Revision ec3937107ab43f3e8b2bc9dad95710043c462ff7 authored by Baoquan He on 04 April 2019, 02:03:13 UTC, committed by Borislav Petkov on 18 April 2019, 08:42:58 UTC
kernel_randomize_memory() uses __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT to calculate the maximum amount of system RAM supported. The size of the direct mapping section is obtained from the smaller one of the below two values: (actual system RAM size + padding size) vs (max system RAM size supported) This calculation is wrong since commit b83ce5ee9147 ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52"). In it, __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT was changed to be 52, regardless of whether the kernel is using 4-level or 5-level page tables. Thus, it will always use 4 PB as the maximum amount of system RAM, even in 4-level paging mode where it should actually be 64 TB. Thus, the size of the direct mapping section will always be the sum of the actual system RAM size plus the padding size. Even when the amount of system RAM is 64 TB, the following layout will still be used. Obviously KALSR will be weakened significantly. |____|_______actual RAM_______|_padding_|______the rest_______| 0 64TB ~120TB Instead, it should be like this: |____|_______actual RAM_______|_________the rest______________| 0 64TB ~120TB The size of padding region is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING, which is 10 TB by default. The above issue only exists when CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING is set to a non-zero value, which is the case when CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is enabled. Otherwise, using __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT doesn't affect KASLR. Fix it by replacing __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT with MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: b83ce5ee9147 ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52") Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: frank.ramsay@hpe.com Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Cc: kirill@shutemov.name Cc: mike.travis@hpe.com Cc: thgarnie@google.com Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417083536.GE7065@MiWiFi-R3L-srv
1 parent a943245
sm4_generic.c
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* SM4 Cipher Algorithm.
*
* Copyright (C) 2018 ARM Limited or its affiliates.
* All rights reserved.
*/
#include <crypto/sm4.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
static const u32 fk[4] = {
0xa3b1bac6, 0x56aa3350, 0x677d9197, 0xb27022dc
};
static const u8 sbox[256] = {
0xd6, 0x90, 0xe9, 0xfe, 0xcc, 0xe1, 0x3d, 0xb7,
0x16, 0xb6, 0x14, 0xc2, 0x28, 0xfb, 0x2c, 0x05,
0x2b, 0x67, 0x9a, 0x76, 0x2a, 0xbe, 0x04, 0xc3,
0xaa, 0x44, 0x13, 0x26, 0x49, 0x86, 0x06, 0x99,
0x9c, 0x42, 0x50, 0xf4, 0x91, 0xef, 0x98, 0x7a,
0x33, 0x54, 0x0b, 0x43, 0xed, 0xcf, 0xac, 0x62,
0xe4, 0xb3, 0x1c, 0xa9, 0xc9, 0x08, 0xe8, 0x95,
0x80, 0xdf, 0x94, 0xfa, 0x75, 0x8f, 0x3f, 0xa6,
0x47, 0x07, 0xa7, 0xfc, 0xf3, 0x73, 0x17, 0xba,
0x83, 0x59, 0x3c, 0x19, 0xe6, 0x85, 0x4f, 0xa8,
0x68, 0x6b, 0x81, 0xb2, 0x71, 0x64, 0xda, 0x8b,
0xf8, 0xeb, 0x0f, 0x4b, 0x70, 0x56, 0x9d, 0x35,
0x1e, 0x24, 0x0e, 0x5e, 0x63, 0x58, 0xd1, 0xa2,
0x25, 0x22, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x01, 0x21, 0x78, 0x87,
0xd4, 0x00, 0x46, 0x57, 0x9f, 0xd3, 0x27, 0x52,
0x4c, 0x36, 0x02, 0xe7, 0xa0, 0xc4, 0xc8, 0x9e,
0xea, 0xbf, 0x8a, 0xd2, 0x40, 0xc7, 0x38, 0xb5,
0xa3, 0xf7, 0xf2, 0xce, 0xf9, 0x61, 0x15, 0xa1,
0xe0, 0xae, 0x5d, 0xa4, 0x9b, 0x34, 0x1a, 0x55,
0xad, 0x93, 0x32, 0x30, 0xf5, 0x8c, 0xb1, 0xe3,
0x1d, 0xf6, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x82, 0x66, 0xca, 0x60,
0xc0, 0x29, 0x23, 0xab, 0x0d, 0x53, 0x4e, 0x6f,
0xd5, 0xdb, 0x37, 0x45, 0xde, 0xfd, 0x8e, 0x2f,
0x03, 0xff, 0x6a, 0x72, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0x5b, 0x51,
0x8d, 0x1b, 0xaf, 0x92, 0xbb, 0xdd, 0xbc, 0x7f,
0x11, 0xd9, 0x5c, 0x41, 0x1f, 0x10, 0x5a, 0xd8,
0x0a, 0xc1, 0x31, 0x88, 0xa5, 0xcd, 0x7b, 0xbd,
0x2d, 0x74, 0xd0, 0x12, 0xb8, 0xe5, 0xb4, 0xb0,
0x89, 0x69, 0x97, 0x4a, 0x0c, 0x96, 0x77, 0x7e,
0x65, 0xb9, 0xf1, 0x09, 0xc5, 0x6e, 0xc6, 0x84,
0x18, 0xf0, 0x7d, 0xec, 0x3a, 0xdc, 0x4d, 0x20,
0x79, 0xee, 0x5f, 0x3e, 0xd7, 0xcb, 0x39, 0x48
};
static const u32 ck[] = {
0x00070e15, 0x1c232a31, 0x383f464d, 0x545b6269,
0x70777e85, 0x8c939aa1, 0xa8afb6bd, 0xc4cbd2d9,
0xe0e7eef5, 0xfc030a11, 0x181f262d, 0x343b4249,
0x50575e65, 0x6c737a81, 0x888f969d, 0xa4abb2b9,
0xc0c7ced5, 0xdce3eaf1, 0xf8ff060d, 0x141b2229,
