endif
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