Revision b4a2fdc9bdc87fc8bd62e8bf7890482c590e558c authored by SZEDER Gábor on 31 December 2017, 10:12:04 UTC, committed by Junio C Hamano on 02 January 2018, 19:25:57 UTC
It seems that Travis CI creates the cache directory for us anyway,
even when a previous cache doesn't exist for the current build job.
Alas, this behavior is not explicitly documented, therefore we don't
rely on it and create the cache directory ourselves in those build
jobs that read/write cached data (currently only the prove state).

In the following commit we'll start to cache additional data in every
build job, and will access the cache much earlier in the build
process.

Therefore move creating the cache directory to 'ci/lib-travisci.sh' to
make sure that it exists at the very beginning of every build job.

Signed-off-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Lars Schneider <larsxschneider@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
1 parent 495ea6c
Raw File
credential-store.c
#include "cache.h"
#include "lockfile.h"
#include "credential.h"
#include "string-list.h"
#include "parse-options.h"

static struct lock_file credential_lock;

static int parse_credential_file(const char *fn,
				  struct credential *c,
				  void (*match_cb)(struct credential *),
				  void (*other_cb)(struct strbuf *))
{
	FILE *fh;
	struct strbuf line = STRBUF_INIT;
	struct credential entry = CREDENTIAL_INIT;
	int found_credential = 0;

	fh = fopen(fn, "r");
	if (!fh) {
		if (errno != ENOENT && errno != EACCES)
			die_errno("unable to open %s", fn);
		return found_credential;
	}

	while (strbuf_getline_lf(&line, fh) != EOF) {
		credential_from_url(&entry, line.buf);
		if (entry.username && entry.password &&
		    credential_match(c, &entry)) {
			found_credential = 1;
			if (match_cb) {
				match_cb(&entry);
				break;
			}
		}
		else if (other_cb)
			other_cb(&line);
	}

	credential_clear(&entry);
	strbuf_release(&line);
	fclose(fh);
	return found_credential;
}

static void print_entry(struct credential *c)
{
	printf("username=%s\n", c->username);
	printf("password=%s\n", c->password);
}

static void print_line(struct strbuf *buf)
{
	strbuf_addch(buf, '\n');
	write_or_die(get_lock_file_fd(&credential_lock), buf->buf, buf->len);
}

static void rewrite_credential_file(const char *fn, struct credential *c,
				    struct strbuf *extra)
{
	if (hold_lock_file_for_update(&credential_lock, fn, 0) < 0)
		die_errno("unable to get credential storage lock");
	if (extra)
		print_line(extra);
	parse_credential_file(fn, c, NULL, print_line);
	if (commit_lock_file(&credential_lock) < 0)
		die_errno("unable to write credential store");
}

static void store_credential_file(const char *fn, struct credential *c)
{
	struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;

	strbuf_addf(&buf, "%s://", c->protocol);
	strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&buf, c->username, 1);
	strbuf_addch(&buf, ':');
	strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&buf, c->password, 1);
	strbuf_addch(&buf, '@');
	if (c->host)
		strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&buf, c->host, 1);
	if (c->path) {
		strbuf_addch(&buf, '/');
		strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&buf, c->path, 0);
	}

	rewrite_credential_file(fn, c, &buf);
	strbuf_release(&buf);
}

static void store_credential(const struct string_list *fns, struct credential *c)
{
	struct string_list_item *fn;

	/*
	 * Sanity check that what we are storing is actually sensible.
	 * In particular, we can't make a URL without a protocol field.
	 * Without either a host or pathname (depending on the scheme),
	 * we have no primary key. And without a username and password,
	 * we are not actually storing a credential.
	 */
	if (!c->protocol || !(c->host || c->path) || !c->username || !c->password)
		return;

	for_each_string_list_item(fn, fns)
		if (!access(fn->string, F_OK)) {
			store_credential_file(fn->string, c);
			return;
		}
	/*
	 * Write credential to the filename specified by fns->items[0], thus
	 * creating it
	 */
	if (fns->nr)
		store_credential_file(fns->items[0].string, c);
}

static void remove_credential(const struct string_list *fns, struct credential *c)
{
	struct string_list_item *fn;

	/*
	 * Sanity check that we actually have something to match
	 * against. The input we get is a restrictive pattern,
	 * so technically a blank credential means "erase everything".
	 * But it is too easy to accidentally send this, since it is equivalent
	 * to empty input. So explicitly disallow it, and require that the
	 * pattern have some actual content to match.
	 */
	if (!c->protocol && !c->host && !c->path && !c->username)
		return;
	for_each_string_list_item(fn, fns)
		if (!access(fn->string, F_OK))
			rewrite_credential_file(fn->string, c, NULL);
}

static void lookup_credential(const struct string_list *fns, struct credential *c)
{
	struct string_list_item *fn;

	for_each_string_list_item(fn, fns)
		if (parse_credential_file(fn->string, c, print_entry, NULL))
			return; /* Found credential */
}

int cmd_main(int argc, const char **argv)
{
	const char * const usage[] = {
		"git credential-store [<options>] <action>",
		NULL
	};
	const char *op;
	struct credential c = CREDENTIAL_INIT;
	struct string_list fns = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP;
	char *file = NULL;
	struct option options[] = {
		OPT_STRING(0, "file", &file, "path",
			   "fetch and store credentials in <path>"),
		OPT_END()
	};

	umask(077);

	argc = parse_options(argc, (const char **)argv, NULL, options, usage, 0);
	if (argc != 1)
		usage_with_options(usage, options);
	op = argv[0];

	if (file) {
		string_list_append(&fns, file);
	} else {
		if ((file = expand_user_path("~/.git-credentials", 0)))
			string_list_append_nodup(&fns, file);
		file = xdg_config_home("credentials");
		if (file)
			string_list_append_nodup(&fns, file);
	}
	if (!fns.nr)
		die("unable to set up default path; use --file");

	if (credential_read(&c, stdin) < 0)
		die("unable to read credential");

	if (!strcmp(op, "get"))
		lookup_credential(&fns, &c);
	else if (!strcmp(op, "erase"))
		remove_credential(&fns, &c);
	else if (!strcmp(op, "store"))
		store_credential(&fns, &c);
	else
		; /* Ignore unknown operation. */

	string_list_clear(&fns, 0);
	return 0;
}
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