0x30373e45, 0x4c535a61, 0x686f767d, 0x848b9299,
0xa0a7aeb5, 0xbcc3cad1, 0xd8dfe6ed, 0xf4fb0209,
0x10171e25, 0x2c333a41, 0x484f565d, 0x646b7279
};
static u32 sm4_t_non_lin_sub(u32 x)
{
int i;
u8 *b = (u8 *)&x;
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
b[i] = sbox[b[i]];
return x;
}
static u32 sm4_key_lin_sub(u32 x)
{
return x ^ rol32(x, 13) ^ rol32(x, 23);
}
static u32 sm4_enc_lin_sub(u32 x)
{
return x ^ rol32(x, 2) ^ rol32(x, 10) ^ rol32(x, 18) ^ rol32(x, 24);
}
static u32 sm4_key_sub(u32 x)
{
return sm4_key_lin_sub(sm4_t_non_lin_sub(x));
}
static u32 sm4_enc_sub(u32 x)
{
return sm4_enc_lin_sub(sm4_t_non_lin_sub(x));
}
static u32 sm4_round(const u32 *x, const u32 rk)
{
return x[0] ^ sm4_enc_sub(x[1] ^ x[2] ^ x[3] ^ rk);
}
/**
* crypto_sm4_expand_key - Expands the SM4 key as described in GB/T 32907-2016
* @ctx: The location where the computed key will be stored.
* @in_key: The supplied key.
* @key_len: The length of the supplied key.
*
* Returns 0 on success. The function fails only if an invalid key size (or
* pointer) is supplied.
*/
int crypto_sm4_expand_key(struct crypto_sm4_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
u32 rk[4], t;
const u32 *key = (u32 *)in_key;
int i;
if (key_len != SM4_KEY_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
rk[i] = get_unaligned_be32(&key[i]) ^ fk[i];
for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
t = rk[0] ^ sm4_key_sub(rk[1] ^ rk[2] ^ rk[3] ^ ck[i]);
ctx->rkey_enc[i] = t;
rk[0] = rk[1];
rk[1] = rk[2];
rk[2] = rk[3];
rk[3] = t;
}
for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i)
ctx->rkey_dec[i] = ctx->rkey_enc[31 - i];
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_sm4_expand_key);
/**
* crypto_sm4_set_key - Set the AES key.
* @tfm: The %crypto_tfm that is used in the context.
* @in_key: The input key.
* @key_len: The size of the key.
*
* Returns 0 on success, on failure the %CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag in tfm
* is set. The function uses crypto_sm4_expand_key() to expand the key.
* &crypto_sm4_ctx _must_ be the private data embedded in @tfm which is
* retrieved with crypto_tfm_ctx().
*/
int crypto_sm4_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
struct crypto_sm4_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
int ret;
ret = crypto_sm4_expand_key(ctx, in_key, key_len);
if (!ret)
return 0;
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
return -EINVAL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_sm4_set_key);
static void sm4_do_crypt(const u32 *rk, u32 *out, const u32 *in)
{
u32 x[4], i, t;
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
x[i] = get_unaligned_be32(&in[i]);
for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
t = sm4_round(x, rk[i]);
x[0] = x[1];
x[1] = x[2];
x[2] = x[3];
x[3] = t;
}
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
put_unaligned_be32(x[3 - i], &out[i]);
}
/* encrypt a block of text */
void crypto_sm4_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
{
const struct crypto_sm4_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
sm4_do_crypt(ctx->rkey_enc, (u32 *)out, (u32 *)in);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_sm4_encrypt);
/* decrypt a block of text */
void crypto_sm4_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
{
const struct crypto_sm4_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
sm4_do_crypt(ctx->rkey_dec, (u32 *)out, (u32 *)in);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_sm4_decrypt);
static struct crypto_alg sm4_alg = {
.cra_name = "sm4",
.cra_driver_name = "sm4-generic",
.cra_priority = 100,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
.cra_blocksize = SM4_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_sm4_ctx),
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
.cra_u = {
.cipher = {
.cia_min_keysize = SM4_KEY_SIZE,
.cia_max_keysize = SM4_KEY_SIZE,
.cia_setkey = crypto_sm4_set_key,
.cia_encrypt = crypto_sm4_encrypt,
.cia_decrypt = crypto_sm4_decrypt
}
}
};
static int __init sm4_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_alg(&sm4_alg);
}
static void __exit sm4_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_alg(&sm4_alg);
}
module_init(sm4_init);
module_exit(sm4_fini);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SM4 Cipher Algorithm");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sm4");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sm4-generic");
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