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Revision 8db1e8743c0f1ed241f6a1b8bf55b6fef07d6751 authored by Johannes Schindelin on 28 March 2024, 18:21:06 UTC, committed by Johannes Schindelin on 19 April 2024, 10:38:23 UTC 
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
 
Critical security issues typically combine relatively common
vulnerabilities such as case confusion in file paths with other
weaknesses in order to raise the severity of the attack.

One such weakness that has haunted the Git project in many a
submodule-related CVE is that any hooks that are found are executed
during a clone operation. Examples are the `post-checkout` and
`fsmonitor` hooks.

However, Git's design calls for hooks to be disabled by default, as only
disabled example hooks are copied over from the templates in
`<prefix>/share/git-core/templates/`.

As a defense-in-depth measure, let's prevent those hooks from running.

Obviously, administrators can choose to drop enabled hooks into the
template directory, though, _and_ it is also possible to override
`core.hooksPath`, in which case the new check needs to be disabled.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
1 parent 584de0b
Raw File
url.h 
#ifndef URL_H
#define URL_H

struct strbuf;

int is_url(const char *url);
int is_urlschemechar(int first_flag, int ch);
char *url_decode(const char *url);
char *url_decode_mem(const char *url, int len);

/*
 * Similar to the url_decode_{,mem} methods above, but doesn't assume there
 * is a scheme followed by a : at the start of the string. Instead, %-sequences
 * before any : are also parsed.
 */
char *url_percent_decode(const char *encoded);

char *url_decode_parameter_name(const char **query);
char *url_decode_parameter_value(const char **query);

void end_url_with_slash(struct strbuf *buf, const char *url);
void str_end_url_with_slash(const char *url, char **dest);

#endif /* URL_H */
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