Revision aba91192ae39cd1a2f79e7ed91e966df3cfe10b7 authored by Carlos Rica on 09 September 2007, 00:39:29 UTC, committed by Junio C Hamano on 10 September 2007, 04:30:54 UTC
Most of this patch code and message was written by Shawn O. Pearce. I made some tests to know what the problem was, and then I changed the code related with the SIGPIPE signal. If the user has misconfigured `user.signingkey` in their .git/config or just doesn't have any secret keys on their keyring and they ask for a signed tag with `git tag -s` we better make sure the resulting tag was actually signed by gpg. Prior versions of builtin git-tag allowed this failure to slip by without error as they were not checking the return value of the finish_command() so they did not notice when gpg exited with an error exit status. They also did not fail if gpg produced an empty output or if read_in_full received an error from the read system call while trying to read the pipe back from gpg. Finally, we did not actually honor any return value from the do_sign function as it returns ssize_t but was being stored into an unsigned long. This caused the compiler to optimize out the die condition, allowing git-tag to continue along and create the tag object. However, when gpg gets a wrong username, it exits before any read was done and then the writing process receives SIGPIPE and program is terminated. By ignoring this signal, anyway, the function write_or_die gets EPIPE from write_in_full and exits returning 0 to the system without a message. Here we better call to write_in_full directly so we can fail printing a message and return safely to the caller. With these issues fixed `git-tag -s` will now fail to create the tag and will report a non-zero exit status to its caller, thereby allowing automated helper scripts to detect (and recover from) failure if gpg is not working properly. Proposed-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Carlos Rica <jasampler@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
1 parent 7b02b85
show-index.c
#include "cache.h"
#include "pack.h"
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int i;
unsigned nr;
unsigned int version;
static unsigned int top_index[256];
if (fread(top_index, 2 * 4, 1, stdin) != 1)
die("unable to read header");
if (top_index[0] == htonl(PACK_IDX_SIGNATURE)) {
version = ntohl(top_index[1]);
if (version < 2 || version > 2)
die("unknown index version");
if (fread(top_index, 256 * 4, 1, stdin) != 1)
die("unable to read index");
} else {
version = 1;
if (fread(&top_index[2], 254 * 4, 1, stdin) != 1)
die("unable to read index");
}
nr = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
unsigned n = ntohl(top_index[i]);
if (n < nr)
die("corrupt index file");
nr = n;
}
if (version == 1) {
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++) {
unsigned int offset, entry[6];
if (fread(entry, 4 + 20, 1, stdin) != 1)
die("unable to read entry %u/%u", i, nr);
offset = ntohl(entry[0]);
printf("%u %s\n", offset, sha1_to_hex((void *)(entry+1)));
}
} else {
unsigned off64_nr = 0;
struct {
unsigned char sha1[20];
uint32_t crc;
uint32_t off;
} *entries = xmalloc(nr * sizeof(entries[0]));
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++)
if (fread(entries[i].sha1, 20, 1, stdin) != 1)
die("unable to read sha1 %u/%u", i, nr);
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++)
if (fread(&entries[i].crc, 4, 1, stdin) != 1)
die("unable to read crc %u/%u", i, nr);
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++)
if (fread(&entries[i].off, 4, 1, stdin) != 1)
die("unable to read 32b offset %u/%u", i, nr);
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++) {
uint64_t offset;
uint32_t off = ntohl(entries[i].off);
if (!(off & 0x80000000)) {
offset = off;
} else {
uint32_t off64[2];
if ((off & 0x7fffffff) != off64_nr)
die("inconsistent 64b offset index");
if (fread(off64, 8, 1, stdin) != 1)
die("unable to read 64b offset %u", off64_nr);
offset = (((uint64_t)ntohl(off64[0])) << 32) |
ntohl(off64[1]);
off64_nr++;
}
printf("%llu %s (%08x)\n", (unsigned long long) offset,
sha1_to_hex(entries[i].sha1),
ntohl(entries[i].crc));
}
free(entries);
}
return 0;
}
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