Revision b3118bdc91876cbc04b7e81dcf7bea71d86ce4f8 authored by Shawn O. Pearce on 14 October 2009, 14:23:51 UTC, committed by Junio C Hamano on 14 October 2009, 20:39:37 UTC
Some types of corruption to a pack may confuse the deflate stream
which stores an object.  In Andy's reported case a 36 byte region
of the pack was overwritten, leading to what appeared to be a valid
deflate stream that was trying to produce a result larger than our
allocated output buffer could accept.

Z_BUF_ERROR is returned from inflate() if either the input buffer
needs more input bytes, or the output buffer has run out of space.
Previously we only considered the former case, as it meant we needed
to move the stream's input buffer to the next window in the pack.

We now abort the loop if inflate() returns Z_BUF_ERROR without
consuming the entire input buffer it was given, or has filled
the entire output buffer but has not yet returned Z_STREAM_END.
Either state is a clear indicator that this loop is not working
as expected, and should not continue.

This problem cannot occur with loose objects as we open the entire
loose object as a single buffer and treat Z_BUF_ERROR as an error.

Reported-by: Andy Isaacson <adi@hexapodia.org>
Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@fluxnic.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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pack.h
#ifndef PACK_H
#define PACK_H

#include "object.h"

/*
 * Packed object header
 */
#define PACK_SIGNATURE 0x5041434b	/* "PACK" */
#define PACK_VERSION 2
#define pack_version_ok(v) ((v) == htonl(2) || (v) == htonl(3))
struct pack_header {
	uint32_t hdr_signature;
	uint32_t hdr_version;
	uint32_t hdr_entries;
};

/*
 * The first four bytes of index formats later than version 1 should
 * start with this signature, as all older git binaries would find this
 * value illegal and abort reading the file.
 *
 * This is the case because the number of objects in a packfile
 * cannot exceed 1,431,660,000 as every object would need at least
 * 3 bytes of data and the overall packfile cannot exceed 4 GiB with
 * version 1 of the index file due to the offsets limited to 32 bits.
 * Clearly the signature exceeds this maximum.
 *
 * Very old git binaries will also compare the first 4 bytes to the
 * next 4 bytes in the index and abort with a "non-monotonic index"
 * error if the second 4 byte word is smaller than the first 4
 * byte word.  This would be true in the proposed future index
 * format as idx_signature would be greater than idx_version.
 */
#define PACK_IDX_SIGNATURE 0xff744f63	/* "\377tOc" */

/* These may be overridden by command-line parameters */
extern uint32_t pack_idx_default_version;
extern uint32_t pack_idx_off32_limit;

/*
 * Packed object index header
 */
struct pack_idx_header {
	uint32_t idx_signature;
	uint32_t idx_version;
};

/*
 * Common part of object structure used for write_idx_file
 */
struct pack_idx_entry {
	unsigned char sha1[20];
	uint32_t crc32;
	off_t offset;
};

extern char *write_idx_file(char *index_name, struct pack_idx_entry **objects, int nr_objects, unsigned char *sha1);
extern int check_pack_crc(struct packed_git *p, struct pack_window **w_curs, off_t offset, off_t len, unsigned int nr);
extern int verify_pack(struct packed_git *);
extern void fixup_pack_header_footer(int, unsigned char *, const char *, uint32_t, unsigned char *, off_t);
extern char *index_pack_lockfile(int fd);

#define PH_ERROR_EOF		(-1)
#define PH_ERROR_PACK_SIGNATURE	(-2)
#define PH_ERROR_PROTOCOL	(-3)
extern int read_pack_header(int fd, struct pack_header *);
#endif
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