Revision ec3937107ab43f3e8b2bc9dad95710043c462ff7 authored by Baoquan He on 04 April 2019, 02:03:13 UTC, committed by Borislav Petkov on 18 April 2019, 08:42:58 UTC
kernel_randomize_memory() uses __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT to calculate
the maximum amount of system RAM supported. The size of the direct
mapping section is obtained from the smaller one of the below two
values:

  (actual system RAM size + padding size) vs (max system RAM size supported)

This calculation is wrong since commit

  b83ce5ee9147 ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52").

In it, __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT was changed to be 52, regardless of whether
the kernel is using 4-level or 5-level page tables. Thus, it will always
use 4 PB as the maximum amount of system RAM, even in 4-level paging
mode where it should actually be 64 TB.

Thus, the size of the direct mapping section will always
be the sum of the actual system RAM size plus the padding size.

Even when the amount of system RAM is 64 TB, the following layout will
still be used. Obviously KALSR will be weakened significantly.

   |____|_______actual RAM_______|_padding_|______the rest_______|
   0            64TB                                            ~120TB

Instead, it should be like this:

   |____|_______actual RAM_______|_________the rest______________|
   0            64TB                                            ~120TB

The size of padding region is controlled by
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING, which is 10 TB by default.

The above issue only exists when
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING is set to a non-zero value,
which is the case when CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is enabled. Otherwise,
using __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT doesn't affect KASLR.

Fix it by replacing __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT with MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS.

 [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Fixes: b83ce5ee9147 ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52")
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: frank.ramsay@hpe.com
Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au
Cc: kirill@shutemov.name
Cc: mike.travis@hpe.com
Cc: thgarnie@google.com
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417083536.GE7065@MiWiFi-R3L-srv
1 parent a943245
Raw File
ecc.h
/*
 * Copyright (c) 2013, Kenneth MacKay
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
 * met:
 *  * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 *  * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
 * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
 * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
 * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
 * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */
#ifndef _CRYPTO_ECC_H
#define _CRYPTO_ECC_H

#define ECC_CURVE_NIST_P192_DIGITS  3
#define ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256_DIGITS  4
#define ECC_MAX_DIGITS              ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256_DIGITS

#define ECC_DIGITS_TO_BYTES_SHIFT 3

/**
 * ecc_is_key_valid() - Validate a given ECDH private key
 *
 * @curve_id:		id representing the curve to use
 * @ndigits:		curve's number of digits
 * @private_key:	private key to be used for the given curve
 * @private_key_len:	private key length
 *
 * Returns 0 if the key is acceptable, a negative value otherwise
 */
int ecc_is_key_valid(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits,
		     const u64 *private_key, unsigned int private_key_len);

/**
 * ecc_gen_privkey() -  Generates an ECC private key.
 * The private key is a random integer in the range 0 < random < n, where n is a
 * prime that is the order of the cyclic subgroup generated by the distinguished
 * point G.
 * @curve_id:		id representing the curve to use
 * @ndigits:		curve number of digits
 * @private_key:	buffer for storing the generated private key
 *
 * Returns 0 if the private key was generated successfully, a negative value
 * if an error occurred.
 */
int ecc_gen_privkey(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits, u64 *privkey);

/**
 * ecc_make_pub_key() - Compute an ECC public key
 *
 * @curve_id:		id representing the curve to use
 * @ndigits:		curve's number of digits
 * @private_key:	pregenerated private key for the given curve
 * @public_key:		buffer for storing the generated public key
 *
 * Returns 0 if the public key was generated successfully, a negative value
 * if an error occurred.
 */
int ecc_make_pub_key(const unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits,
		     const u64 *private_key, u64 *public_key);

/**
 * crypto_ecdh_shared_secret() - Compute a shared secret
 *
 * @curve_id:		id representing the curve to use
 * @ndigits:		curve's number of digits
 * @private_key:	private key of part A
 * @public_key:		public key of counterpart B
 * @secret:		buffer for storing the calculated shared secret
 *
 * Note: It is recommended that you hash the result of crypto_ecdh_shared_secret
 * before using it for symmetric encryption or HMAC.
 *
 * Returns 0 if the shared secret was generated successfully, a negative value
 * if an error occurred.
 */
int crypto_ecdh_shared_secret(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits,
			      const u64 *private_key, const u64 *public_key,
			      u64 *secret);
#endif
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