Revision da353fac65fede6b8b4cfe207f0d9408e3121105 authored by Daniel Jordan on 27 October 2021, 21:59:20 UTC, committed by David S. Miller on 28 October 2021, 13:41:20 UTC
sk->sk_err appears to expect a positive value, a convention that ktls doesn't always follow and that leads to memory corruption in other code. For instance, [kworker] tls_encrypt_done(..., err=<negative error from crypto request>) tls_err_abort(.., err) sk->sk_err = err; [task] splice_from_pipe_feed ... tls_sw_do_sendpage if (sk->sk_err) { ret = -sk->sk_err; // ret is positive splice_from_pipe_feed (continued) ret = actor(...) // ret is still positive and interpreted as bytes // written, resulting in underflow of buf->len and // sd->len, leading to huge buf->offset and bogus // addresses computed in later calls to actor() Fix all tls_err_abort() callers to pass a negative error code consistently and centralize the error-prone sign flip there, throwing in a warning to catch future misuse and uninlining the function so it really does only warn once. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c46234ebb4d1e ("tls: RX path for ktls") Reported-by: syzbot+b187b77c8474f9648fae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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File | Mode | Size |
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asymmetric-parser.h | -rw-r--r-- | 981 bytes |
asymmetric-subtype.h | -rw-r--r-- | 1.7 KB |
asymmetric-type.h | -rw-r--r-- | 2.8 KB |
big_key-type.h | -rw-r--r-- | 816 bytes |
ceph-type.h | -rw-r--r-- | 162 bytes |
dns_resolver-type.h | -rw-r--r-- | 482 bytes |
encrypted-type.h | -rw-r--r-- | 1.1 KB |
keyring-type.h | -rw-r--r-- | 337 bytes |
request_key_auth-type.h | -rw-r--r-- | 747 bytes |
rxrpc-type.h | -rw-r--r-- | 2.3 KB |
system_keyring.h | -rw-r--r-- | 2.5 KB |
trusted-type.h | -rw-r--r-- | 2.2 KB |
trusted_tee.h | -rw-r--r-- | 286 bytes |
trusted_tpm.h | -rw-r--r-- | 2.7 KB |
user-type.h | -rw-r--r-- | 1.9 KB |
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