Revision f53c5de29cec68e3294a008052251631eaffcf07 authored by SZEDER Gábor on 18 March 2017, 18:24:08 UTC, committed by Junio C Hamano on 18 March 2017, 19:22:33 UTC
'git {log,diff,...} -S<...> --pickaxe-regex' can segfault as a result
of out-of-bounds memory reads.

diffcore-pickaxe.c:contains() looks for all matches of the given regex
in a buffer in a loop, advancing the buffer pointer to the end of the
last match in each iteration.  When we switched to REG_STARTEND in
b7d36ffca (regex: use regexec_buf(), 2016-09-21), we started passing
the size of that buffer to the regexp engine, too.  Unfortunately,
this buffer size is never updated on subsequent iterations, and as the
buffer pointer advances on each iteration, this "bufptr+bufsize"
points past the end of the buffer.  This results in segmentation
fault, if that memory can't be accessed.  In case of 'git log' it can
also result in erroneously listed commits, if the memory past the end
of buffer is accessible and happens to contain data matching the
regex.

Reduce the buffer size on each iteration as the buffer pointer is
advanced, thus maintaining the correct end of buffer location.
Furthermore, make sure that the buffer pointer is not dereferenced in
the control flow statements when we already reached the end of the
buffer.

The new test is flaky, I've never seen it fail on my Linux box even
without the fix, but this is expected according to db5dfa3 (regex:
-G<pattern> feeds a non NUL-terminated string to regexec() and fails,
2016-09-21).  However, it did fail on Travis CI with the first (and
incomplete) version of the fix, and based on that commit message I
would expect the new test without the fix to fail most of the time on
Windows.

Signed-off-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
1 parent 842a516
Raw File
pack.h
#ifndef PACK_H
#define PACK_H

#include "object.h"
#include "csum-file.h"

/*
 * Packed object header
 */
#define PACK_SIGNATURE 0x5041434b	/* "PACK" */
#define PACK_VERSION 2
#define pack_version_ok(v) ((v) == htonl(2) || (v) == htonl(3))
struct pack_header {
	uint32_t hdr_signature;
	uint32_t hdr_version;
	uint32_t hdr_entries;
};

/*
 * The first four bytes of index formats later than version 1 should
 * start with this signature, as all older git binaries would find this
 * value illegal and abort reading the file.
 *
 * This is the case because the number of objects in a packfile
 * cannot exceed 1,431,660,000 as every object would need at least
 * 3 bytes of data and the overall packfile cannot exceed 4 GiB with
 * version 1 of the index file due to the offsets limited to 32 bits.
 * Clearly the signature exceeds this maximum.
 *
 * Very old git binaries will also compare the first 4 bytes to the
 * next 4 bytes in the index and abort with a "non-monotonic index"
 * error if the second 4 byte word is smaller than the first 4
 * byte word.  This would be true in the proposed future index
 * format as idx_signature would be greater than idx_version.
 */
#define PACK_IDX_SIGNATURE 0xff744f63	/* "\377tOc" */

struct pack_idx_option {
	unsigned flags;
	/* flag bits */
#define WRITE_IDX_VERIFY 01 /* verify only, do not write the idx file */
#define WRITE_IDX_STRICT 02

	uint32_t version;
	uint32_t off32_limit;

	/*
	 * List of offsets that would fit within off32_limit but
	 * need to be written out as 64-bit entity for byte-for-byte
	 * verification.
	 */
	int anomaly_alloc, anomaly_nr;
	uint32_t *anomaly;
};

extern void reset_pack_idx_option(struct pack_idx_option *);

/*
 * Packed object index header
 */
struct pack_idx_header {
	uint32_t idx_signature;
	uint32_t idx_version;
};

/*
 * Common part of object structure used for write_idx_file
 */
struct pack_idx_entry {
	unsigned char sha1[20];
	uint32_t crc32;
	off_t offset;
};


struct progress;
typedef int (*verify_fn)(const unsigned char*, enum object_type, unsigned long, void*, int*);

extern const char *write_idx_file(const char *index_name, struct pack_idx_entry **objects, int nr_objects, const struct pack_idx_option *, const unsigned char *sha1);
extern int check_pack_crc(struct packed_git *p, struct pack_window **w_curs, off_t offset, off_t len, unsigned int nr);
extern int verify_pack_index(struct packed_git *);
extern int verify_pack(struct packed_git *, verify_fn fn, struct progress *, uint32_t);
extern off_t write_pack_header(struct sha1file *f, uint32_t);
extern void fixup_pack_header_footer(int, unsigned char *, const char *, uint32_t, unsigned char *, off_t);
extern char *index_pack_lockfile(int fd);
extern int encode_in_pack_object_header(enum object_type, uintmax_t, unsigned char *);

#define PH_ERROR_EOF		(-1)
#define PH_ERROR_PACK_SIGNATURE	(-2)
#define PH_ERROR_PROTOCOL	(-3)
extern int read_pack_header(int fd, struct pack_header *);

extern struct sha1file *create_tmp_packfile(char **pack_tmp_name);
extern void finish_tmp_packfile(struct strbuf *name_buffer, const char *pack_tmp_name, struct pack_idx_entry **written_list, uint32_t nr_written, struct pack_idx_option *pack_idx_opts, unsigned char sha1[]);

#endif
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