Revision ba91c49dedbde758ba0b72f57ac90b06ddf8e548 authored by Maxim Mikityanskiy on 10 June 2021, 16:40:31 UTC, committed by David S. Miller on 10 June 2021, 21:26:18 UTC
The TCP option parser in cake qdisc (cake_get_tcpopt and
cake_tcph_may_drop) could read one byte out of bounds. When the length
is 1, the execution flow gets into the loop, reads one byte of the
opcode, and if the opcode is neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads
one more byte, which exceeds the length of 1.

This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263f8 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack
out of bounds when parsing TCP options.").

v2 changes:

Added doff validation in cake_get_tcphdr to avoid parsing garbage as TCP
header. Although it wasn't strictly an out-of-bounds access (memory was
allocated), garbage values could be read where CAKE expected the TCP
header if doff was smaller than 5.

Cc: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8b7138814f29 ("sch_cake: Add optional ACK filter")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
1 parent 07718be
Raw File
ecdh.c
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/* ECDH key-agreement protocol
 *
 * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation
 * Authors: Salvator Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com>
 */

#include <linux/module.h>
#include <crypto/internal/kpp.h>
#include <crypto/kpp.h>
#include <crypto/ecdh.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include "ecc.h"

struct ecdh_ctx {
	unsigned int curve_id;
	unsigned int ndigits;
	u64 private_key[ECC_MAX_DIGITS];
};

static inline struct ecdh_ctx *ecdh_get_ctx(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
{
	return kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
}

static int ecdh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
			   unsigned int len)
{
	struct ecdh_ctx *ctx = ecdh_get_ctx(tfm);
	struct ecdh params;

	if (crypto_ecdh_decode_key(buf, len, &params) < 0 ||
	    params.key_size > sizeof(u64) * ctx->ndigits)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (!params.key || !params.key_size)
		return ecc_gen_privkey(ctx->curve_id, ctx->ndigits,
				       ctx->private_key);

	memcpy(ctx->private_key, params.key, params.key_size);

	if (ecc_is_key_valid(ctx->curve_id, ctx->ndigits,
			     ctx->private_key, params.key_size) < 0) {
		memzero_explicit(ctx->private_key, params.key_size);
		return -EINVAL;
	}
	return 0;
}

static int ecdh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req)
{
	struct crypto_kpp *tfm = crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req);
	struct ecdh_ctx *ctx = ecdh_get_ctx(tfm);
	u64 *public_key;
	u64 *shared_secret = NULL;
	void *buf;
	size_t copied, nbytes, public_key_sz;
	int ret = -ENOMEM;

	nbytes = ctx->ndigits << ECC_DIGITS_TO_BYTES_SHIFT;
	/* Public part is a point thus it has both coordinates */
	public_key_sz = 2 * nbytes;

	public_key = kmalloc(public_key_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!public_key)
		return -ENOMEM;

	if (req->src) {
		shared_secret = kmalloc(nbytes, GFP_KERNEL);
		if (!shared_secret)
			goto free_pubkey;

		/* from here on it's invalid parameters */
		ret = -EINVAL;

		/* must have exactly two points to be on the curve */
		if (public_key_sz != req->src_len)
			goto free_all;

		copied = sg_copy_to_buffer(req->src,
					   sg_nents_for_len(req->src,
							    public_key_sz),
					   public_key, public_key_sz);
		if (copied != public_key_sz)
			goto free_all;

		ret = crypto_ecdh_shared_secret(ctx->curve_id, ctx->ndigits,
						ctx->private_key, public_key,
						shared_secret);

		buf = shared_secret;
	} else {
		ret = ecc_make_pub_key(ctx->curve_id, ctx->ndigits,
				       ctx->private_key, public_key);
		buf = public_key;
		nbytes = public_key_sz;
	}

	if (ret < 0)
		goto free_all;

	/* might want less than we've got */
	nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, req->dst_len);
	copied = sg_copy_from_buffer(req->dst, sg_nents_for_len(req->dst,
								nbytes),
				     buf, nbytes);
	if (copied != nbytes)
		ret = -EINVAL;

	/* fall through */
free_all:
	kfree_sensitive(shared_secret);
free_pubkey:
	kfree(public_key);
	return ret;
}

static unsigned int ecdh_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
{
	struct ecdh_ctx *ctx = ecdh_get_ctx(tfm);

	/* Public key is made of two coordinates, add one to the left shift */
	return ctx->ndigits << (ECC_DIGITS_TO_BYTES_SHIFT + 1);
}

static int ecdh_nist_p192_init_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
{
	struct ecdh_ctx *ctx = ecdh_get_ctx(tfm);

	ctx->curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P192;
	ctx->ndigits = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P192_DIGITS;

	return 0;
}

static struct kpp_alg ecdh_nist_p192 = {
	.set_secret = ecdh_set_secret,
	.generate_public_key = ecdh_compute_value,
	.compute_shared_secret = ecdh_compute_value,
	.max_size = ecdh_max_size,
	.init = ecdh_nist_p192_init_tfm,
	.base = {
		.cra_name = "ecdh-nist-p192",
		.cra_driver_name = "ecdh-generic",
		.cra_priority = 100,
		.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
		.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct ecdh_ctx),
	},
};

static int ecdh_nist_p256_init_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
{
	struct ecdh_ctx *ctx = ecdh_get_ctx(tfm);

	ctx->curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
	ctx->ndigits = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256_DIGITS;

	return 0;
}

static struct kpp_alg ecdh_nist_p256 = {
	.set_secret = ecdh_set_secret,
	.generate_public_key = ecdh_compute_value,
	.compute_shared_secret = ecdh_compute_value,
	.max_size = ecdh_max_size,
	.init = ecdh_nist_p256_init_tfm,
	.base = {
		.cra_name = "ecdh-nist-p256",
		.cra_driver_name = "ecdh-generic",
		.cra_priority = 100,
		.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
		.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct ecdh_ctx),
	},
};

static bool ecdh_nist_p192_registered;

static int ecdh_init(void)
{
	int ret;

	ret = crypto_register_kpp(&ecdh_nist_p192);
	ecdh_nist_p192_registered = ret == 0;

	return crypto_register_kpp(&ecdh_nist_p256);
}

static void ecdh_exit(void)
{
	if (ecdh_nist_p192_registered)
		crypto_unregister_kpp(&ecdh_nist_p192);
	crypto_unregister_kpp(&ecdh_nist_p256);
}

subsys_initcall(ecdh_init);
module_exit(ecdh_exit);
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ecdh");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ECDH generic algorithm");
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