Revision 8ec7791bae1327b1c279c5cd6e929c3b12daaf0a authored by Michael Ellerman on 06 May 2021, 04:49:58 UTC, committed by Michael Ellerman on 14 May 2021, 07:27:36 UTC
The STF (store-to-load forwarding) barrier mitigation can be
enabled/disabled at runtime via a debugfs file (stf_barrier), which
causes the kernel to patch itself to enable/disable the relevant
mitigations.

However depending on which mitigation we're using, it may not be safe to
do that patching while other CPUs are active. For example the following
crash:

  User access of kernel address (c00000003fff5af0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
  segfault (11) at c00000003fff5af0 nip 7fff8ad12198 lr 7fff8ad121f8 code 1
  code: 40820128 e93c00d0 e9290058 7c292840 40810058 38600000 4bfd9a81 e8410018
  code: 2c030006 41810154 3860ffb6 e9210098 <e94d8ff0> 7d295279 39400000 40820a3c

Shows that we returned to userspace without restoring the user r13
value, due to executing the partially patched STF exit code.

Fix it by doing the patching under stop machine. The CPUs that aren't
doing the patching will be spinning in the core of the stop machine
logic. That is currently sufficient for our purposes, because none of
the patching we do is to that code or anywhere in the vicinity.

Fixes: a048a07d7f45 ("powerpc/64s: Add support for a store forwarding barrier at kernel entry/exit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.17+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506044959.1298123-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au

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Raw File
cmac.c
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
 * CMAC: Cipher Block Mode for Authentication
 *
 * Copyright © 2013 Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
 *
 * Based on work by:
 *  Copyright © 2013 Tom St Denis <tstdenis@elliptictech.com>
 * Based on crypto/xcbc.c:
 *  Copyright © 2006 USAGI/WIDE Project,
 *   Author: Kazunori Miyazawa <miyazawa@linux-ipv6.org>
 */

#include <crypto/internal/cipher.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>

/*
 * +------------------------
 * | <parent tfm>
 * +------------------------
 * | cmac_tfm_ctx
 * +------------------------
 * | consts (block size * 2)
 * +------------------------
 */
struct cmac_tfm_ctx {
	struct crypto_cipher *child;
	u8 ctx[];
};

/*
 * +------------------------
 * | <shash desc>
 * +------------------------
 * | cmac_desc_ctx
 * +------------------------
 * | odds (block size)
 * +------------------------
 * | prev (block size)
 * +------------------------
 */
struct cmac_desc_ctx {
	unsigned int len;
	u8 ctx[];
};

static int crypto_cmac_digest_setkey(struct crypto_shash *parent,
				     const u8 *inkey, unsigned int keylen)
{
	unsigned long alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(parent);
	struct cmac_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
	unsigned int bs = crypto_shash_blocksize(parent);
	__be64 *consts = PTR_ALIGN((void *)ctx->ctx,
				   (alignmask | (__alignof__(__be64) - 1)) + 1);
	u64 _const[2];
	int i, err = 0;
	u8 msb_mask, gfmask;

	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->child, inkey, keylen);
	if (err)
		return err;

	/* encrypt the zero block */
	memset(consts, 0, bs);
	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child, (u8 *)consts, (u8 *)consts);

	switch (bs) {
	case 16:
		gfmask = 0x87;
		_const[0] = be64_to_cpu(consts[1]);
		_const[1] = be64_to_cpu(consts[0]);

		/* gf(2^128) multiply zero-ciphertext with u and u^2 */
		for (i = 0; i < 4; i += 2) {
			msb_mask = ((s64)_const[1] >> 63) & gfmask;
			_const[1] = (_const[1] << 1) | (_const[0] >> 63);
			_const[0] = (_const[0] << 1) ^ msb_mask;

			consts[i + 0] = cpu_to_be64(_const[1]);
			consts[i + 1] = cpu_to_be64(_const[0]);
		}

		break;
	case 8:
		gfmask = 0x1B;
		_const[0] = be64_to_cpu(consts[0]);

		/* gf(2^64) multiply zero-ciphertext with u and u^2 */
		for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
			msb_mask = ((s64)_const[0] >> 63) & gfmask;
			_const[0] = (_const[0] << 1) ^ msb_mask;

			consts[i] = cpu_to_be64(_const[0]);
		}

		break;
	}

	return 0;
}

static int crypto_cmac_digest_init(struct shash_desc *pdesc)
{
	unsigned long alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(pdesc->tfm);
	struct cmac_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(pdesc);
	int bs = crypto_shash_blocksize(pdesc->tfm);
	u8 *prev = PTR_ALIGN((void *)ctx->ctx, alignmask + 1) + bs;

	ctx->len = 0;
	memset(prev, 0, bs);

	return 0;
}

static int crypto_cmac_digest_update(struct shash_desc *pdesc, const u8 *p,
				     unsigned int len)
{
	struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm;
	unsigned long alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(parent);
	struct cmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
	struct cmac_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(pdesc);
	struct crypto_cipher *tfm = tctx->child;
	int bs = crypto_shash_blocksize(parent);
	u8 *odds = PTR_ALIGN((void *)ctx->ctx, alignmask + 1);
	u8 *prev = odds + bs;

	/* checking the data can fill the block */
	if ((ctx->len + len) <= bs) {
		memcpy(odds + ctx->len, p, len);
		ctx->len += len;
		return 0;
	}

	/* filling odds with new data and encrypting it */
	memcpy(odds + ctx->len, p, bs - ctx->len);
	len -= bs - ctx->len;
	p += bs - ctx->len;

	crypto_xor(prev, odds, bs);
	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, prev, prev);

	/* clearing the length */
	ctx->len = 0;

	/* encrypting the rest of data */
	while (len > bs) {
		crypto_xor(prev, p, bs);
		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, prev, prev);
		p += bs;
		len -= bs;
	}

	/* keeping the surplus of blocksize */
	if (len) {
		memcpy(odds, p, len);
		ctx->len = len;
	}

	return 0;
}

static int crypto_cmac_digest_final(struct shash_desc *pdesc, u8 *out)
{
	struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm;
	unsigned long alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(parent);
	struct cmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
	struct cmac_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(pdesc);
	struct crypto_cipher *tfm = tctx->child;
	int bs = crypto_shash_blocksize(parent);
	u8 *consts = PTR_ALIGN((void *)tctx->ctx,
			       (alignmask | (__alignof__(__be64) - 1)) + 1);
	u8 *odds = PTR_ALIGN((void *)ctx->ctx, alignmask + 1);
	u8 *prev = odds + bs;
	unsigned int offset = 0;

	if (ctx->len != bs) {
		unsigned int rlen;
		u8 *p = odds + ctx->len;

		*p = 0x80;
		p++;

		rlen = bs - ctx->len - 1;
		if (rlen)
			memset(p, 0, rlen);

		offset += bs;
	}

	crypto_xor(prev, odds, bs);
	crypto_xor(prev, consts + offset, bs);

	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, out, prev);

	return 0;
}

static int cmac_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
	struct crypto_cipher *cipher;
	struct crypto_instance *inst = (void *)tfm->__crt_alg;
	struct crypto_cipher_spawn *spawn = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
	struct cmac_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);

	cipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(spawn);
	if (IS_ERR(cipher))
		return PTR_ERR(cipher);

	ctx->child = cipher;

	return 0;
};

static void cmac_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
	struct cmac_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
	crypto_free_cipher(ctx->child);
}

static int cmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
{
	struct shash_instance *inst;
	struct crypto_cipher_spawn *spawn;
	struct crypto_alg *alg;
	unsigned long alignmask;
	u32 mask;
	int err;

	err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH, &mask);
	if (err)
		return err;

	inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*spawn), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!inst)
		return -ENOMEM;
	spawn = shash_instance_ctx(inst);

	err = crypto_grab_cipher(spawn, shash_crypto_instance(inst),
				 crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]), 0, mask);
	if (err)
		goto err_free_inst;
	alg = crypto_spawn_cipher_alg(spawn);

	switch (alg->cra_blocksize) {
	case 16:
	case 8:
		break;
	default:
		err = -EINVAL;
		goto err_free_inst;
	}

	err = crypto_inst_setname(shash_crypto_instance(inst), tmpl->name, alg);
	if (err)
		goto err_free_inst;

	alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
	inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alignmask;
	inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
	inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;

	inst->alg.digestsize = alg->cra_blocksize;
	inst->alg.descsize =
		ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmac_desc_ctx), crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment())
		+ (alignmask & ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1))
		+ alg->cra_blocksize * 2;

	inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize =
		ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmac_tfm_ctx), crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment())
		+ ((alignmask | (__alignof__(__be64) - 1)) &
		   ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1))
		+ alg->cra_blocksize * 2;

	inst->alg.base.cra_init = cmac_init_tfm;
	inst->alg.base.cra_exit = cmac_exit_tfm;

	inst->alg.init = crypto_cmac_digest_init;
	inst->alg.update = crypto_cmac_digest_update;
	inst->alg.final = crypto_cmac_digest_final;
	inst->alg.setkey = crypto_cmac_digest_setkey;

	inst->free = shash_free_singlespawn_instance;

	err = shash_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
	if (err) {
err_free_inst:
		shash_free_singlespawn_instance(inst);
	}
	return err;
}

static struct crypto_template crypto_cmac_tmpl = {
	.name = "cmac",
	.create = cmac_create,
	.module = THIS_MODULE,
};

static int __init crypto_cmac_module_init(void)
{
	return crypto_register_template(&crypto_cmac_tmpl);
}

static void __exit crypto_cmac_module_exit(void)
{
	crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_cmac_tmpl);
}

subsys_initcall(crypto_cmac_module_init);
module_exit(crypto_cmac_module_exit);

MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("CMAC keyed hash algorithm");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cmac");
MODULE_IMPORT_NS(CRYPTO_INTERNAL);
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